With Us or Against Us: Why We Now Have to Put the Matter So Starkly

The United States is drawing lines in the sand, and its European and Middle Eastern allies do not like it. Analysts have pointed out the benefits France accrued from Arab anti-Americanism especially in the aftermath of its 1966 exit from the military command of NATO. Since 9/11, analysts have finally been drawing attention to the manner in which American Middle Eastern allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia have used anti-American propaganda to hold onto power. Blaming the United States for the failings of their own governments deflects the anger of their own people, while pointing to "the street's" anti-Americanism deflects American demands for democratization.

On the European scene, it is impossible to understand the virulent German opposition to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein without noting what Germany has to lose. For as the Berlin-based journalist Michel Verrier writes in the August 2002 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, nothing less is at stake in the Middle East than the country's long term effort "to build on the foundations laid by Kaiser Wilhelm, Bismark and Hitler." After all, German opposition to American efforts to contain and then remove the Iraqi dictator has a striking precedent. Germany strongly opposed the Reagan Administration's effort to punish Muammar Khaddafi for a terrorist attack on American soldiers stationed in their country.

On Saturday, April 5, 1986 a bomb exploded in the La Belle disco in West Berlin. Two people were killed (including a GI), and hundreds were wounded (including 50 to 60 Americans). On March 25, the NSA intercepted a message from Tripoli to several European Libyan embassies reading: "Prepare to carry out the plan." One of the embassies was in East Berlin. Another message from the Libyan embassy in East Berlin to Tripoli reading "We have something planned that will make you happy" was intercepted just before the bombing as was a message reading "an event occurred. You will be pleased with the result" after the bombing. The Reagan administration decided to exercise its right to self-defense, and asked the allies for help.

In his memoir, Turmoil and Triumph, George Shultz describes the European response thus: Margaret Thatcher agreed to cooperate provided the evidence against Libya was made public. The French equivocated over flight rights and "German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher," Shultz recounts, "was on his way to Washington reportedly to tell us that that there was insufficient evidence to justify an attack against Libya. The international "sentiment registered," Shultz sums up, was that Reagan "should put his gun back in his holster."

The United States ignored the hand-wringing and bombed Tripoli. President Reagan told the nation "I warned that there should be no place on earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant it. I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone it necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have." Shultz goes on to describe the popularity of the bombing in both Europe and the US and to celebrate what he calls the "triumph in Tokyo."

That triumph consisted of persuading the seven leading industrial nations meeting in Tokyo to drop the "root cause" argument. Instead the summit declared that "terrorism had no justification" and reaffirmed its "condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support it." This "ringing condemnation," Shultz exalts, "was followed by the commitment to take actions individually and collectively that would place restrictions on the activities of states that sponsored terrorism, apply the rule of law through improved extradition procedures and immigration and visa requirements, and strengthen cooperation among the police, security, and intelligence services of our countries." The message to Khaddafi, Shultz told the press: "You've had it, pal." (pp. 669-688)

He was wrong, of course. Germany ignored American protests and helped Libya, Iraq and Iran to develop chemical weapons. In fact, during the eighties, Germany emerged as the leading arms supplier for the Middle East. German companies cashed in when Israel bought German gas mask to protect itself from the Scud B missiles that Germany helped Iraq acquire before the Gulf war.

Not only did Washington not punish its allies for their fair-weather friendship, but the Bush and Clinton administrations did their level best to aid German unification and went along with Germany's recognition of Croatian independence which opened the Balkan's gates of hell. On the other hand, Tripoli was most grateful. "Germany had always done serious and honest work in our Country," said Saif Al Islam, the son of Muammar Khadaffi to a Der Tagesspeigel reporter in a January 21, 2001. After all, he added, Germany and Libya had long historical links and Khaddafi's first car was a Volkswagen.

An illuminating example of the manner in which secular Khaddafi repaid Germany was his help in improving German relations with the theocratic Taliban regime. After all, in the 1920s Germany helped Afghanistan set up its first national army and Zahir Shah refused allied pleas to expel German nationals from Kabul during World War II. So it was only fair that Germany would lead a 15 country Afghanistan Support Group in efforts to supply Kabul with humanitarian aid. German generosity was rewarded when it got to host the negotiations leading to the selection of Karzai as the interim head of the newly constituted Afghani government and when prominent Afghanis called on the German army to head the multinational force in Kabul. If Verrier is to be believed, Germany was disappointed that Turkey got the assignment.

Is it a wonder that the Bush administration's decision to change the rules of the game and demand active support met with so much hostility? Dan Coats, the American ambassador to Germany, criticized the German government's position on Iraq in an interview with the German News Agency. He was invited to the foreign ministry in Berlin for a dressing down. Not only did Ambassador Coats not back down but Condoleeza Rice made it clear that Schroder's election campaign had poisoned American-German relations. The Germans felt as if a generous and indulgent injured parent had suddenly and unexpectedly laid down the law. Trusting in tradition, the newly reelected Chancellor accepted the resignation of his justice minister who had lost her seat after comparing President Bush's "methods" to those of Hitler and tried to convince his constituents that his cool foreign minister will quickly mend German -American fences.

In the meantime, the German foreign office did what it has always done, tried to exploit its disagreement with the United States to further its interests in the Middle East. On September 30, the German embassy in Cairo posted on its website an unusually lengthy report of the sympathetic Egyprian press coverage of the German-American clash. It begins with the recent German foreign ministry decision to increase the size of embassies in the Arab and Muslim countries in order "to boost dialogue between the Arab and Western cultures, give a correct image about Islam, and build bridges of communication." It continues with the following commentary by the head of Al Ahram's foreign desk: "It seems that Schröder´s campaign came too close to the banned area in the German consciences, unveiling deep and unhealed wounds. Perhaps it is enough for the German citizen to see the US military bases all over the country, to feel hurt in his dignity and pride. This citizen might have been unable to talk in public about these wounds till recently, but he has started to express himself, at last." The October 8th Egyptian press review includes a specific report describing the German Ambassador's emphasis on the fact that both Germany and Egypt hold similar views on Iraq. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer reaffirmed Egyptian-German agreement on this issue not only in his past five visits to Cairo, but also in his recent meeting with his Egyptian counterpart in Washington.

In short, Germany's wish to distance itself from American use of force in the Islamic world are rooted in the same real politics considerations which are at the root of French policy. In the past Cold war needs prevented Washington from exposing this reality. The Bush administration's task is to convince its allies, including Germany, that the period of free ridership is over. This is the reason that George W. Bush refrained from congratulating Schroder on his victory, Donald Rumsfeld snubbed his German counterpart, Richard Perle suggested that Germany forget about becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. The White House also refuses to invite Schroder or Fischer for a friendly chat.

Post 9/11 America can no longer afford to be taken for granted.