Prof. Donald Boudreaux dumps on poor old Louis XVI as an “absolute monarch” who “created no wealth,” but rather was a “predator” who “destroyed wealth,” one assumes, by taxation.

While I am no great defender of the Bourbons, apart from their having helped the American Revolution, I believe the history of that period, and ours, is a bit more complex than that.

Whether ill gotten or not, a major motivation for the ostentatious display of wealth in a given social system is to establish status and hierarchy. A great virtue of the American system is that it has made it possible, for example, for virtually everyone to own an automobile as a means of transportation

It, therefore, becomes essential to establish the car as something much more than that! An Acura model has the only overall 5 star safety rating, but that brand (really a spruced up Honda Accord) has never achieved the status of a Lexus, Mercedes, Rolls, or Jaguar, and is rather boring because it is never in the repair shop as much either, which makes it something of a best-buy in the luxury category.

One could extend that example indefinitely to other items, the more related to “conspicuous consumption,” the better – that are not really important as an essential part of a decent lifestyle. Good ‘ol Thorstein V. called it “The Theory of the Leisure Class,” and I have always had a certain sympathy for the wealthy caught in that cultural syndrome, even if their wealth was in some cases a bit tainted.

The Bourbons were caught in a very different situation. The great historian Carroll Quigley, for one, pointed out in The Evolution of Civilizations (for which I am proud to have contributed a Bibliographical Note) that the French system was not that centralized, absolute structure argued by many historians, but rather much less centralized than the emerging British system of that time.

In short, the French system was much more feudal than the British, with the aristocrats in the provinces having considerably more power.

While the Parliament in GB might ameliorate some of the absolute power of the British monarch after the English Revolution, it was also part of a very powerful emerging British “State System,” including a much more efficient tax system with which, in Boudreaux’s terminology, the State could expropriate “wealth.”

The on-going fiscal problems of the French State were a reflection of its still relatively feudal condition. The ostentatious nature of Versailles, ironically, was in no small part an effort to partially curtail the real power of the aristocracy by bringing them there for fun and games for extended periods, thus luring them away from their provincial power bases.

The real centralization of State Power in France was, of course, brought about by the French Revolution and Napoleon.

Interestingly, the French system can be seen in an even purer form in the Tokugawa system in Japan at roughly the same time, a brilliant plan to break the power of the feudal aristocracy by keeping them at court for part of the year in a carefully thought out virtually checker-board pattern, thus keeping feudal lords from cooperating against the center.

The story of “The 47 Ronins,” Japan’s greatest story of the period is a magnificent recounting of that system, and draws new versions each year, even today.

So, I would suggest, Louis’ power was less than absolute, and he was having to try all sorts of schemes to make ends meet, all of which rather exhausted a guy also keeping a few mistresses on the side.