The Air War in Iraq: Why Is It Off the Media's Radar Screen?
When it came to fantasies and fears of destruction we knew no bounds. As the scholar Stephen Weart has written in Nuclear Fear, A History of Images:
Right from the start [the] new idea of atomic weapons was linked to an even more impressive idea: the end of the world. When [scientist Frederick] Soddy first told the public about atomic energy, in May 1903, he said that our planet is ‘a storehouse stuffed with explosives, inconceivably more powerful than any we know of, and possibly only awaiting a suitable detonator to cause the earth to revert to chaos.' This was an entirely new idea: that it might be technically possible for someone to destroy the world deliberately. Yet the idea slipped into the public mind with suspicious ease… For example, in 1903 the irrepressible Gustave Le Bon got into newspaper Sunday supplements in various countries by imagining a radioactive device that could "blow up the whole earth' at the touch of a button."
In fact, for almost half a century before 1945, such weapons were the property only of science fiction. Michael Sherry in his magisterial (if highly detailed) history, The Rise of American Air Power, offers this comment on the machine that delivered the first of those atomic devices of our imagination to a real city,"More than any other modern weapon, the bomber was imagined before it was invented." Should we be amazed or horrified, proud or ashamed to have so actively imagined a century or more of future horrors of our own making? The imagination worked so quickly, but at least as miraculous was how quickly the inventors and the scientists followed.
I doubt that any invention other than the airplane has so combined the wonder of creation, of the defiance of obvious human limits, and of destruction so intimately and for so long; so long, in fact -- at least to judge from the non-coverage of the air war the Bush administration has unleashed in"postwar" Iraq against heavily populated urban centers -- that we (or our reporters) have evidently simply become inured to the very idea of it. Now, it seems, the wonder and even the horror of air power is largely gone, but the inventions, the destruction, and the carnage remain.
The odd thing is this: No sooner had we human beings risen above the earth in powered flight -- think Icarus -- than we expressed the wonder of that event by dropping bombs from the planes that took us into the heavens. After that, it was just a straight line up (or do I mean down?) for the next near century.
Look at it this way: the Wright Brothers'"whopper flying machine" leaves the beach at Kitty Hawk for the first time on December 17, 1903. That initial flight lasts all of twelve seconds before the plane hits the sand 120 feet away. Later the same day, the plane flies 859 feet in 59 seconds before, on a final flight, it totals itself and is no more. Only five years later, the Wright brothers are demonstrating their new invention in the skies over Washington for the U.S. Army Signal Corps. By 1911, two years short of a decade after its invention, the plane is wedded to the bomb. According to Sven Lindqvist's (irritatingly organized but fascinating) labyrinth of a book, A History of Bombing, one Lieutenant Giulio Cavotti"leaned out of his delicate monoplane and dropped the bomb -- a Danish Haasen hand grenade -- on the North African oasis Tagiura, near Tripoli. Several moments later, he attacked the oasis Ain Zara. Four bombs in total, each weighing two kilos, were dropped during this first air attack."
On the"natives" in the colonies, naturally enough. What better place to test a new weapon? And that first attack, as perhaps befits our temperaments, was, Lindqvist tells us, for revenge, a kind of collective punishment called down upon Arabs who had successfully resisted the advanced rationality (and occupying spirit) of the Italian army. Given where we've ended up, it would be perfectly reasonable to consider this moment the beginning of modern history, even of modernism itself.
A generation, no more, from Kitty Hawk to 1,000-bomber raids over Germany. Another from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to"shock and awe" in Iraq. No more than a blink of history's unseeing eye. Between 1911 and the end of the last bloody century, villages, towns and cities across the Earth were destroyed in copious numbers in part or in full by bombs. Their names could make up a modern chant: Chechaouen, Guernica, Shanghai, London, Coventry, Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Damascus, Pyongyang, Haiphong, Grozny, Baghdad, and now Falluja among too many other places to name (and don't even get me started on the bomb-ravaged colonial countryside of our planet from Kenya to Malaya). Millions and millions of tons of bombs dropped; millions and millions of dead, mostly, of course, civilians.
And from the Japanese and German cities of World War II to the devastated Korean peninsula of the early 1950s, from the ravaged southern Vietnamese countryside of the late 1960s to the"highway of death" on which much of a fleeing Iraqi army was destroyed in the first Gulf War of 1991, air power has been America's signature method of war.
Think of it this way: Imagine the history of the development of the plane and of bombing as, in shape, a giant, extremely top-heavy diamond. In 1903, one fragile plane flies 120 feet. In 1911, another only slightly less fragile plane, still seeming to defy some primordial law, drops a bomb. In 1945, vast air armadas take off to devastate chosen German and Japanese cities. On August 6, 1945, all the power of those armadas are compacted into the belly of the Enola Gay, a lone B-29, which drops its single bomb on Hiroshima, destroying the city and so many of its inhabitants. And then just imagine that the man who commanded the U.S. Army Air Forces, both the armadas and the Enola Gay, General Henry"Hap" Arnold (according Robin Neillands in The Bomber War, The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany),"had been taught to fly by none other than Orville Wright, one of the two men credited with inventing the first viable airplane." Barely more than a generation took us from those 120 feet at Kitty Hawk past thousand-plane bomber fleets to the Enola Gay and the destruction of one city from the air by one bomb. Imagine that.
