Gaza: How We Got Here ... The Deep Cause of War

Gaza in 2003

Like many observers I am both sick at heart and emotionally drained from watching and reading about the horrible events in Gaza.  Is there more to be said about them?  Yes, I think there is if we hope to achieve a degree of security and peace. So, at the risk of duplication, allow me to show how the events of today were preordained and how patterns of action have been repeated year after year.  Media reported day-by-day events are difficult to comprehend without some sense of how they were shaped so I have here laid out a historical guide.  Some of it, or perhaps even most of it, may be familiar, but I have tried to "connect the dots” in a way that I do not believe has been satisfactorily done.   Only if we understand the history can we hope to help solve this very complex, often shameful and sometimes dangerous problem.   Following is "The Deep Past."  It is Part One of three parts.   I ask your indulgence. (Parts two and three will be published later on HNN.)

The Deep Cause of War: The Long Term

                  What we call the "Palestine Problem" is really a European Problem.  No European society treated Jews as full members, and most have ugly records of anti-Semitism.  Even relatively benign Western governments exploited, segregated or banished Jews (and such other minorities as Gypsies, Muslims and deviant Christians).   Less benign governments practiced pogroms, massacres and expulsions.  European history reveals a pervasive, powerful  and perpetual record of intolerance to all forms of ethnic, cultural and religious difference. 

                  Jewish reaction to the various forms of repression was usually passivity but occasionally flight interspersed with attempts to join the dominant community.   When Jews were attacked by Christian mobs during the Crusades, they suffered and tried to hide; when they were thrown out of such medieval cities as Cambridge, they fled to new refuges; when they and the Muslim Arabs were forced out of Spain in 1492, most found refuge in Muslim countries which were far more tolerant of minorities than contemporary Christian societies; when Eastern (Ashkenazi) and "Oriental," mainly Spanish,  (Sephardic) Jews in small numbers began to reach Germany, Austria, France and England in the eighteenth century, many converted to Catholicism; finally, most of the European and American Jewish communities assimilated culturally and by generous public actions sought to prove their social value to their adopted nations.  Generally speaking, they were successful in their efforts in America, England and Italy but failed in France, Germany and Austria.  Even when they faced existential threats, there is no record of a serious attempt by European Jews to defend themselves.

                  In the latter years of the nineteenth century, the reaction of the Jewish communities resident in Europe began to change.  In part this was because, like other European peoples, Jews began to think of themselves as a nation.  This transformation of attitude led to a change from the desire for escape to a temporary haven (Nachtaysl) to permanent establishment in what Theodor Herzl called a Judenstaat, the creation of a separate, faith-based nation-state, which was viewed as the permanent solution to anti-Semitism.  This was the essential aim and justification for Zionism.

Nineteenth century Europeans understood and approved of the concept of nation-states but only for themselves; in France, Germany, Italy, Austria and the Balkans, Europe was reforming itself along national lines.   However, no European nation-state was willing to tolerate a resident rival nationalism.  So Herzl's call for Jewish nationhood was generally regarded as subversive by non-Jews and was feared by the more established Jewish communities and the religious establishment as a probable cause of an anti-Jewish reaction.    These attitudes would remain in contention down to our times.

                  Even earlier than the Europeans were imbibing the ideas of nationalism, their ruling classes were thrusting into the Americas, Africa and Asia to create empires.  Spain dominated the Americas and was insistent that the ethnic-religious problems of the Old World not be transmitted there so it sought ethnic "purity" of its colonizers; neither Jews  nor suspect conversos were allowed.  England effectively ruled India beginning in the last years of the eighteenth century, and the nature of its colonial government, drawn from the middle class, generally precluded Jewish involvement.  On the contrary, when  France invaded Algeria from 1830, it opened its doors to fairly large-scale Jewish immigration from Malta and elsewhere.  Germany briefly tried to create an empire in Africa but was stopped by the First World War.  Russia meanwhile was consolidating its Asian empire and in parts of it created Jewish zones in some of which people of non-Semitic backgrounds were absorbed into Jewish culture, but, in the western heart of the Russian empire, anti-Semitism was pervasive and violent.  By the nineteenth century, Russian Jews were leaving in vast number for Western Europe and the United States.  In the last decade of the nineteenth century almost 200,000 arrived in America alone.

