Fall From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal (Part 3)
C. Was Homicide Rare?
Bellesiles
claims that, in step with low gun rates, homicide rates were
low
until the Civil War. Bellesiles claims that “[w]hites rarely assaulted
other
whites in the colonies and almost never killed one another.”118 These
claims
are not only unsupported by the evidence he offers, but also false.
Randolph
Roth, who has studied homicide rates throughout early America,
exposes
this error in his review in the William and Mary Quarterly.119 Roth
points
out that homicide rates during much of the seventeenth century were
actually
higher than they are today. In other places and times in early
America,
rates were similar to those today:
The
homicide rate for adult European colonists in New England
before
King Philip’s War was as high as the rate in the United
States
today, 7-9 per 100,000 adults per year. Before the Pequot
War,
the rate was higher still: roughly 110 per 100,000 adults per
year,
or 11 to 14 times the rate today. A number of those colonists
were
murdered by Native Americans, but the homicide rate was
still
very high if one discounts those murders, as Bellesiles does.120
How
does Bellesiles make such a basic error? In part, he just presents
false
counts in the records he cites or makes claims that could not possibly
be
supported by the evidence on which he relies. For example, Bellesiles
claims
that “in forty-six years Plymouth Colony’s courts heard five cases of
assault,
and not a single homicide,” 121 citing
the standard published version
of
seventeenth-century records of Plymouth Colony courts.122
There
are many homicide cases heard in Shurtleff’s Records of the
Colony
of New Plymouth Colony in New England, and they are relatively
easy
to find. One need only look in the indices to find the murder and
manslaughter
prosecutions. As Randolph Roth writes:
The
records cover 1633-1691, with some gaps. Bellesiles does not
state
which 46 years he studied, but every contiguous period of 46
years
contains homicides. The 11 homicides are in 1:96-97; 2:132-
34;
3:70-72, 73, 82, 143, 205, 5:159, 167-68, 264-65, 6:82, 113,
141-42,
153-54; 7:305-07. A probable homicide appears in 2:170-
71,
and 3 suspicious deaths that may have been homicides in 3:202-
03,
217-18, 4:32-33, 5:141. The 3 multiple murders during King
Philip’s
War are in 5:204-06, 209, 224. Three additional murders in
Plymouth
Colony appear in William Bradford, Of Plymouth
Plantation,
1620-1647.123
Relative
to other crimes, homicide prosecutions appear to be common.
Bellesiles
misses every homicide prosecution in these records.
Nearly
as stunning is Bellesiles’s claim: “[D]uring Vermont’s frontier
period,
from 1760 to 1790, there were five reported murders (excluding
those
deaths in the American Revolution), and three of those were
politically
motivated.” 124
The source he
cites for this count is the Vermont
Superior
Court records. He presumably meant the Vermont Supreme Court,
since
Vermont had no Superior Court in that period. But he could not
possibly
have used these Supreme Court records to count murders for
thirty-one
years in Vermont, from 1760 to 1790. As Roth explains about the
Vermont
Supreme Court:
[T]hat
court did not open until December 1778, and its minutes
from
September 1782 to August 1791 have been missing since the
early
twentieth century. In fact, Vermont, together with the rest of
New
England, had an elevated homicide rate during the American
Revolution,
and 70 percent of known adult homicides and probable
homicides
in Vermont, 1760-1790, were committed with guns.125
Thus,
Bellesiles could not have counted Vermont murders during 1760-
1790
in the source he cites because that source did not exist for more than
half
of the period and is lost for most of the rest of the period. Where did
Bellesiles
come up with his numbers for thirty-one years of Vermont data?
We
may never know.
These
are not the only problems with Bellesiles’s accounts of murder.
His
counts in his main table of homicide data (Table 6)126 do not add up. He
relates
that he has 735 cases of homicide and that he drew 501 cases from
one
source and “an additional 184 cases” 127 from a list of newspapers. But
this
still leaves Bellesiles exactly fifty cases short of his total of 735 cases.
Where
did the other fifty cases come from? Readers are left to speculate.
Finally,
Bellesiles’s unsupported claim that homicide rates rose after
the
Civil War128 is much too simple a story.
Just as the gun culture and the
romance
of the gun were supposedly taking over (in the decades after the
Civil
War), homicide rates were actually plummeting throughout much of
the
country, while in the Reconstruction South murder was rising.129 The
relationship
between guns and homicides over time is so complex that it
cannot
be reduced to the easy formula put forward in Arming America that
high
gun ownership and high homicide rates go together.