Then imagine that both civilian plane flight and the killing of enormous numbers of civilians from the air (now subsumed in the term" collateral damage") have over that not-quite-century become completely normal parts of our lives. Too normal, it seems, to spend a lot of time thinking about or even writing fiction about. When we get on a plane today, what do we do --close the window shade and watch a movie on a tiny TV screen or, on certain flights, TV itself in real time as if we were still in our living rooms. So much for either shock or awe. Today, American planes regularly bomb the distant cities of Iraq and no one even seems to notice. No one, not even reporters on the spot, bothers to comment. No one writes a significant word about it. Should we be amazed or horrified, proud or ashamed?
"Hotels had crumbled into the street"
With that in mind, here's the thing in Iraq -- and I'm not sure you can even call it strange: American reporters can now be found embedded with tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle units. ("Captain Paul Fowler sat on the curb next to a deserted gas station," writes Anne Barnard of the Boston Globe."Behind him, smoke rose over Fallujah. His company of tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles had roamed the eastern third of the city [Falluja] for 13 days, shooting holes in every building that might pose a threat, leaving behind a landscape of half-collapsed houses and factories singed with soot. ‘'I really hate that it had to be destroyed. But that was the only way to root these guys out,' said Fowler, 33, the son of a Baptist preacher in North Carolina. ‘The only way to root them out is to destroy everything in your path.'") American reporters can climb aboard Surcs (Small Unit Riverine Craft), high-tech Swift Boat equivalents, as John Burns of the New York Times did recently, to"roar up the Euphrates on a dawn raid." They can follow U.S. patrols as they bust down Iraqi doors looking for insurgents. They can even describe the perilous, missile-avoiding" corkscrew" landings their planes make as they are first delivered to Baghdad International Airport and the IED and suicide car-bomber strewn roadway in from the airport. The only thing they evidently don't do once they get to Iraq -- and I base this solely on the reporting of the war that comes back to us -- is look up. The Iraqi air seems to be filled with all kinds of jets, fearsome AC-130 Spectre gunships, Hellfire-Missile-armed Predator drones, and ubiquitous Apache, Cobra, Lynx, and Puma helicopters that -- now that the highways are so perilous -- are the preferred method of military transport and that seem to hover endlessly over potential urban battlefields.
The Old City of Najaf that abuts the holy Shrine of Imam Ali was largely destroyed in August, partially from the air in the midst of bitter fighting between American troops and relatively lightly armed, ill-trained but tenacious young Shiite men loyal to the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. ("Few in the shrine could sleep through the ominous rumble of American AC-130 Specter gunships, capable of firing 1,800 bullets per minute. When the bombs fell closer than ever, hundreds rose to march and chant in the courtyard, saying they hoped their voices boosted the morale of the Mahdi Army.") In one of our last acts before a cease fire was declared, according to Dexter Filkins of the New York Times, we used"a 2,000-pound, laser-guided bomb to strike a hotel about 130 yards away from the shrine's southwest wall, in an area known to American commanders as ‘motel row.…' [R]eports indicated the hotel was a redoubt for al-Sadr fighters.… The official said the strike had been ‘100 per cent successful,' demolishing the hotel."
Filkins later described the post-truce moment this way:"[The rebels] stood in a scene of devastation. Hotels had crumbled into the street. Cars were blackened and twisted where they had been hit. Goats and donkeys lay dead on the sidewalks. Pilgrims from out of town and locals coming from home walked the streets agape, shaking their heads, stunned by the devastation before them."
Similarly, much of the city of Falluja has just been devastated in fighting in which American fire power of every sort was called in. The razing of that city began with weeks of"targeted" air attacks on what were termed insurgent"safe havens." Falluja is now a wasteland and, while fantasies about its reconstruction abound, the fighting only continues. (At least 20 U.S. troops have died there, to almost no press attention, since the city was declared secure and the operation deemed a"success.") Falluja remains cordoned off; up to 250,000 Fallujan refugees are still unable to return; and American military strategists, who over the months since the first failed Marine attempt to take the city in April planned its eventual destruction, are now evidently planning to"ask" the"head of every household" (read: males)"to wear an identification badge" once back in the city.