                  Despite the differences, we can see that while nationalism was the ideology of choice domestically, imperialism captured the imagination of Europeans in foreign affairs.  So how did these two ideologies impact upon what most Europeans regarded as "the Jewish problem"?

                  In England we see most clearly what some leading politicians thought might be the answer: encouraging the emigration of Jews from Europe to the colonies.  One of the early proponents of this, essentially anti-Semitic, policy was Sir Laurence Oliphant.  As he proposed, getting rid of the Jews as neighbors --  that is, in England --  and thus solving the "Jewish Problem" would foster British trade and help Britain consolidate its empire if they established themselves as colonies in Africa or Asia.   Added to the benefit imperialists identified was the vague but attractive idea held by many fervent Christians that if the Jews returned to the Holy Land, they would become Christian.  Thus, support for Zionism seemed to many Europeans to be  a win-win policy.  

                  Europeans knew little about the peoples they were conquering in Africa and Asia and did not regard their well-being as of much importance.  Americans, let us admit, were even more brutal in dealing with native Americans.  So were the Australians with the Aboriginals and the South African Boers with the Bantu.  Rich, Western societies generally regarded the poor of the world, and especially other races, colors and creeds,  as subhuman, without claims on freedom or even sustenance.  This was the attitude taken up by the early Zionists toward the Arabs.   Even their existence was often denied.  The Zionist leader, Israel Zangwill.  described Palestine and Zionist aspirations for it as being "a country without a people for a people without a land. "

                  Zangwill's was a powerful slogan.  Unfortunately, it masked a different reality.  Given the technology of the times, Palestine was actually densely populated.  The overwhelming portion of the inhabitants were villagers who farmed such land as they could water.   Water, never plentiful, was the limiting factor.  Nomads lived on the edges but they were always few in number, never as much as 15% of the natives.  They too used sparse resources in the only way they could be used, by moving their animals from one temporary source of grazing to another as rain made possible.

                  Until massive amounts of money and new technologies became available from the 1930s, population and land were in balance but, of course, in balance on a lower level than in wetter, richer climates where societies had more advanced technologies.

                  Oliphant, his successors in the British government and others in the French government were not concerned about what their policies did to native peoples.  The British were keen to take the lands of African blacks and to plunder the Indians while the French engaged in policies approaching genocide in Algeria.  As focused on Palestine, the British sought to solve the problem of what to do with the Jews at the expense of peoples who could not defend themselves -- and to benefit from the work of the Jews rather like medieval kings did -- rather than to reform their own attitudes toward Jews.   Thus, as Claude Montefiore, the president of the Anglo-Jewish Association declared on November 30, 1917,  "The Zionist movement was caused by anti-Semitism."

The Deep Cause of War: The Middle Term

                  The two World Wars set the parameters of the "middle term" causes of the struggle for Palestine.  Briefly,  we can sketch them under four headings:  first, the desperate struggle of the British to avoid defeat in the First World War by courting Jewish support;  second, the struggle of the British both to defeat the still powerful Ottoman empire and to avoid the danger of mutiny of Muslims in their Indian empire; third, the British attempts to "square" of the triangle of promises made during the war to Arabs, Jews and their French allies; and, fourth, the management of a viable "mandate," as they renamed their League of Nations- awarded colonies.  Taken together, these acts form the "middle term" of the causes of war in our times.  They are:

                  First, in the final period of the First World War, the Russians were convulsed by revolution and sought a separate peace with Germany (the 1917-1918 negotiations that led to the Brest-Litovsk treaty).  The Germans' incentive for the treaty was that it allowed them to shift their powerful military formations from the Eastern to the Western front.  They hoped that in one huge push they could overwhelm the already depleted and exhausted Anglo-French armies before America could effectively intervene.  The Allied High Command thought this was likely.   Slaughter of the Allied forces had been catastrophic.  At the same time, England faced bankruptcy.  It had drawn down its own reserves and exhausted its overseas credit.  It was desperate. 

