Max Holland: An Old Schism Haunts the 9/11 Commission





[Mr. Holland, a contributing editor at the Nation magazine, was a research fellow with the Presidential Recordings Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs from 1998 to 2003.]

Although attention largely focused on the solemn ceremonies, the most remarkable feature of the events marking the fifth anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks may have been the 9/11 Commission's reversion to its repressed partisanship.

The precipitating factor was the seal of approval Thomas Kean bestowed on a controversial ABC miniseries that tended to ascribe a larger portion of the blame for 9/11 to the Clinton administration (although, in truth, the Bush administration did not go unscathed). Kean, a Republican former governor who chaired the commission, had been instrumental in keeping the panel on a more or less bipartisan page. But the price of unity had always been that everyone within sight was described as in some way to blame, which is another way of finding that no one was. The docudrama strove to accomplish the opposite. Thus, Kean's endorsement of The Path to 9/11 as "true to the spirit" of what had happened was tantamount to tearing up an agreed-upon script, a provocative thing to do just weeks before a national election. Some of his former Democratic colleagues responded in kind.

Generating an aura of political bipartisanship had never been easy. In April 2004, during the public-hearings phase of its investigation, the panel gave every sign of becoming unhinged, with the sessions in Washington coming to resemble an intensely combative congressional investigation. Democratic members sought to pin the lion's share of responsibility for 9/11 onto the Bush administration because it had ostensibly disregarded an ample warning. Republicans countered by depicting a Clinton administration that had vacillated after U.S. embassies and the USS Cole burned.

Under increasing criticism, the commission managed to close ranks, and in July 2004 it delivered a report that was an instant and widely praised best-seller. The government's subsequent, and massive, reorganization of the intelligence community, instigated in part by the report, also burnished the commission's image.

THE BLAME GAME—In the two years since the report's publication, some of the sheen has worn off, as it has become apparent that to achieve unanimity the commission took a bipartisan dive. The report is compelling when the subject is Al Qaeda and its plot. But whenever the issue is how Washington let that plot be carried out, the historical analysis is underwhelming. The narrative reads like "an elephant rolling a pea," as a review by Loch Johnson, a University of Georgia political scientist, put it. "Especially disturbing [was] the inability of the commission—or, more likely . . . its unwillingness—to assign any blame among intelligence managers or policymakers." The only thing worse than this lack of accountability, as previously reported in these pages, was the commission's decision to deny the public access to the information it had assiduously collected from government files. This barring of access insures that the panel's non-interpretation will reign supreme until at least January 2009.

The authors of the 9/11 report tried to mask this deficit with a catchy theme: 9/11 happened, first and foremost, they maintained, because of a "failure of imagination" in two successive administrations. Problem is, the facts the commission presented not only failed to support this idea, they eviscerated it. If there truly was a failure of imagination, how was it that CIA director George Tenet declared war on Al Qaeda in 1998? Similarly, on August 29, 2001, an FBI agent (identified only as "Steve" in the report) e-mailed an FBI analyst (named "Jane") and demonstrated a very lucid conception of the stakes. "Steve" angrily wrote that "someday [Americans] will die [and] the public will not understand why we were not more effective" in tracking down Khalid al Mihdhar. Thirteen days later, al Mihdhar helped crash American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon.

There was no failure of imagination. But there was a failure of will and implementation, an inability to come to grips with a lethal, implacable threat. What the ABC docudrama managed to do was reopen a political divide that the 9/11 commissioners had so scrupulously sought to paper over.

CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND—Another notable feature of the fifth anniversary is the rise of conspiracy theories about what happened on September 11. According to recent polls, about 36 percent of Americans now believe that the U.S. government had an as-yet-undisclosed hand in the catastrophic events.

This development, in one sense, was entirely predictable five years ago, and nothing can be done about it. Nearly 65 years after the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor, there still exists a hard-core group who believe Franklin Roosevelt knew about the exact coordinates of the surprise attack, but let it proceed because he was hellbent on entering the war.

The "paranoid style," as historian Richard Hofstadter dubbed it in 1964, has always been a feature of American politics. Still, there is something unsettling when, two years after release of the 9/11 report, the doubters total more than one-third of those polled. The reason for this may be the report's failure to satisfy Americans' thirst for a coherent explanation for the calamity. Here, the aftermath of the 1941 assault on Pearl Harbor provides some insights.

After the surprise attack on the base, Roosevelt appointed the so-called Roberts Commission, headed by Justice Owen Roberts of the Supreme Court, to investigate why the United States was caught unawares. As with any such inquiry, the selection of who would do the investigating was of paramount importance. That would turn out to be the panel's Achilles' heel, in addition to the brevity of its probe and lack of access to critical information. Roberts, a Republican, was chosen because he had made his mark investigating the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s. The four other panel members were military men, two handpicked by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and two by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. What made this odd was that Knox and Stimson headed the very departments that were the subjects of investigation. One of the generals selected by Stimson, moreover, was a close personal friend of thirty years' standing.