But if the Old City of Najaf (evidently still largely unreconstructed) and the whole city of Falluja are now memorials to American fire power and an American willingness to call down retribution from the skies, air power has been used far more widely across much of heavily populated urban Iraq without extended press comment, on or off editorial pages. Let me offer just a few examples from many to give a sense of the range of Iraqi cities hit from the air in recent months:
Baqubah:"Some 30 insurgents were stationed in buildings near the stadium in eastern Baqubah, apparently to obstruct US forces from reaching downtown. Rather than clear the buildings -- two vacant schools and a swimming pool -- Colonel Pittard decided to demolish them with four 500-lb. bombs." (Christian Science Monitor, July 21)
Tall Afar:"Soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, also known as the Stryker Brigade, launched a fierce attack on Tall Afar on Thursday… The fighting, which included three airstrikes involving AC-130 gunships and F-16 fighter jets, killed 67 insurgents, according to the U.S. military." (Washington Post, Sept. 12)
Sadr City, Baghdad:"Hospital officials in Sadr City, a vast slum in northeast Baghdad that is overwhelmingly hostile to the American occupation, said one person had been killed in an overnight airstrike by the Americans. For weeks, the military has been deploying an AC-130 gunship and fighter jets over the area to try to rout the Mahdi Army, a militia loyal to the firebrand Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr." (New York Times, Oct. 6)
Kut:"A U.S. helicopter struck Sadr's office in Kut, killing two people...." (Washington Post, April 9)
Samarra:"By U.S. military estimates, about 125 rebels were killed and more than 80 captured. Most of the deaths occurred early Friday in the first hours of the strike, when U.S. helicopter gunships blasted suspected rebel positions with rocket fire." (Los Angeles Times, October 4 [scroll down])
Mosul:"A semblance of calm has returned to Mosul after U.S. forces carried out air strikes on insurgents, but residents say Iraq's third largest city remains tense and Iraqi police are nowhere to be seen. U.S. war planes struck rebel areas in the southwest of the city late on Thursday after two days of widespread violence in which groups of insurgents rampaged, burning police stations, stealing weapons and tipping the city towards chaos." (Reuters, Nov. 12)
Karbala:"American AC-130 gunships and tanks battled militiamen near shrines in this Shiite holy city Friday." (Associated Press, May 21)
Falluja:"Highly accurate, 500-pound bombs called JDAMs -- Joint Direct Attack Munition -- were dropped on suspected insurgent hideouts overnight in the southern sector of the city, military sources said. The U.S. Air Force also used AC-130 Spectre gunships, armed with 105 mm cannons and 40 mm guns, to blast remaining insurgent pockets." (CNN, Nov. 16)
Hiyt:"...near the town of Hiyt...[a]ir strikes were called in on the mosque position. The mosque is partially damaged and is currently on fire…" (Aljazeera, Oct. 12)
Baghdad Airport (and elsewhere):"US forces struck at targets near Baghdad airport on Friday evening while attack helicopters and F-16 fighter jets carried out raids elsewhere in Iraq in operations against resistance fighters... Earlier, a US helicopter gunship killed seven people allegedly preparing to launch rocket attacks on an American military base in Iraq." (Aljazeera, Nov. 16)
Towns south of Baghdad:"More than 5000 men supported by Cobra helicopters, F-18 hornets and F-16s, will launch raids in and around the so-called Triangle of Death south of Baghdad." (the Scotsman, Nov. 24)
This far-from-exhaustive list is taken from the summary press reports on the war that appear almost daily. Normally, only a few lines, as above, are devoted to the air war against urban areas which is, by the nature of the situation, a war of terror. Such anodyne reports represent the bare minimum the military offers journalists in Iraq on the subject. I have yet to see any cumulative figures on air strikes in Iraq per day, week, or month, maps of the reach of the air war, or more than a few photos of its results; nor, in fact, have I found a single article of any significance on the air war in Iraq itself, discussing military strategy or even the problems Air Force strategists or pilots feel they face, no less what it's like for civilians (or rebels) in most of Iraq's major cities to experience such periodic attacks, or what kinds of casualties result (or who the casualties actually are), or what, if any, may be the limitations on the use of air power, or what its effects on the insurgency seem to be, or, in fact, anything on any aspect of the regular bombing, missiling, or strafing of city neighborhoods.
Here is a response by the Marine Commander in Falluja, Lieutenant General John Sattler, to a question at a November 18th briefing by a New York Times reporter on the fighting in Falluja:
GEN. SATTLER: Yeah. Approximately four days ago we were averaging somewhere along 50 precision -- and I stress the word "precision" -- about 50 precision airstrikes a day… Today we had three air strikes -- three precision-guided munition air strikes today.That's about the size of what we know. To the extent that we know anything about the loosing of air power on heavily populated urban areas, we only know what an uninquisitive press has been told by the military and stenographically recorded, which means we know remarkably little. Here, however, is the impression of the BBC's Stuart Richie, just a week ago on our air campaign in northern Iraq:
Fighter planes"on the go all through the night"? Is this not worth a single newspaper or magazine article?
I found an empty camp bed, but sleep was virtually impossible -- troops moving in and out all night by helicopter and Hercules planes. Fighter planes also seemed to be on the go all through the night, this time on sorties to Mosul, I believe.
Icarus (Armed with Vipers) Over Iraq
Given the history of twentieth century war, which is, in many ways, simply the history of bombing cities, should our"war reporters" not have been prepared for this? Shouldn't anyone have been thinking about the destruction of cities when it's been such a commonplace? Shouldn't major papers have insisted on embedding reporters in Air Force units (if not on the planes themselves)? Shouldn't reporters have visited our air bases and talked to the pilots? Does no one remember the magnitude of the air war in Vietnam (or Laos or Cambodia), no less any other major war experience of our lifetimes?
