Apr 7, 2007
A Rothbardian Take on the French and Indian War:
For those interested in early American history or military history, I strongly recommend Fred Anderson's THE WAR THAT MADE AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005). Not merely is it a captivating read, but its overall interpretation of the French and Indian War is amazingly similar to Murray Rothbard's in volume 2 of his CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY: "SALUTARY NEGLECT"; THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1975), despite the fact that Anderson probably never heard of Rothbard.
Anderson previously wrote a much longer book on the same subject, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEAR'S WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). One of the few comprehensive studies of that conflict since the classic, multi-volume works of Francis Parkman and Lawrence Henry Gipson, it became the basis for a PBS series on "The War that Made America," which in turn was converted into the newer, shorter book. Yet of the two books, THE WAR THAT MADE AMERICA is of much greater interest to libertarians, not only because it is more succinct, but also because it goes deeper into the war's background, becomes less caught up in military minutia, and does a better job of keeping the Indians in proper focus throughout the later stages of the war.
Rather than treating the conflict as primarily between the British and French empires, THE WAR THAT MADE AMERICA places the Indians center stage right from the outset. And it does so without viewing them all collectively as victims. Indeed, they become sophisticated and diverse players in Anderson's account. Like Rothbard, he singles out the Iroquois for their brutal imperialism against other Indian groups, and he even goes further in implicating the Iroquois' Covenant Chain alliance with the British for the war's outbreak. Also like Rothbard, Anderson is sympathetic to Pennsylvania's pacifism in earlier conflicts, explaining how it contributed to the colony becoming one of the most prosperous in British North America--until the policy was undermined by, among other factors, the conniving of Benjamin Franklin. Anderson's account coincides with Rothbard in making clear that the British were all along a major aggressive threat to the French in North America rather than vice versa, as alleged in so many Anglo-centric accounts. Anderson likewise emphasizes attempted land engrossment by men such as Franklin and George Washington. Finally, like Rothbard, Anderson demonstrates how costly to the British were the ultra war policies of William Pitt the Elder after his rise to power.
Anderson's discussion of the war's conduct, although obviously far more detailed than Rothbard's, has intriguing parallels with Rothbard's treatment of the later Revolutionary War in a subsequent volume of CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY. Rothbard followed the then "new" military history in stressing the critical but often neglected role of the American militia during the Revolution. Anderson does the same for the military role of the Indians, who in previous accounts tend to be treated as superfluous auxiliaries of little genuine value. Anderson illustrates how the Indians gathered intelligence, affected logistics, and provided other vital services that could spell the difference between battlefield victory or defeat. He furthermore chronicles a strategic debate among the French that was echoed in the debate about military strategy that American revolutionaries would later carry on. Whereas New France's Governor-General Vaudreuil favored LA GUERRE SAUVAGE, an irregular strategy that relied heavily on Indian allies and Canadian militia, the marquis de Montcalm preferred imposing the strictures of conventional European warfare with nearly exclusive reliance on regulars. Anderson suggests that Montcalm's winning of this strategic debate was a major cause of France's ultimate military defeat in the war.
To top if off, Anderson's WAR THAT MADE AMERICA is exceedingly well written, and an excellent introduction for anyone unfamiliar with the period.
Anderson previously wrote a much longer book on the same subject, CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEAR'S WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). One of the few comprehensive studies of that conflict since the classic, multi-volume works of Francis Parkman and Lawrence Henry Gipson, it became the basis for a PBS series on "The War that Made America," which in turn was converted into the newer, shorter book. Yet of the two books, THE WAR THAT MADE AMERICA is of much greater interest to libertarians, not only because it is more succinct, but also because it goes deeper into the war's background, becomes less caught up in military minutia, and does a better job of keeping the Indians in proper focus throughout the later stages of the war.
Rather than treating the conflict as primarily between the British and French empires, THE WAR THAT MADE AMERICA places the Indians center stage right from the outset. And it does so without viewing them all collectively as victims. Indeed, they become sophisticated and diverse players in Anderson's account. Like Rothbard, he singles out the Iroquois for their brutal imperialism against other Indian groups, and he even goes further in implicating the Iroquois' Covenant Chain alliance with the British for the war's outbreak. Also like Rothbard, Anderson is sympathetic to Pennsylvania's pacifism in earlier conflicts, explaining how it contributed to the colony becoming one of the most prosperous in British North America--until the policy was undermined by, among other factors, the conniving of Benjamin Franklin. Anderson's account coincides with Rothbard in making clear that the British were all along a major aggressive threat to the French in North America rather than vice versa, as alleged in so many Anglo-centric accounts. Anderson likewise emphasizes attempted land engrossment by men such as Franklin and George Washington. Finally, like Rothbard, Anderson demonstrates how costly to the British were the ultra war policies of William Pitt the Elder after his rise to power.
Anderson's discussion of the war's conduct, although obviously far more detailed than Rothbard's, has intriguing parallels with Rothbard's treatment of the later Revolutionary War in a subsequent volume of CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY. Rothbard followed the then "new" military history in stressing the critical but often neglected role of the American militia during the Revolution. Anderson does the same for the military role of the Indians, who in previous accounts tend to be treated as superfluous auxiliaries of little genuine value. Anderson illustrates how the Indians gathered intelligence, affected logistics, and provided other vital services that could spell the difference between battlefield victory or defeat. He furthermore chronicles a strategic debate among the French that was echoed in the debate about military strategy that American revolutionaries would later carry on. Whereas New France's Governor-General Vaudreuil favored LA GUERRE SAUVAGE, an irregular strategy that relied heavily on Indian allies and Canadian militia, the marquis de Montcalm preferred imposing the strictures of conventional European warfare with nearly exclusive reliance on regulars. Anderson suggests that Montcalm's winning of this strategic debate was a major cause of France's ultimate military defeat in the war.
To top if off, Anderson's WAR THAT MADE AMERICA is exceedingly well written, and an excellent introduction for anyone unfamiliar with the period.