                  So what options did the British have?  Let us be clear: whether their assessment was right or wrong  is  irrelevant because they acted on what they thought they knew.  They believed that  support for Zionist aspirations would,  or at least might,  change their fortunes because they thought that: 

                  *the Bolsheviks who had become the Russian government were overwhelmingly Jewish and seeing British support for what was presumably their aspiration for a national home, they would rescind or not implement the contentious and unpopular Brest-Litovsk treaty and so keep the German army from redeploying on the Western front;

                  *a large part of the officer corps of the German army was Jewish and seeing British support for what was presumably their aspiration for a national home and also being disillusioned by the losses in the war and the way they were discriminated against by the Prussian high command they would either defect or at least fight less hard; and

                  *the American financial world ("Wall Street") was controlled by Jews who, seeing British support for what was presumably their aspiration for a national home, would open their purses to relieve the desperate need of Britain for money to buy food and arms.

                  This appreciation was the justification for the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917.  As then British Prime Minister David Lloyd George later declared,

The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to give facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause.

Second, the Balfour Declaration was not a "stand alone" document: Britain had already sought the support of the predominant Arab Muslim leader.  Since the Ottoman  Sultan-Caliph had declared support for the Central Powers, Sharif  ["noble descendant of the Prophet"] Husain,  who was then the governor of Mecca, was the most venerated Muslim the British could hope to use to accomplish their two urgent objectives:  the first was defeating the Ottoman army  (which had just captured a whole British division and was threatening the Suez Canal) and the second was  preventing what their jittery security service was always predicting, another Indian "mutiny"  and/or the defection of the largely Muslim Indian army as a result of the declaration of a jihad by the Sultan-Caliph. 

                  To accomplish these twin aims, the British encouraged the Sharif of Mecca to proclaim his support for the Allied cause and  to organize a "Revolt in the Desert."  In return, the British offered to recognize Arab independence under his rule in most of the Middle East.  The British offer was spelled out by the senior British official in the Middle East, Sir Henry McMahon, in a series of official letters of which the first was dated July 14, 1915.   The area to be assigned to Husain was essentially "Syria" or what is today divided into Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, part of Arabia and Palestine/Israel. This initial offer was subsequently reconfirmed and extended to Iraq by a series of separate declarations and acts.

                  Although the British government had committed itself to support Arab claims for this area, it also began the following year negotiating with France and the Russian empire for this and other parts of the Middle East.   An Anglo-French accord was reached  in 1916 by Sir Mark Sykes with M. Georges Picot.  Their agreement allocated to France much of what had been promised to the Arabs and designated as an international zone the then Ottoman coastal areas from the Sinai frontier with Egypt including Gaza up to and including the now Lebanese city of Tyre (Arabic: Sour) except for a small British enclave at Acre. 

                  

                  Third, as the war ended and the negotiations began in Paris for a Treaty of Peace, the British had to try to explain, hide or revise these three wartime agreements.  They were  embarrassed when the new Bolshevik government published the hitherto secret Sykes-Picot agreement, but they managed for years to keep the Husain-McMahon correspondence secret.  What they could not hide was the Balfour Declaration.  However, they began a process of "definition" of their policy that ran completely counter to what the Zionists had expected. 

                  The Zionists, from the beginning, were determined to turn Palestine into a Jewish nation-state (Herzl's Judenstaat),  but, being sensitive to British politics, their leaders denied "the allegation that Jews [aimed] to constitute a separate political nationality."  The word the Zionists proposed for what they intended to create in Palestine,  coined by Max Nordau as a subterfuge 'to deceive by its mildness," was  heimstätte (something less than a state, roughly a "homeland) to be employed "until there was no reason to dissimulate our real aim."   

                  Predictably, the deception fooled no one.  As Lord Kitchener had remarked when the Balfour Declaration was being debated in the English Cabinet, he was sure that the half a million Palestinians would "not be content  [with an Old Testament role as a suppressed minority to be] hewers of wood and drawers of water."   He was right, but few people cared.  Certainly not then. 

                  The native Palestinians were not mentioned in any of the three agreements:  the agreement with Sharif Husain dealt broadly with most of Arab Middle East while the Sykes-Picot agreement shunted them, unnamed,  aside into a rather vague international zone and the Balfour Declaration used the curious circumlocution for them as "the existing non-Jewish communities."  (However, while focusing on Jewish aspirations and avoiding naming the Palestinians, it specified that nothing should be done that would "prejudice" their "civil and religious rights.") 