A glance at the history of American war tells us air power is as American as apple pie and that Americans were dreaming of cities destroyed from the air long before anyone had the ability to do so. As H. Bruce Franklin tells us in his book War Stars, The Superweapon and the American Imagination, as early as 1881, a former naval officer, Park Benjamin wrote a short story called"The End of New York" that caused a sensation. In it the city was left in ruins by a Spanish naval bombardment. By 1921, air-power visionary Billy Mitchell was already flying mock sorties over New York and other East coast cities,"pulverizing" them in"raids" sensationalized in the press, to publicize the need for an independent air force. ("The sun rose today on a city whose tallest tower lay scattered in crumbled bits…" began the New York Herald after Mitchell's"raid" on New York City, a line that should still send small shudders through us all and remind us how much the sensational of the previous century has become the accepted of our world.)
It would seem hard to forget that the"invasion" of Iraq began from the air -- as much a demonstration of power meant for viewers around the world as for Saddam Hussein and his followers. Who could forget those cameras strategically placed on the balconies of Baghdad hotels for the shock-and-awe son-et-lumière show -- dramatic explosions in the night (with everything but a score to go with it). Does no one remember Air Force claims that air power alone could win wars? In all the articles now being written about our overextended ground forces, does no one want to write about how the military is trying to fill the urban gap with air power?
Is there some secret I'm missing here? Not a single article anywhere in the American press, no less on a front page. (About the closest you can get is an exceedingly modest September Associated Press piece by Robert Burns entitled, "Air power gains more prominent role in Iraq counterinsurgency efforts.") Doesn't anyone find it strange that, back in 1995, our papers -- from their front pages to their editorial and op-ed pages -- were convulsed by a single contested air-war exhibit being mounted at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum on the bombing of Hiroshima? A historical argument about the use of air power half a century ago merited such treatment, but the actual -- and potentially hardly less controversial -- use of air power against the cities of Iraq doesn't merit a peep?
I can find but a single press example of an American reporter in the air in this post-war war. Over a year ago, on November 17, 2003, the New York Times's Dexter Filkins wrote "Over Baghdad: Wary Targets, Yet Confident" ("It is not a good time to be a helicopter pilot in the skies over Iraq"), focusing on the dangers to American pilots in the Iraqi skies. From a passage like the following, one can sense much about the year between then and now in Iraq -- something of a corkscrew downward like that landing at Baghdad International:"[Lt. Col. James Schrote, who commands a fleet of 16 Black Hawks here], a veteran of the ill-fated American venture in Somalia 10 years ago, said the city he flies over today has much to recommend it over the Somali capital, Mogadishu, then without a government and broken up by feuding warlords. ‘Baghdad is much more civilized than that,' he said."
That, as far as I can tell, is it. Now, it's true that any air war is harder to report on than a ground war, especially if reporters aren't allowed in planes or on helicopters (as they are on the river boats and in the Bradleys, for instance). But hardly impossible. Most reporters in Baghdad, after all, have at least been witnesses to air attacks in the capital itself. In one case, an American helicopter even missiled a crowd in a Baghdad street only a few hundred yards from the heavily fortified American heartland, the capital's Green Zone, killing a reporter for al Arabiya satellite network while he was reporting in footage seen only briefly on American TV but repeatedly around the world.
Life under the helicopters is a story that might be written. At the very least, the subject could be investigated. Airmen could be interviewed. Victims could be found. The literature could be read because, as it happens, Air Force people are thinking carefully about the uses of air power in the Iraqi counterinsurgency war, even if reporters aren't. Journalists could, for instance, read Thomas F. Searle's piece on "Making Air Power Effective Against Guerrillas." (If I can find it, they can.) Searle is a military defense analyst with the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell AF Base in Alabama and he concludes:
Airpower remains the single greatest asymmetrical advantage the United States has over its foes. However, by focusing on the demands of major combat and ignoring counterguerrilla warfare, we Airmen have marginalized ourselves in the global war on terrorism. To make airpower truly effective against guerrillas in that war, we cannot wait for the joint force commander or the ground component commander to tell us what to do. Rather, we must aggressively develop and employ airpower's counterguerrilla capabilities.
Journalists in Iraq could report on the new airborne weaponry being deployed and tried out there. After all, like other recent American battlefields, Iraq has also doubled as a laboratory for the corporate development and testing of ever more advanced weaponry. A piece, for instance, could be done on the newly armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the Hunter, being deployed alongside the Predator in Iraq. (The people who name these things have certainly seen too many scifi movies.) In a piece in Defense Daily, a"trade" publication (Ann Roosevelt,"Army Prepares For Armed UAV Operations," November 3), we read:
The Army in Iraq is poised to start operations using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armed with a precision weapon, Northrop Grumman's [NOC] Viper Strike munition, a service official said… The Army is arming the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI)- Northrop Grumman [NOC] Hunter UAV, under an approximately $4 million Quick Reaction Capability contract with Northrop Grumman that will be completed in December, John Miller, Northrop Grumman director of Viper Strike, told Defense Daily… The Hunter can carry two Viper Strike missiles. The Hunter UAV has been used in Iraq"since day one," [Lt. Col. Jeff] Gabbert [program manager Medium Altitude Endurance] said. The precise Viper Strike munition is important because,"it has very low collateral damage, so it's going to be able to be employed in places where you might not use 500-pound bombs or might not use a Hellfire munition, [but] you'll be able to use the Viper Strike munition.
