Incompetence and Assessment
My father sent along a link to a article: he didn't think much of it, and was actually sending it along as an example of a self-evident proposition the empirical demonstration of which required extensive effort and for which someone got academic credit. Goodness knows there's lots of that out there: eating too much junk is bad for you, as is sitting around doing nothing but watching TV; that sort of thing (as my father says,"anything, in sufficient quantities, will kill you"). My personal favorite, also sent along by my father, I think, was the research showing that children who scored high on" curiousity" as three year-olds performed better in the first two years of school than children who had scored poorly; the Boston-based researchers did the research on children somewhere in the Caribbean, obviously requiring regular return visits, probably during the colder periods of the school year (in-class observation had to be part of the process).
This article, though, is much more interesting: Justin Kruger and David Dunning (Department of Psychology, Cornell University),"Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77:6 (Dec 1999), 1121-1134. The abstract concludes [emphasis added and some statistical notations removed throughout]
Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. Although their test scores put them in the 12th percentile, they estimated themselves to be in the 62nd. Several analyses linked this miscalibration to deficits in metacognitive skill, or the capacity to distinguish accuracy from error. Paradoxically, improving the skills of participants, and thus increasing their metacognitive competence, helped them recognize the limitations of their abilities."In essence," they continue,"we argue that the skills that engender competence in a particular domain are often the very same skills necessary to evaluate competence in that domain–one's own or anyone else's." This isn't actually terribly original: they cite a pretty good stack of previous studies demonstrating that deep incompetence affects not just performance but evaluation. Even grading cannot improve the situation short term:"bottom-quartile participants failed to gain insight into their own performance after seeing the more competent choices of their peers. If anything, bottom-quartile participants tended to raise their already inflated self-estimates, although not to a significant degree." People can learn to recognize their level of incompetence:
In fact, the training packet was so successful that those who had originally scored in the bottom quartile were just as accurate in monitoring their test performance as were those who had initially scored in the top quartile. ... To be sure, participants still overestimated their logical reasoning ability, and their performance on the test relative to their peers, but they were considerably more calibrated overall and were no longer miscalibrated with respect to their raw test score.Still, without tailored pre-training (which didn't actually raise the test scores much), incompetents remained very poor judges of performance.
In their analysis section the authors ask"Although our analysis suggests that incompetent individuals are unable to spot their poor performances themselves, one would have thought negative feedback would have been inevitable at some point in their academic career. So why had they not learned?" Some of the answers are predictable: politeness, mistaken attribution of failure to other factors, lack of self-correction opportunities, selective self-awareness and relative lack of transparency of the success of others. I would add two factors which they do not address, related to the structure of academic enterprises: social promotion (including higher-ed "retention") and the use of student evaluations in hiring/retention/tenure/promotion decisions.
To some extent, this study is a demonstration of something that I've been saying for years: experimental psychology is the study of undergraduates, particularly psychology majors: in this case, Cornell students getting extra credit in psych. On the other hand, that more strongly supports my reaction: Quantitative student feedback is deeply flawed data and should be used only very carefully. Minor differences in scores are meaningless; major differences in scores may be meaningful only if outliers and course level and other known independent variables are controlled for.
Something to think about while we're handing out those [censored] bubble forms....