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Two good points are raised.
The first seems to be that, if we are unfortunate enough to have our public transport system run by or controlled by the state, then we are also to suffer the further misfortune that a mimicing of even some of the benefits that a privatized system might deliver, is nonetheless to be disallowed. While I see where you're coming from, this still seems counter-intuitive for those who are, to all intents and purposes, obliged to use the system.
Secondly, there would be no need, were there effective laws in place. But, no I wouldn't consider it a threat to Liberty, if such behaviour would be the probable result in a libertarian polity. Otherwise we would seem to forced into the apparently contradictory position that a libertarian polity would also be a threat to Liberty. There would seem to be an apparent equivocation in use of the term liberty being used to make this argument work.
And thirdly, even if you do consider the ban unjustified, but the behaviour of the so-called protesters unpleasant, why not take a somewhat more measured approach to their behaviour than the one taken - which seems to wholeheartedly endorse it.
As you would expect, I agree that the private owner of a transport system has the right to ban the consumption of alcohol on his or her justly acquired property. However, I don't think it follows that Transport for London, an arm of the state, has a corresponding right to ban the consumption of alcohol on the property that the state recognizes as being under its control. There is a huge difference between justly acquired private property and state property.
That aside, and accepting your argument, why is it necessary to make the consumption of alcohol a criminal offense if inebriation and urination in public are already crimes (which they are)? The police and the courts have sufficient powers to arrest people engaged in these unpleasant activities if they choose to exercise those powers. Would you not agree that the expansion of this sort of police power is a threat to our liberties in and of itself?
I would have more respect for the people of London had they done this after the ban went into effect.
I attempted to use the Circle Line on Saturday night, having failed to inform myself of this so-called party. This was a minor inconvenience - apart from the unpleasantness of having to make my way out of a threatening and puke-filled station - I resolved the problem by walking part of the way to my destination instead. This was presumably a one-off protest, and is not, of itself, of very much significance.
The wider question is whether the Mayor of London was right to impose the ban on consumption of alcohol on the London Transport system. This was done (in part) because the Mayor believes - I think correctly - that the majority of LT users would prefer not to have to face inebriates during the course of their journeys. I share this preference. The contrary case has been made earlier on this website: that it is an action that no politician should undertake because it represents an infringement of individual liberty.
Let us consider the counterfactual situation in some Libertarian alternative polity, where public transport is run by a variety of competing companies. Let us suppose, furthermore, that one of these companies, seeking to attract custom from those who do not enjoy the company of drunks, imposes an alcohol ban on its lines. Let us additionally suppose that its competitors, seeing that they are losing business as a result, impose similar bans.
My question is this : do we think that a fundamental infringement of individual liberties has thereby occurred. Or do we think that, private companies are merely exercising their rights to run their affairs as they think fit? I presume the answer is the latter. In which case, we need to ask the further question as to whether the mayor's action - in the unfortunate situation that such policies cannot be enacted privately - is really quite such an infringement of rights as seems sometimes to be implied. I suggest that the answer is no. By saying this, I do not doubt that Boris Johnson imposed the ban in his first days in office for all the usual, rather disreputable reasons as well as the stated one. We should not however allow this to blind us to the fact that the individual liberty argument is more complex than rather specious soundbites might imply