Of course, it would be a reportorial coup if any reporter were to go up in a plane or helicopter and survey the urban damage in Iraq, as Jonathan Schell did from the back seat of a small forward air controller's plane during the Vietnam War. (From this he wrote a report for the New Yorker magazine,"The Military Half," which remains unparalleled in its graphic descriptions of the destruction of the Vietnamese countryside and which can be found collected in his book, The Real War.)
But that's a lot to hope for these days. The absence of coverage, however, is a little harder to explain. Along with the vast permanent military base facilities the U.S. has been building in Iraq to the tune of billions of dollars -- hey, we're capable of constructing, if not reconstructing, quite effectively in Iraq when it really matters -- the loosing of air power on Iraq's cities is the great missing story of the postwar war. Is there no reporter out there willing to cover it? Is the repeated bombing, strafing, and missiling of heavily populated civilian urban centers and the partial or total destruction of cities such a humdrum event, after the last century of destruction and threatened destruction, that no one thinks it worth the bother to attend to? Is the Bush administration really to be given another remarkable free ride?
Related Link:"U.S. Cuts Risky Ground Convoys in Iraq by Expanding Airlifts," New York Times 14 December 2004.
This article first appeared on www.tomdispatch.com, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news and opinion from Tom Engelhardt, a long time editor in publishing, the author of The End of Victory Culture, and a fellow of the Nation Institute.
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Dave Livingston - 1/7/2005
To an extent I strongly agree with your assessment, but with the caveat that because aircraft mechanics are highly skilled & trained & in strong demand in the civilian economy it isn't easy for the Army to retain the people it needs.
Pardon me, please, if I gave the impression I was taking you to task over your first comment. To a point I was in mentioning the rule of thumb of 25 hours of maintenance per each hour airborne seconding your observation that they're, helicopters, expensive to operate.
Too, when the economy's strong there's usually a strong demand for commercial pilots, which is partly why at times the services have difficulty in retaining pilots.
As I recall, it costs anywhere from a half million dollars upwards to train a multi-engine jet pilot. We were told in '66 that in then current dollars it cost the Army roughly a quarter of a million to train us single-enhine chopper pilots.
In short, our high tech armed forces are darned expensive. But as suggested above, there frequently is a side benefit to the tax-payer's expenditure on pilot training in addition to the obvious need to keep our armed forces staffed, it provides the airlines with a comparatively inexpensive source of highly trained pilots.
For example, a cousin of mine was a Naval aviator who upon leaving the Navy went to work for Delta Airlines. He was recently retired from Delta. But back during the VN War he was still with Delta & urged me to get out of the Army & he'd assist me to get on with Delta, but I chose to remain in the Army & to return to Viet-Nam for a second tour, regardless the pay from Delta would have been much more than the Army paid.
Wdy'd I make such an illogical choice from the financial point-of-view? Because 1) a mite to my own surprise I discovered I was pretty good at soldiering, especially in combat. Never mind I apparently wasn't quite as good in combat as I had thought. After all, I did managre to get mysrelf badly shot up very near the nominal end of my second tour in Viet-Nam. Of course, Mr. Charles, actually PAVN soldiers, had a little something to do with the incident. Darn it, there simply were too many of'em with whom I tangled in that last-for-me gfirefight. Or I became arrogantly over confident. Either way,it smarted some to have a bullet bounce off my noggin.
A second reason I chose to remain in the Army, not untypical, I guess, was that after a year of dodging bullets in Viet-Nam the notion of becoming an aerial bus driver, whose most important duty was to aviod taking the very slighest risk with paying customers' conveyance appeared dull as mud. A third related reason was how much adventure does flying from point A to point B & back entail? Unfortunately I chose to ignore one of the best definitions of adventure, "Adventure is someone else far away having a very tough go of things." In other words, adventure in the abstract sometimes appears attractive, but living it sometimes it isn't nearly so attractive as it appeared to be in the abstract. :-)))
Nonetheless, of course the world usually has a plentitude of people ready & willing to go adventuring. But those often become instances of "If only I had known..." :-)))
Dave Livingston - 1/7/2005
Your comment caused me to both smile (I very strongly agree with your point about reporters) & then cringe.
Yes, indeedy B-52 strikes cause tremendous damage, as was demonstrated in Afghanistan & during Operation Iraqi Freedom as well in Viet-Nam, but they are area, not pin-point weapons. They aren't suitable in an environment in which civilians are intermingled with or even near combatants.
From my own little war, Viet-Nam, I can assure anyone interested that tac air, tactical fighter/bombers were sometimes very much appreciated by those of us down below. Oh golly, were they not. When one was in deep kimshi,it was a blessed wonder to have F-100s &/or F-4s boring in lending assistance. Army helicopter gunships were frequiently the first to respond to yells for help & they did a great job (I wouldn't be alive were it not for'em), but for sheer smothering firepower nothing beat A-1 Skyraiders, F-100 Super Sabres & F-4 Phantoms.
Despite today's PC complaints about napalm if one's unit (& fanny) was on the verge of being over-run there was nothing preetier to see than a sheet of nap laid down in front of one--nada!
Dave Livingston - 1/7/2005
Don't know 'bout D.R.'s "obsessive fascination...," but I do know for troops committed to small unit engagements tactical airpower is to put it mildly, highly desirable. For one thing, tac air can be a more precisely used weapon with consequent less collateral damage than artillery.