Critics rightly pointed to these built-in conflicts when they charged the panel with having a hopeless bias against the U.S. commanders in Hawaii, while de-emphasizing, if not ignoring, equal or greater mistakes that had been made in Washington. Ultimately, the Roberts Commission did not put questions about the attack to rest; its performance generated controversy and spawned conspiracy theories.

Something of the same phenomenon may be happening with the 9/11 panel, and for similar reasons. It would have been more appropriate for Jamie Gorelick, who served for three years as Clinton's deputy attorney general, to appear before the panel solely as a sworn witness; instead she was one of the most active of the ten commissioners who shaped the report.

Likewise, historians will one day ponder why Philip Zelikow was selected as the commission's executive director. A friend of Condoleezza Rice's since their days together on the National Security Council under George H.W. Bush, Zelikow was a key member of Rice's transition team in 2000 and 2001 and was instrumental in the pivotal decision to demote counter-terrorism "czar" Richard Clarke. After 9/11, Zelikow remained an outside adviser to Rice, helping to draft the administration's 2002 national security blueprint for unilateral, pre-emptive military action—the framework for the invasion of Iraq. Without Precedent is the title of Kean's recently co-authored memoir about the commission's work, an apt choice considering that the panel featured a staff director who had to oversee the investigation, testify, and recuse himself simultaneously.

Since February 2005, Zelikow has been counselor to now Secretary of State Rice. It's a textbook case of what Ralph Nader calls Washington's "deferred bribe syndrome." (Disclosure: From 1999 to 2003, this author worked at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs while Zelikow was its director.)

ILL-CONCEIVED SPEECHES—The fifth anniversary of 9/11 also afforded George Bush a natural opportunity to deploy a president's ultimate asset, an address to the nation from the Oval Office. And once again, Bush used the occasion to promote his foreign policy of crackpot Wilsonianism.

Bush's cleverness (and presumably Karl Rove's) rests on his dressing up an untenable, insolvent policy with words that tug at the heart and mind of nearly every citizen. What American would declare him- or herself squarely opposed to democracy? Or against freedom?

Immediately after 9/11, the administration faced a choice: to address, via politico-military means, the threat posed by Al Qaeda, or to exploit the occasion to smite all of America's real or presumed enemies. The president has repeatedly assured Americans that what he is doing is only the contemporary version of FDR's call to arms to defeat fascism, or Harry Truman's policy of containing communism. Ten years from now, Condoleezza Rice has claimed, the Bush era will be seen as the flowering of a new golden age of U.S. power and diplomacy, akin to the period when the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO laid the groundwork for a prosperous and democratic Western Europe.

The only thing more astounding than the administration's staggering hubris is the smugness of its ignorance. Bush has not reinvented a contemporary version of containment but rather is engaged in a twenty-first-century version of rollback, an aggressive policy of combating communism that had been discredited by the mid-1950s.

Bush's latest mantra is that the world is a better place with Saddam Hussein stripped of power. Who would deny that? It's also true that the world would have been a better place in 1950 if Joseph Stalin had been deposed. But presidents from Truman to Bush's own father moved cautiously against the citadels of communist power, avoiding war until the Soviet empire imploded because of its own internal weakness. Bush and Rice would have Americans believe that the same nation that contained the Soviet empire for forty-five years was incapable of keeping Saddam Hussein in check.

By invading Iraq pre-emptively and under a false premise, Bush opened a second front before defeating Al Qaeda, giving it another theater of operations, a powerful recruiting tool, and training grounds. Meanwhile, the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan. Widening the war to include Iraq also squandered much international goodwill toward the U.S. in the wake of 9/11. World opinion, although intangible, always matters, but seldom as much as it does here.

Judging from the president's fifth-anniversary address, he remains bent on exaggerating Al Qaeda's deadly but limited menace into a polarizing, world-historical clash. His analysis threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the ideology of jihad has been, if anything, spreading. Five years into what Bush initially termed a crusade, there is a growing mismatch between the president's aim of remaking the world and America's not unlimited means.

If this isn't crackpot Wilsonianism, then it's a simpleton's view of history from a president who has watched one too many John Wayne movies.




