Studying Crowds is out of Fashion for Historians—Here's Why We Should

Recent and current events in the ongoing Arab Spring and now the Occupy movement should remind us of the complex role of crowds in history.  Lots of scholars are looking at the ongoing developments, of course, but I think mainly in terms of social justice goals rather than crowd dynamics.  Both are important, but we don’t want to forget about the crowd aspect.

Those of us social historians of a certain age cut our eye teeth on crowds, with the work of George Rudé, Eric Hobsbawm, and Charles Tilly.  In the 1960s, the relevance of this aspect of social history to the world around us seemed obvious and fascinating.  We learned about the rationality of crowds, the careful selection of targets, and how crowd action could turn into larger social and political change.

Then crowds went out of fashion, and I actually wonder how many historians have recently given any thought to crowds or, more important, taught about them. It’s certainly time for a revival.

And it’s an ideal moment, as well, for some debate over what historical findings can be applied to current crowd situations.  There are, after all, historical moments when crowds formed and nothing happened.  The relationship between crowds and the wider public is crucial.  So too is the choice of targets – the Occupy movement, in contrast to the Arab Spring, may be unusual in having goals that are not very clearly linked to what a crowd can aim for, other than locating its action in the neighborhood of villains like Wall Street.  Crowds and violence form a crucial topic.  Occupy is now being urged, by well-wishers, to adhere strictly to the law, lest the public be alienated—but this is not necessarily the most fruitful crowd tactic historically.

There’s also always the question of police tactics and how they impact wider public reactions, and comparisons between pepper spray, the Arab Spring, and earlier crowd situations that led to wider outcomes are welcome.  The same invitation to historical comparisons applies to conservative efforts, then and now, to dismiss crowds as merely irrational and scruffy.

We also have to consider change.  Crowds face more daunting repressive technology than they did in the heyday of the kinds of crowds Rudé studied—it’s harder to move from crowd action to real seizure of power than it once was, as the Arab Spring demonstrates and, indeed, as China demonstrated in 1989.  Connections between crowds and politics, a crucial topic for Occupy, may be more difficult as well, particularly in an American culture that has taught so many people the importance of emotional and behavioral restraint and in a political structure so resistant to wide popular input.

Once in a great while, historically, crowds merely have to show up in numbers and passion, and change results.  This was the scenario in 1989-1991 in east-central Europe, when regimes were so devoid of self-confidence or support—given developments in Russia—that they faded at the mere sight of committed crowds.  But this is unusual, perhaps even misleading, for historically crowd action requires a greater tactical sense and more risk.

The main point, at this juncture, particularly for those historians who would like the current moment to translate into substantive change, is to urge renewed analysis and a clear juxtaposition of historical findings (including incorporation of recent changes in context) to the present moment, and on a global scale.  Some historical staples don’t go away, despite the faddishness of many historian practitioners.

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