Ben, I'm not that impressed by your argument that merely because the Air Force is dropping bombs all over the place that thee are many more insurgents than reported. For one thing, there is a tendency that when in doubt whether or no bad guys are at such & such a place, to blow it away based on the assumption that ammunition is cheaper than the lives that might be expended on determining if "that" really is where some of the bad guys are.
Of course there's a potential bad side effect to recon by fire, more civilian casualities. But as the C.O. of a Cavalry troop or Infantry company headed up a road one would rather have a doubtful location smothered by firepower before risking one's own men. Or at least yours truly certainly would. As the Good Book says, "One's heart is where one's treasure is" & on the battlefield the troops for whom I'm responsible are my treasure.
Dave Livingston - 1/7/2005
During the Viet-Nam War the rule of thumb used was that for each hour airborne a helicopter required 25 hours of maintenance.
But then, any equipment used intensively in a combat environment, say a tank, requires a lot of maintenance.
In Viet-Nam, my little war, for instance for an Air Cavalry troop with a TOE of 27 helicopters, 9 Cobra gunships in the Aero-Weapons platoon, 5 UH-1s, Hueys, assigned to the Aero-Rifle platoon, 10 OH-6s (early on in the war OH-13s or OH-23s) in the Aero-Scout platoon & two more UH-1s assigned to troop HQ had assigned to each chopper a crewchief, responsible for basic day-to-day maintenance. In addition, the troop had a Maintenance Detachment of roughly a hundred well-trained mechanics to perform more advanced repairs & maintenance.
Then at division level there was a Maintenance battalion to perform even more complex maintenance tasks for all the division's aircraft. But then the two Air Cavalry/Air Assault divisions assigned to 'Nam, the 1st Cavalry Division & the 101st Airborne Division were aircraft heavy divisions, each with approximately 400 helicopters & perhaps a half dozen fixed-wing aircraft as well.
Flying over insecure roads is & was far from the only reason to utilize helicopters. For example, rather than taking an hour or more to haul a wounded G.I. via military ambulance over chuck-holed roads to a MASH, a chopper could frequently get him there in relative comfort, or at least bump-free in perhaps a quarter of that time.
Who begrudges the use of a chopper if it is a life-saver? Combat experience has demonstrated time-after time that the quicker a wounded G.I. is gotten to a MASSH, or at least an aid station, the more likely he is to survive his wounds.
Unqestionably, yours truly's body would have been moldering in the grave these past thirty-five years & more had it once WIA had to have been hauled by hand-carried stretcher out the jungle to the miles & miles away nearest road rather than having been extracted by jungle penetrator (a wire cage to enclose a body & protect it from whip-lashing tree branches) winched up to a Medivac chopper, which then deed-deed to the nearest MASH & in the meanwhile the on board Medic administering a blood transfusion enroute.
Of course there was an unfortunate aspect to the utiliziation of Medivac choppers, the enemy in the habit of using the red crosses painted on Medivac choppers as targets. Therefdore, if infantry could not secure the area, flying a Medivac chopper was a particularly harzardous duty assignment.
Too, it was a mite hardardous to be dangling from a Medivac chopper under fire, even if the enemy didn't use a jungle penetrator itself as a target, it could become uncomfortable in a penetrator if the chopper's pilot were incapacitated & the machine plumeted to the ground atop the casuality being extracted.
The point is, there's no magical solution to most battlefield problems. But as we've discovered with helicopters, maintenance intensive or no, they are highly efficient & compartively low risk in moving people, supplies, ammunition & whatever in virtually every environment.
On the other hand, we've not used choppers much in a high-intensity combat environment, for instance opposing Soviet Armored divisions with their oddles of anti-aircraft weapons in an environment such as the North German plain. The survival of helicopters would probably drop significantly in such an environment. To a limited degree this was demonstrated in 1971 with the incursion of Laos from Northern I Corps in the face of a masssive anti-aircraft defense. In short, we then lost a lot of helicopters to anti-aircraft traps.
Arnold Shcherban - 12/15/2004
I maintain that already more Iraqis ("bad" or "good guys" - doesn't matter) have been killed over the US-UK
military and occupation campaign than one of "the greatest
monsters of the last century" - Saddam Hussein - killed
over his stay in power (for about 20 years), if one does not count Iran-Iraq war.
That's what I maintain, and that is what is true.
John H. Lederer - 12/14/2004
Ok. I can think things over from my vantage point here at the top of the petard blast. Guess the fuse was a bit short.
Ben H. Severance - 12/13/2004
I misread your comments. My apologies. Your points regarding the insurgents' technological savvy are well stated, though no less discouraging, albeit for different reasons, namely that it suggests that the Iraqis know better how to wage guerrilla warfare than the U.S. knows how to suppress one.
Andrew D. Todd - 12/13/2004
Well, my point is that the insurgency is prospering precisely _because_ the insurgents are more mentally capable of using the new technology than the United States Army is. They don't have so many mental blinders. They are using their little Improvised Explosive Devices, with remote controls taken from garage door openers, etc.
The following item is self-explanatory.
The article does not say who the reservists scrounged from. If it turned out to be the regular army, that might account for the venomous quality of the incident. In other words scrounge at your peril, but there are no penalties to simply coming to a stop, and "working to rule."