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Lawrence Brooks Hughes - 9/24/2006

It is very difficult for me to disagree with Condi Rice when she says anyone looking back ten years from now will notice the enormous pivot taken by U.S. foreign policy starting five years ago. The old line preached by Scowcroft, Powell (and scribes at The Nation), held that people like the Afghans and Iraqis were not capable of democratic self-government. The new line is that the United States believes they are. But one should also consider the totality of the Bush foreign policy, not just its application in wartorn areas. Our government today supports Ukraine, Lebanon, and any number of other countries in quest of democracy. What's wrong with that? Is it at odds with the spirit of 1776? Of course not. It is in sync with 1776 and the good wishes of most Americans ever since. We also are building strong relations with India, which is more friendly with us today than at any time since its independence. In addition, our new policy of "glastnost" toward the United Nations has been extremely successful, and all the corruption of that organization has finally spilled out to inform the public. This particularly nasty genie will never return to his bottle, and we should be very proud of Bush for liberated him. As for the liberations of Iraq and Afghanistan, they have cost us the lives of roughly 500 volunteer soldiers per year--not a prohibitive price. We regularly lose something like 500 soldiers to military accidents every year in peacetime. The war launched by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson cost us 56,000 men, or about 7,000 per year, half of them conscripted, and the war launched by President Truman cost another 50,000. I wish Americans on the Left, who are at perfect liberty to loathe George Bush and Karl Rove as much as they please, would judge our national foreign policy on its merits, and not through the lens of their hatred for Bush. By any yardstick the current president's foreign policies have been extremely successful.


Don Williams - 9/19/2006

The most scary thing about Sept 11 is that --5 years later -- the US news media is still refusing to tell America WHY the attack occurred. President Bush lied about that issue from day 1 -- and was allowed to do so by the news media.

The 911 Commission refused to address
the subject -- Harvard historian and Commission staffer Ernest May admitted
as much in his New Republic article.
In its 9/11 movie, ABC TV continued the coverup that began on Sept 11.
It boasted of its reporter interviewing Bin Laden circa 1998 --but refused to tell US viewers what Bin Laden said.

2) Without the support and shelter of the Islamic people, Al Qaeda is little
more than a street gang. The most effective way to locate,weaken and
destroy Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups would be to address the Islamic
world's major and justified grievances against the acts of the US
government --grievances which Bin Laden exploits. But that will not happen because the US news media, like US politicians, serves , supports, and protects the wealthy special interests who provoked the Sept 11 attack. So 5 years later, we are $2+ Trillion deep in debt , our Bill of Rights is in shreds, and we have lost 2000+ more dead and tens of thousands wounded --some maimed for life.

3) In 1997 and 1998 interviews with US TV networks and in his fatwas, Bin
Laden explicitly stated three reasons why the Islamic world should wage war
on America:
a) The US government has kept the corrupt Saudi dictatorship in power for decades so that US oil companies could steal the only wealth and future the Saudi people have. (Note: Some people may know of the massive number of advanced weapons the US gives to the Saudi dictatorship -- and to the dictatorships of Kuwait and UAE. But most US citizens don't know that the US defense contractors --with the encouragement and support of the US government -- have trained, advised and armed the Saudi Gestapo for decades.)
b) The US government intentionally killed over 600,000 children in Iraq by destroying Iraqi water plants and then encouraging the spread of deadly
epidemics by blocking Iraqi import of water purification chemicals and
forcing people in a desert land to drink polluted water. A rather nasty way to encourage rebellion against Saddam Hussein. But when Madeleine Albright was asked by 60 Minutes circa 1996 if the massive number of dead children was worth it, she said yes.
c) The US government has destroyed the Palestinian people by enormous
transfers of military arms and money to support Israeli aggression. After
living in refugee camps for decades, the Palestinian average annual income
is roughly $1600. (Note: Bin Laden reiterated this point in Nov 2001, in
news interviews after Sept 11. In early 2001, Arial Sharon used US-made
F16 jets to bomb Palestinians. Bush halted protests by the State Department and responded to world protests by selling Sharon 52 more F16s in June 2001. The order to execute the Sept 11 attack was issued in July 2001.)

4) So --with the aid of the news media -- how did Bush respond to 911? He lied to the American people about why the attack occurred
("They hate our freedom"). He had Condi Rice twist the arms of US TV
network CEOs to block future broadcasts of Bin Laden's grievances. He invaded Iraq and killed tens of thousands more Iraqis in order to seize non-existent WMDs, based upon "false intelligence" provided by Ahmad Chalabi.

Next, Condi Rich --she who had a Chevron oil tanker named after her -- welcomed Iraq's new Minister of Oil:

Ahmad Chalabi.


John H. Lederer - 9/18/2006

"Immediately after 9/11, the administration faced a choice: to address, via politico-military means, the threat posed by Al Qaeda, or to exploit the occasion to smite all of America's real or presumed enemies."


The only threat is Al Qaeda?

One can not merely "smite" other real enemies but must also smite "presumed" ones?

"Smiting" ia all that one can do to real enemies other than Al Qaeda? No politico-military means?

What precisely, aside from the length of the words,the Latin roots and pretension, distinguishes "politico-military means" from common everday "smiting"?

Can we look at bodies around a bomb crater and say some were "addressed with politico-military means" while others were smitten?


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