                  It was not until 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, that an attempt was made to find out what the Palestinians wanted.  No one in Paris knew;  so, strongly opposed by both Britain and France, President Woodrow Wilson sent a mission of inquiry, the King-Crane Commission, out to the Levant to find out.  Wilson, already desperately ill and having turned over leadership  of the American delegation to my cousin Frank Polk,  probably never saw their report, but what the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians  told the American Commissioners was essentially that they wanted to be left alone and if that was not feasible they would accept American  (but not British) supervision.  The British were annoyed by the American inquiry; they did not care what the natives wanted. 

                  The British were also increasingly disturbed that heimstätte was being taken to mean more than they had intended.  So, when Winston Churchill became Colonial Secretary  and as such was responsible for Palestine, he publicly rebuked the Zionists for trying to force Britain's hand and emphasized that in the Balfour Declaration the British government had  promised only to support establishment in Palestine of a Jewish homeland.  It did not commit Britain to make  Palestine as a whole the Jewish homeland.   Echoes of these statements would be heard, because shouted back and forth over the following thirty years, time after time.  Ultimately the shouts would become shots.

                  British attempts over the years to reconcile their promises to the Arabs, the French and the Zionist movement occupies shelves of books, filled a number of  major government studies and was taken up in several international conferences.  The promises were, of course, irreconcilable.  One must admire the candor of Lord Balfour, the titular author of the Balfour Declaration,  who, in a remarkable statement to his fellow Cabinet ministers on August 11, 1919, admitted that "so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers [Britain and France] have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which at least in letter, they have not always intended to violate."             

                  Fourth, having driven out the Ottoman Turkish forces, the British set up military governments.  Knowing about these double- or triple-deals, efforts at concealment, post-facto interpretations,  lawyer-like quibbles, linguistic arguments and Biblical allusions, the British commander, General (later Field Marshal, Lord) Edmond Allenby, refused to be drawn into the fundamental issue of policy, declaring that such measures as were being taken were "purely provisional,"  but the military government quickly morphed into a British colony, defined by the new League of Nations as a "mandate" in which the imperial power was obligated to "uplift" the natives and prepare them for self-rule. Practical decisions were to be set by the civil High Commissioner.  The first such official was an English Zionist, Sir Herbert Samuel, who came into office to begin large-scale immigration of Jews into Palestine,  to recognize de facto a Jewish government (the "Jewish Agency") and to give Jewish immigrants permission to acquire and irrevocably hold land that was being farmed by Palestinian villagers.  I turn now to the transformation of Palestine under British rule.

The Deep Cause of War:  The British Term (1919-1948)

                  The Palestine which the British had conquered and around which they drew a frontier  had a surface area of 10,000 square miles (26,000 square kilometers) and had been divided among three sanjaqs (subdivisions of a province) of the Ottoman  villayet (province) of Beirut.   The British had expelled its governors and their civil, police and military officers, who were Ottoman officials, and had established a colonial government.

                  The population  of 752,000 was divided mainly  between 600,000 Arabic-speaking Muslims and roughly 80,000 Christians and the same number of Jews. Each group  had its own schools, hospitals and other public programs staffed by religiously educated men.  The  Jews were mostly pilgrims or merchants and lived mainly in Jerusalem, Haifa and the larger towns.  Christians, similarly, had their own churches and schools,  but unlike the Muslims and Jews they were divided among a variety of sects.  A British study in 1931 found them to include

 adherents of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Uniate  (Melkite), Anglican, Armenian (Gregorian), Armenian Uniate, Jacobite, Syrian Catholic, Coptic, Abyssinian, Abyssinian Uniate, Maronite, Chaldean, Lutheran and other churches.

                     

Whatever else the land of Palestine produced, it was certainly luxuriant in religion.

The Palestine that emerged at the end of the First World War was also an heir to the Ottoman Empire because the British had decided that Ottoman laws were still in effect.  What these laws mandated would play a major role in Palestinian-Zionist affairs so they must be noted.  The key point is that in its later years, the Ottoman empire had attempted various reforms that were primarily aimed at increasing its ability to draw tax revenue from the population.  The most important of these changes was the imposition of quasi-private ownership on the traditional system of land ownership.. From roughly 1880 onward, wealthy urban or even foreign merchants, money lenders and officials were able to acquire title to lands by agreeing to pay the taxes.  Similar systems and similar transfer of "ownership" occurred in many areas of Asia and Africa.  "Modernization" often came at the price of legal dispossession.   So important was this was a concept and a process in future events that it must be understood.