In 1914, there was such a thing as the "cavalry mentality," meaning that, let us say, the Royal and Imperial Uhlans were obsessively proud of their horses, and their lances, and their steel breastplates, and their "schapskas" (a kind of helmet terminating in a three-cornered mortarboard), and they had these special kind of riding boots that came up over the knee in front. French currasiers, on the other hand, had helmets with a crest in the ancient greek style. Hussars had their "busbys," or bearskin helmets. The cavalry went to extravagant lengths to avoid being issued with shovels. The real cavalry despised the United States Cavalry and the Australian Light Horse, for being "mounted infantry," who didn't have all this folderal, who actually dismounted, dug in, and used rifles. "I say, old boy, you know, _peasants_ dig; and if these Americans and colonials dig, that probably means they _are_ peasants!" The cavalry usually died well, charging machine guns on horseback.
The cavalry mentality was practically bound up with ideas about caste and racial superiority. The archetypal cavalry officer belonged to the anachronistic agrarian landlord class. Read Isak Dinnesen (Karen Blixen) and Elspeth Huxley, if you want to get a sense of the way their minds worked. Both of these writers spoke for a group who retreated all the way to Africa, rather than change their assumptions. At a certain point, these officers were mentally incapable of entertaining new ideas, because that would have called into question their places within their own societies.
One sees a considerable degree of the cavalry mentality emerging in the American policies in Iraq.
Ben H. Severance - 12/13/2004
I admit that I am not up on the latest techonological breakthroughs, but your references to robots and drones is hardly encouraging. The insurgency is as intense as ever, the new-fangled gadgets nothwithstanding. And I'd rather not follow the Israeli model; they've been trying to defeat terrorism for five decades. Besides, I thought the Bush Adminstration was trying to nation-build in Iraq, yet the military strategy there seems to be more of a wargame exercise than a genuine effort to bring peace.
Ben H. Severance - 12/13/2004
You make a valid point in rebutting my assertion, but even if most of the flights are merely precautionary airstrikes, it still suggests that Iraq is highly unstable. How can you claim progress when the ground troops must first blast everything in their path before making any movements? And yet the bombardments are still ineffectual as the rising casualty rate indicates. The U.S. army is sustaining a higher weekly fatality rate since Fallujah than it did for most of the weeks prior to Fallujah. The insurgency is far from suppressed. Rumsfeld knows how to conquer a country; he has no idea how to pacify one.
Vernon Clayson - 12/13/2004
It took a while but I finally came to a conclusion on why the news media isn't interested in the air war. It's very simple, it's because it has been a success, if dozens of aircraft were shot down there would be no end of condemnation by the media for our lack of, and faulty, equipment. The media will not be happy until the president himself gets involved in welding armor onto Humvees. If they had any sense at all they would be asking why we don't use more tanks, Bradleys and armored personnel carriers in situations where Humvees seem to lack the armor to engage the bombers and killers in Iraq.
Michael Barnes Thomin - 12/12/2004
No, I don't, and neither does the BBC.
John H. Lederer - 12/12/2004
You maintain that much of urban Iraq has been pulverized from the air?
The proposition is easily ascertainable. Satellite images with sufficient resolution are available on the web.
Michael Barnes Thomin - 12/11/2004
"Whoops -- been listening a bit too much to the BBC and reading too much of the Independent there...."
Another Bill O'reilly fan...
John H. Lederer - 12/11/2004
"Furthermore, given that much of urban Iraq has been pulverized from the air.."
Whoops -- been listening a bit too much to the BBC and reading too much of the Independent there....
Andrew D. Todd - 12/10/2004
I notice that you are making a lot of statements about 1960's high-tech, and assuming that they are still true. That is mostly not the case. At the component level, 1960's high-tech was driven by "special-requirements" jobs, usually but not always military. Nowadays, high-tech is driven by mass-production, typically for consumer goods. For example, the most advanced work in computers at present is being done for video games. A million units is a comparatively short production run. Special requirements jobs are usually driven by what I call the "Beowulf assumption," that the way to make a super-power machine is to hook together a lot of small cheap machines. What counts is not performance per se, but price/performance ratio. One implication of this is that security restrictions and export controls tend to be be irrelevant. Businessmen are always probing to see what can be manufactured in a third-world country, and you are not going to be able to prevent diversion, certainly not if you practice a unilateralist foreign policy. Sponsor states, eg. Iran, will always be able to buy consumer goods; take them apart and reassemble them into weapons; and smuggle them to combatants. For example, imagine a PGM conversion kit for a 122mm rocket or a RPG, costing a hundred dollars or less. Fifty or a hundred of them might go into a suitcase. The idea would be to "piggyback" on the Soviets' preexisting mass production/sales program. I leave you to imagine what the military implications might be.
About the best you can do is to copy the insurgent's tactics, to emulate the suicide bomber with a robot, insofar as possible. You need to build a wide variety of different robots, in order to give yourself choices. The Israelis are using remote-controlled bulldozers to clear urban areas. Of course the dozer is going to get blown up from time to time. However, there is no one aboard, and the dozer is an off-the-shelf Caterpillar, and they can easily purchase a replacement, and slap on a new remote-control package. Effectively, the Israelis are treating a bulldozer as a round of ammunition. This gives them the option to calculatedly destroy ten percent of a city, in a Hausmann-ian program of street widening, instead of destroying the entire city in the course of calling fire on snipers.
