Should the IAEA Stay Out of Politics? Can It?
That's pure fantasy, but the claim is as old as the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The purpose of the IAEA is, has always been and should remain, to negotiate the close links between global politics and nuclear development.
Today, most people know the IAEA as the UN's "nuclear watchdog." But at the time of its creation, in 1957, it sought to promote nuclear energy. World leaders hoped "peaceful uses" of the atom would counterbalance Cold War tensions. Only in its second decade did the IAEA's policing power grow important.
In the 1950s, the IAEA sponsored nuclear research in Latin America, India, Pakistan and the Middle East -- especially in Egypt and Iran. These "technical cooperation" programs aimed to transfer civilian power reactors to developing nations. Then as now, they were fraught with political tensions about which nations transferred technology, to whom and at what cost.
Early on, for example, the United States proposed that the IAEA serve as a fuel bank. The US would supply the agency with low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA would then distribute to developing nations for use in prototype reactors.
Other nations with burgeoning atomic industries saw the US proposal as an attempt to monopolize the market for nuclear reactors. Low-enriched uranium worked only in American-made light-water reactors. Back then, Canadian, French, Soviet and British reactors all used another form of uranium. Meanwhile, developing nations worried that such an arrangement would perpetuate colonial-era inequalities. Recently, Mr. El Baradei has revived the idea of an international fuel bank, as a way for countries to get reactor fuel without building enrichment facilities that could be turned to weapons-making. Echoing decades-old reasoning, Iran claims that this system would reinforce global inequalities.
In the mid-1960s, the IAEA began thinking seriously about how to prevent diversion of civilian technologies toward military purposes. Most buyers resisted the prospect of inspections, which they felt undermined national sovereignty.
In 1968, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) formally addressed the matter of access. All signatories pledged "good faith" efforts to end the arms race and proceed toward "general and complete disarmament." Nuclear weapons states pledged not to transfer atomic weapons to non-weapons states. The latter agreed to accept IAEA safeguards and inspections. In return, the NPT asserted "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."
Ahmadinejad frequently invokes this "inalienable right" to justify Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment. The United States and others scoff at this claim, since Iran also refuses inspections, the other half of the NPT bargain.
What did the "inalienable right" really mean, historically? The NPT balanced two world views: a post-colonial perspective that insisted on all nations' fundamental rights to sovereignty and development, and a Cold War perspective that focused on regulating access to nuclear weapons. For superpowers and developing nations, the treaty thus embodied very different aspirations, fundamentally at odds with each other. For over thirty years, then, the IAEA and the NPT have meant radically different things to different countries.
Iran -- along with India, Pakistan, and others -- often denounces the hypocrisy of nuclear weapons states. The lack of progress toward "general and complete disarmament," they argue, betrays those states' lack of good faith. Meanwhile, the nuclear "haves" cynically promote the NPT's high moral purpose simply to maintain their dominance of the market for nuclear technologies.
This reasoning doesn't justify widespread acquisition of nuclear weapons, of course. Yet neither is it false. The US and others do need to comply more fully with the NPT.
But the problem runs deeper. If we really want to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, we need to take seriously the two-faced nature of our current non-proliferation regime and engage (again) in real dialogue with the aspirations of non-nuclear weapons states.
The IAEA has never been, and can never be, a narrowly technical agency. The real question should be: how can we help the agency be more effective in negotiating the politics inherent in nuclear technology?
This piece was distributed for non-exclusive use by the History News Service, an informal syndicate of professional historians who seek to improve the public's understanding of current events by setting these events in their historical contexts. The article may be republished as long as both the author and the History News Service are clearly credited.
comments powered by Disqus
- Egyptian ‘Mona Lisa’ A Fake
- The Story Behind ‘Woman in Gold’: Nazi Art Thieves and One Painting’s Return
- Scott Walker, Allergic to Dogs, May Run Against Political History
- Russian History Receives a Makeover That Starts With Ivan the Terrible
- Parsing Ronald Reagan’s Words for Early Signs of Alzheimer’s
- Joan Waugh on Grant's and Lee's 'gentlemen's agreement' ending the Civil War
- Charlatan or Sage? Contested Legacy of the late Dr. Ben, a Father of African Studies
- Historians make it easy for visitors to DC to understand the history of the Mall
- History's Grandin Wins Bancroft Prize for "The Empire of Necessity"
- Nobel prize-winning scientist writes a history of science