D. Were Privately Owned
Guns Mostly in Poor
Working Condition?
While
it is not surprising that government-owned guns might be rusting
away
in armories during peacetime, Bellesiles claims that guns in private
hands
were also mostly old or broken. For example, he claims that 53% of
the
guns in frontier probate inventories were listed as broken or defective:
“An
examination of more than a thousand probate records from the
frontiers
of northern New England and western Pennsylvania for the years
1765
to 1790 revealed that only 14 percent of the inventories included
firearms;
over half (53 percent) of these guns were listed as broken or
otherwise
defective.” 130
Bellesiles
makes a similar claim about the guns
listed
in Providence, Rhode Island, probate inventories: “More than half of
these
guns are evaluated as old and of poor quality.”131
Neither
claim is true. Justin Heather and I have completed a careful
analysis
of data from four of the six counties in Bellesiles’s 1765-1790
frontier
sample (those from Vermont) and a partial analysis of inventories
from
the other two counties (those from Western Pennsylvania). So far the
rate
of guns “listed” as old or broken is less than 15%, not the 53% that
Bellesiles
claims.132 Bellesiles’s own website
report on guns in frontier
Vermont
now shows very few listed as old or broken.133
As
to the Providence, Rhode Island, data, Bellesiles has dropped the
claim
from the hardback edition of Arming America that the guns in the
inventories
were evaluated as old or broken and now claims that the
majority
of guns are so low-valued that he reappraises them as old or
broken.134 There are a number of
problems with this claim. Most important,
historians
should not reappraise 300-year old guns that they have never
seen
based solely on evidence of their monetary value. Bellesiles does not
provide
a sufficient basis for his reappraisal. He does not reappraise a few
very
low-valued guns. Rather, he appraises the median-priced gun in
Providence
as old or broken. The best evidence we have for what a typical
gun
cost in Providence, Rhode Island, is the very probate data showing that
guns
cost about one pound.135
This is
consistent with other data, as I show
in
the next Section. A new military-quality weapon in a time of war might
go
for two to three times that amount, but that does not mean that an
ordinary
working gun or fowling piece in a time of peace would go for
more
than about a pound. In addition, Bellesiles should have at least
disclosed
the fact that he made such a reappraisal in his original
publication.
Instead, he claimed this reappraisal only after his error was
exposed.
Finally,
as to the frontier data on dysfunctional guns, Bellesiles says
that
they are listed as such. It is not possible to change this claim based
on a
reappraisal.
Of the estates that Heather and I examined, 83-91% of them
listed
guns that were not described as old or broken.136 This does not, of
course,
indicate that most of these guns were of military quality or even
suitable
for battle. Many were undoubtedly fowling pieces, better suited for
hunting
birds. But this is solid evidence that many Americans owned
functioning
guns.
E. How Expensive Were
Guns?
Michael
Bellesiles claims that guns were too expensive for widespread
private
ownership, a claim that has often been repeated by positive
reviewers.137 Bellesiles writes that “a
flintlock cost £4 to £5.” 138
Of
course, everything was expensive in colonial America for a
populace
that was very poor by today’s standards. Reviewers apparently
failed
to note that Bellesiles provides no source for his claim about what
guns
cost. Yet good evidence exists, and it conflicts with Bellesiles’s claim.
First,
there are auction data. In North Carolina auctions in 1774, a
simple
“gun” sold for less than £1 (median price: £0.8).139 This was
roughly
the same as a table, a chair, a dictionary, a great coat, or a saddle.140
Comparing
the cost of buying a simple shotgun or pistol at Wal-Mart today
to
buying these other items would suggest that guns were not relatively
more
expensive then than they are today.
We
also have extensive probate data from the colonial period, most of
which
shows median prices for guns not listed as old or broken from just
under
£1 to about £1.5.141
Further, with
median probated estate sizes in
1774
of more than £200,142
a gun at about
£1 was a relatively minor
expense.
Even if one rightly assumes that probated estates are skewed
toward
the wealthier decedents, an analysis of the effect of wealth shows
that
guns were listed in substantial portions of estates above the very
poorest.143 Only for estates below £10
did fewer than thirty percent of
inventories
list guns. And, whatever the cost, people bought guns before
other
seeming essentials. In the earlier colonial period, Gloria Main and
Anna
Hawley both found more guns than tables or chairs or stools.144 When
men
could afford to buy a gun, they did.145 This suggests either that they