In respect of helicopters or trucks for logistic support, smart airdrops might be a better solution. You can design a "'smart parachute," with PGM electronics controlling small winches to pull on the canopy lines, and fly the parachute down from say, 20,000 ft, to a designated location (use a drogue chute down to 1000 ft, then open the main canopy). This enables you to use a good-sized fixed-wing aircraft, with reasonable operating costs, up above the effective zone of most anti-aircraft weapons.
Of course, in the long run, once the insurgents gain access to PGM's, the occupier has to assume that literally every building within several thousand yards of his forces, without exception, is a potential launch site. That, practically, leaves a choice between genocide and retreat.
Michael Barnes Thomin - 12/10/2004
“All men dream; but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity; but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible. This I did... For my work on the Arab front I had determined to accept nothing. The Cabinet raised the Arabs to fight for us by definite promises and self-government afterwards. Arabs believe in persons, not institutions..."
"The Turk was stupid and would believe the rebellion was abosolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare. Analogy is fudge, anyhow, and to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife...We had no base machinery, no formal staff, no clerks, no government, no telegraphs, no public opinion, no troops of British nationality, no honour, no conventions... Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic... In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine, (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebrical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.”
- Lt. Col. T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia); from T. E. Lawrence, Oriental Assembly, London: Williams and Norgate LTD., 1939: 143-144; 114-134.
Michael Barnes Thomin - 12/10/2004
"In combat, there are no winners. The victors just happen to lose less than the vanquished. One side may impose its will on the other, but there is nothing noble or virtuous about the process. People are killed and maimed, homes and communities are destroyed, lives are shattered, families are broken apart and scattered to the wind- and just a few years later, we can barely remember why." -Sergeant Major (ret.) Eric L. Haney,
from Inside Delta Force: The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit. New York: Delacorte Press, 2002.(Haney, vii).
Michael Barnes Thomin - 12/10/2004
And all for what?
Vernon Clayson - 12/9/2004
And we haven't used the heavy bombers, B-52's, etc., in a while, maybe it's time to bring them in. The Muslim insurgents seem so fond of explosives, let's show them serious explosives. In a kind of tit-for-tat, when they set off a roadside bomb, we carpet bomb with B-52's. Who cares if reporters don't get to go along for the ride, they can see the results at ground level, it's very impressive.
Ben H. Severance - 12/8/2004
A good article and a revealing one. The U.S. military has a matchless edge in battlefield technology, yet it still hasn't suppressed the Iraqi insurgency after more than twenty months of combat. If Engelhardt is right, that the U.S. Air Force is conducting extensive, diurnal airstrikes all over Iraq (but presumably mostly in the Sunni Triangle), then one must conclude that the Iraqi insurgency is far larger and widespread than the Pentagon would have the American public believe. It's probably time to admit that the active insurgency probably numbers at least 35,000, albeit decentralized into local paramilitary units. Furthermore, given that much of urban Iraq has been pulverized from the air, yet the insurgency continues, one could hardly be faulted in thinking that operations against such guerrilla strongholds as Fallujah are accomplishing very little. In fact, according to Engelhardt, it would appear that airpower's greatest contribution is purely tactical; it gives the ground troops just enough extra punch to keep from being overwhelmed by the guerrillas.
America's aerial infestation over the skies of Iraq has killed thousands of insurgents and civilians, and produced massive physical destruction, but the war rages on at an ever increasing intensity level. It's time to stop relying solely on firepower and introduce some real leadership into the campaign. By that, I mean a DoD under someone other than Rumsfeld, whose obsessive fascination with high-tech warfare has now become a mill-stone around the military's neck.
Jonathan Dresner - 12/7/2004
You're entirely correct about the utility of helicopters (I hope you don't think I was questioning the need for them; they're a fantastic technology from the battlefield perspective); the problem is our shortage of working machines and qualified maintenance and flight crews, a consequence of not being prepared, operationally, to fight the war we are currently engaged in.
Arnold Shcherban - 12/7/2004
All in all - timely article, but with some quite invalid comparisons (bows to the allies?) and notable ommisions, like placing London in the list of destroyed cities alongside with Dresden, Hiroshima, and Haiphong. The complete destruction of the latter cities can hardly be compared with the though considerable, but still far cry from respective ones, damage to the city of London caused by the German luftwaffe.
As the examples of the ommissions I can submit
Warsaw, Minsk, Odessa, Kiev, Leningrad, Budapest.
After this article the figures of many thousands of civilian casualties in Iraq don't look ideologically or
politically motivated anymore, but quite consequential.
Oscar Chamberlain - 12/7/2004
You are absolutely right about the absence of information. When it comes to the military (any military at war, not simply ours), you cannot assume that no news is good news.
Jonathan Dresner - 12/6/2004
I do remember reading a NYTimes article not that long ago about the maintenance and human resource problems involved in the constant use of helicopters to transport troops and supplies. Because the roads aren't secure, of course (not even the main road to the Baghdad airport, lately, according to reports).
But that's only one article, with little/no follow-up.
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