It’s partly our fault.1 Presidents want and work to be imperial because of us – scholars. As often as we argue that presidents go beyond the boundaries of the Constitution because of historical precedents, constitutional paradoxes, strategic calculations, and irresistible calls of character, we neglect our own role in urging presidents toward imperial actions. It’s time we take responsibility for our normative judgments and engage in corrective measures from within the walls of the academy. If we want presidents to respect separation of powers and defer to Congress, then we need to reconsider our definitions of presidential leadership and greatness.

Many presidential studies describe a select few men who asserted imperial authority while in office as “great” and “strong” presidents who exhibited “courageous leadership.” Marc Landy and Sidney Milkis remind us that “a recent poll of thirty-two eminent historians and political scientists singled out Lincoln as the greatest president in history.” They go on to explain that “like the other contenders for presidential greatness in American history—George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln—Franklin Delano Roosevelt left more than a record of achievement; he left a constitutional legacy.” Hence, scholars lionize imperial presidents like Lincoln and Roosevelt as men who saw what needed to be done and took action to redefine the constitutional relationships to work as they saw fit, not as the framers had originally intended.

Collectively, we praise these presidents for their energy, vision, and initiative. We justify—rather than admonish—these presidents’ extra-constitutional actions as necessary expansions of executive power during extraordinary times. Few studies acknowledge that there may have been other, more constitutionally appropriate options available to these presidents or that there have been unintended consequences from their legacies.2

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Imperial Presidency (1973), which first sounded the alarm about the growth of the executive, excuses presidents like FDR and JFK because their extra-constitutional actions were done for normatively good reasons. Even if we grant that Lincoln and Roosevelt acted appropriately, they died before they had an opportunity to initiate a contraction of executive power. As a result, we don’t know whether or not they would have. We assume they would have (after the crises had passed) because we assume that they expanded executive power for good reasons. There is, however, no evidence for this other than their words.

Upon close examination, the literature reveals that these presidents are great not because their extra-constitutional actions were necessarily justified, but because they convinced us that they were legitimate—good, right, legal, and moral. Stephen Skowronek tells us that “successful political leaders do not necessarily do more than other leaders; successful leaders control the political definition of their actions, the terms in which their places in history are understood.” In essence, we accept their vision and we repeat it in our studies.

How did they get us to accept it? Landy and Milkis explain: “Great presidents were not apart from democratic politics; they mastered it.” Their mastery was in persuading us that they fought for democratic principles and that they worked to secure liberty for all. Their ends appeared to justify their means. Hence, we minimize their transgressions.

A few have seen through this strategy. Alexander Hamilton wrote to Edward Carrington in 1792: “If I were disposed to promote Monarchy & overthrow State Governments, I would mount the hobby horse of popularity—I would cry out usurpation—danger to liberty &c, &c—I would endeavor to prostrate the National Government—raise a ferment—and then ride the Whirlwind and direct the Storm.”

But most of us aren’t as discerning as Hamilton. And this is why we’re partly responsible for sitting presidents attempting extra-constitutional actions coupled with rhetorical justifications. Presidents want to leave an institutional legacy, to restructure the constitutional relationships between the branches, and to be remembered by us as great, strong, courageous leaders.

Can you blame them? Perhaps, they are ruled by what Hamilton knew would animate the men who quested for the presidential chair—“the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds” (Federalist 72)?

While we cannot simply downgrade presidents like Lincoln and Roosevelt because they were imperial, there are a few corrective measures we can employ immediately to develop a more differentiated understanding of greatness and leadership. Presidential leadership has come to mean dominating the other branches of government, while keeping the public enamored and attached to one’s presidency. This has got to change, if we want presidents to respect constitutional boundaries and defer to Congress.

If we take separation of powers seriously, then we’ll stop expecting presidents to win when they engage in a battle with another branch of government. Their success rates should be around 50 percent because presidents have limited powers over other branches. Presidents are not “weak” just because they cannot pass legislation. If they had wanted to pass legislation, they would have tried to become Speaker of the House, rather than president of the United States. Similarly, if they had wanted to set legal precedents, they would have followed a career path that would have led them to the Supreme Court, rather than the White House. What we should be doing is looking at how presidents fulfill their constitutional duty, how they “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and…preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States,” rather than how they dominate the other branches with their agendas.

If we take the Constitution seriously, then we’ll stop using the president’s national approval rating to measure public support. The selection method for the president is the Electoral College, which means that an aggregate number is a poor reflection of his electoral and/or public support. Scholars curious about presidential approval should be looking at how a president is either expanding or diminishing his party’s electoral coalition. How his administration is playing in the states that he won? These are better measures of pubic attachment than a Gallup poll.

Lastly, we need to redefine presidential greatness away from simply imperial actions during extraordinary times. It’s important to recognize other political achievements. A simple library search will bring up many more scholarly books and articles on Abraham Lincoln than on Grover Cleveland, despite the fact that Grover Cleveland is the only person to have won the office twice—in nonconsecutive terms.3 This was no small achievement.

If we want different presidents, then we must measure greatness and leadership differently. We’re impacting both politics and history, whether we want to recognize it or not. If we don’t change, it’s unlikely that the presidents will.

1 I use the first person in this essay because I am as much apart of this tradition as anyone in presidential studies. The book manuscript (Presidents, Parties, and the Politics of Survival, forthcoming 2006, Lynne Reiner Publishers) that I recently completed focused on the “great” presidents before they won office in an attempt to understand the strategies of successful presidential aspirants.

2 One notable exception to the majority of presidential studies is a forthcoming book (July 2006, SUNY Press) edited by Christopher S. Kelly, Executing the Constitution: Putting the President Back into the Constitution.

3 A Library of Congress keyword search of “Abraham Lincoln” revealed 3580 entries, while a search of “Grover Cleveland” brought up 368 entries.

References  

Freeman, Joanne. 2001. Alexander Hamilton: Writings. New York: The Library of America.

Landy, Marc and Sidney M. Milkis. 2000. Presidential Greatness. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership From John Adams to George Bush. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.