CSIS's Tony Cordesman has released a new report on the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces.  I haven't had time to read the whole thing, but it's rather grim.  Cordesman reports (pp. 52-53) for example that:

there have been many occasions on which various Iraqi forces have failed to perform their missions both as a result of these insurgent attacks, a lack of leadership and integrity on the part of some Iraqi officers, and a lack of experience and dedication on the part of other ranks.

The failure of the Iraqi police forces in Mosul during and after the battle of Fallujah in November 2004, and the need to dismiss their commander Brigadier General Mohammed Keri Barhawi is only one example of such problems.  Nearly 75% of some 4,000 Iraqi forces deserted when insurgents attacked on November 12, 2004, in the midst of the US-Iraqi attack on insurgents in Fallujah. The ranks of Iraqi National Guard units dropped from 1,100 to 300 men in hours, and two companies -- some 200 men -- abandoned all of their equipment. The 106th Iraqi National Guard Battalion did well, but the 307th Battalion virtually disintegrated.

Somewhat similar failures occurred in Samarra, although at a much lower level. Some 2,000 Iraqi troops did join the US forces fighting to retake the city in October 2004, but only after some 300 men out of a 750-man battalion deserted before the fighting even began.

At the same time, Iraqi forces are showing that they can be effective when they have the proper leadership, organization, training, equipment, and facilities. Some have fought well in demanding battles and engagements, and even less combat-capable forces like the police are taking hold in many areas.

He goes on to explain how the Iraqi forces, in general, do not have proper leadership, organization, training, equipment, and facilities.