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Whatever Happened to the Powell Doctrine?

Secretary of State Colin Powell must feel at war with his own doctrine.

As the United States, Britain and Spain introduced a new draft U. N. Security Council resolution which laid the political and legal groundwork for a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq, we couldn't help but wonder: Whatever happened to the Powell Doctrine?

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In the aftermath of his military experience in Vietnam, Colin Powell decided that his country should never again be caught in a military quagmire. In the early 1990s, he developed "The Powell Doctrine," a set of criteria to determine when military force should be used: As a last resort, with strong public support and only if there is a well-defined national interest at stake. And it should be executed with overwhelming force and a clear exit strategy.

The impending war in Iraq, however, arguably meets only one criterion of the Powell Doctrine.

Weapons inspectors have just begun their work, which is why France, Russia and China argue that war is not yet a last resort.

Public support for a war in Iraq is hardly strong. In the most recent New York Times/CBS News poll, while a majority of Americans support the use of force as an option, 59 percent want to give the United Nations and weapons inspectors more time.

The divided opinion reflects the lack of a well-defined national interest in going to war now. The Bush administration has tried to portray a pre-emptive war against Iraq as essential to the war on terrorism, but the evidence of "links" between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda is highly questionable.

Some critics suggest the real U.S. motive is access to oil. As early as 1980, President Carter, in referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, declared, "An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

But, if oil is the reason for war, Bush has not been willing to acknowledge it. As the Powell Doctrine asserts, the rationale for war should be forthright and compelling.

An exit strategy is also missing. The United States now plans a military occupation of postwar Iraq, which has the makings of a long, messy, open-ended commitment.

The ability to bring overwhelming force, however, is indisputably in place. The 150,000 U.S. troops, armed with advanced weaponry, are facing an Iraqi military that is significantly weaker than the one that was routed from Kuwait in 1991.

Colin Powell, drawing on his experience and wisdom, had created a clear and compelling doctrine for the use of military force. Regrettably, Bush administration appears to be ignoring those lessons in planning for war in Iraq.


This article first appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle and is reprinted with permission of the author.