                 

Land in Palestine (and adjoining Lebanon as in Egypt, India and much of Africa and Asia) was an extension to a village.  Like the houses, the plots mirrored the kinship structure.   If a family tree were superimposed on a map,  it would show that adjoining parcels were owned by close relatives; the further away the land, the more distant the kin relationship.  One could read into the land ownership pattern the history of births, deaths, marriages, family disputes and the waxing and fading of lineages.

                  Despite  the Ottoman changes, villagers continued to plow and harvest according to their system.  In fact, they did everything they could to avoid contact with the government.  They did so because the collection of taxes resembled a military campaign in which their grain might be confiscated, their cattle driven away, their sons kidnapped for military service and other indignities imposed.  In Palestine as in Syria, Iran and the Punjab where the process has been carefully studied, peasants often agreed to have their lands registered as the possession of  rich and influential merchants and officials who would promise to protect them.   In short the new system promoted a sort of mafia.

                  That was the legal system the British found when they set up their government in Palestine.  Ottoman tax records specified that large blocs of villages and their lands "belonged"  not to  village crop farmers but to the influential "tax farmers." One example was the Lebanese merchant family, the Sursuks.  In 1872, the Sursuks  had acquired a kind of ownership (known in Ottoman law as miri)from the Ottoman government for a whole district in the Vale of Esdraelon near Haifa.  The 50,000 acres the Sursuks acquired was apportioned among some 22 villages.   In return for the title to the land, they agreed to pay the yearly tax which they extracted from the villagers in their multiple roles as tax collector, purchaser of shared crops and money lender.   They apparently made at least 100% profit yearly on their purchase; the land was one of the most fertile areas in the country.  As an English traveler, Lawrence Oliphant, wrote in 1883,  this land

looks today like a huge green lake of waving wheat, with its village-crowned mounds rising from it like islands, and it presents one of the most striking pictures of luxuriant fertility which it is possible to imagine.

                 

  While the law was Ottoman, it corresponded to English practice dating from the Seventeenth century "enclosures" of commons.  The British imposed it on Ireland and enforced it on the Punjab, Kenya  and other parts of their empire.  The Sursuks had purchased it, according to the records, for an initial £ 20,000.  Under the Land Transfer Ordinance of  1920,  they were allowed to sell it.  So in 1921, the Zionist purchasing agency bought the land and villages for £726,000.    The Sursuks became rich; the Zionists were delighted; the losers were the villagers.  Some 8,000 of them were evicted.  Moreover, for the most laudable of reasons -- the Zionist regulation that forbade exploitation of natives, -- the dispossessed villagers could not even work as landless laborers on their former lands.  Nor could the land ever be repurchased from the Jewish National Fund which provided that the land was inalienable. 

                  Both anger and greed gripped the Palestinian upper class:  some sold their lands for what appeared then astronomical prices, but about 80% of all purchases were from absentee owners, like the Sursuks.  The map below shows Zionist land ownership  before the declaration of the State of Israel.

                 

In less than a decade, tensions between the two communities reached a flash point.  The flash point was then, and continued to the present time to be, the place where the Wailing Wall abutted the principal Islamic religious site, al-Aqsa mosque.  For the first time, on August 15, 1929, a mob of several hundred Jewish youths paraded with the Zionist flag and sang the Zionist anthem.  Immediately, a mob of Arab youths attacked them.  Riots spread across the country and for the first but far from the last time, Britain had to rush in troops.  Within two weeks, 472 Jews and at least 268 Arabs had been killed.  It was a harbinger of things to come

                  The British were deeply disturbed.  Riots were expensive; a civil war would be ruinous.  So the Home government decided to seek advice on what it should do.  It turned to a man with great experience. Sir John Hope-Simpson had been a senior officer in the elite (British) Indian Civil Service, had helped to solve serious problems  in Greece and in China and had been elected to Parliament as a Liberal  He was commissioned to find a solution.  Not surprisingly, he concluded that the issues were land and immigration because

                  ...the result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that the land...ceased to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future.  Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land.  Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use.  The land is mortmain and inalienable.  It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and goodwill on the part of Zioni