The Army on Thursday published a long-awaited study of the U.S. war in Iraq that criticizes decisions of some of the service’s most senior officers and outlines some hard-learned lessons from the eight-year-long conflict.

The two-volume study, written by a team of army officers, was commissioned in 2013 by Gen. Ray Odierno, when he was serving as the Army chief of staff, and a draft was finished by June 2016.

The Wall Street Journal reported in October that the publication of the history had been stymied, as senior officials worried about the study’s impact on the reputation of prominent officers and congressional support for the service. Some lawmakers urged the Army to make the history public as soon as possible.

The history, which totals more than 1,300 pages, now is posted on the U.S. Army War College website, along with more than 1,000 declassified documents that were used in the research.

The study draws sharp conclusions about the U.S. failure to train Iraqi forces so they could become self-reliant; the limitations of coalition warfare; and Washington’s inability to deter Iran and Syria from giving sanctuary and support to militant groups.