Blogs > Liberty and Power > Typhoid Robert

Mar 2, 2007

Typhoid Robert




KVOA TV reports, A young man infected with an especially virulent strain of tuberculosis has been held for the past eight months in a hospital jail ward under a court order, and may be held until he dies. Robert Daniels has not been charged with a crime, but the 27-year-old violated the rules of a voluntary quarantine, exposing others to a potentially deadly illness. Maricopa County public health officials then got a court order to keep him locked up. (Some voluntary quarantine; obey it or be imprisoned. This is a definition of the word "voluntary" with which I am unfamiliar.)

The story raises the fascinating issue of whether the imprisonment of an innocent but potentially deadly young man can be justified.

Libertarian theory gives a clear answer. The imprisonment is not and cannot be justified. The young man has committed no crime; he is a self-owner with the same individual right to freedom as anyone/everyone else.

For the sake of argument, however, let's up the ante. Let's assume he is not just a potential threat to people who are vulnerable to this strain of tuberculosis but that everyone who comes into contact with him will die. I would advocate some form of isolation -- forced if necessary -- but I would not and could not justify it on libertarian principle. My advocacy of using force would rely on the fact that the Typhoid Mary/Robert scenario destroys the intellectual framework of libertarianism. In other words, libertarianism rests on the political worldview of rights being universal -- possessed in equal measure by all human beings. My exercise of a right does not interfere with your ability to exercise the comparable right. For example, my right of free conscience -- the freedom to reach my own conclusions about morality, religion etc. -- in no way prevents you from exercising your judgment on similar matters. This framework is sometimes called "Lockean." It contrasts with a "Hobbesian" worldview by which human beings are in a state of nature, a war of all against all; that is, my life requires your death. Within a Hobbesian world, individual or universal rights make no more sense for human beings than they do for wild animals whose lives are a natural cycle of being both predator and prey.

In short, libertarian principles make sense only within the context that is specifically stripped away by Typhoid Mary. The situation does not destroy the validity of libertarianism, which continues to address 99.99% of all situations in life and 100% of those most people will confront. Nor does the situation place libertarianism at a disadvantage relative to other political theories since none of them provides a good answer to Typhoid Mary or lifeboat situations. The dynamic of situation does mean, however, that in the absence of libertarian principles I will fall back on the default justification of protecting my own life and the lives of those for whom I care. I would interfere with the young man's freedom as little as I possibly could to achieve my goal...but interfere I would. I would not appeal to the State because giving such power to that pack of snarling dogs would end up with my being badly bitten. But I would assist another party in ensuring the isolation.

Another thing I wouldn't do? As stated earlier, I would not justify any of my actions through an appeal to libertarianism. No such justification is available.

You are invited to browse and join http://www.wendymcelroy.com/smf a libertarian BB that I moderate.


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Lisa Casanova - 3/6/2007

Anthony,
I'm trying to think of how it might be seen if we lived in an all-private-property society, and I was the private owner of a place where large crowds gathered (maybe a skating rink or a large store). I might choose to exclude the obviously ill, but it would be very hard to exclude everyone with a contagious disease, especially those that are not obvious. It would be so intrusive and burdensome that no one would be likely to want to patronize my place. So I imagine that it would be some sort of "enter at your own risk" arrangement. We all assume certain risks in entering spaces with other human beings, be it risks of allergies or diseases, and that risk is not something that can really be eliminated.
For the person with the peanut allergy, I would say they are voluntarily assuming the risk of coming in contact with their particular allergen. If an allergic person were justified in using defensive force whenever they encounter their allergen, you could end up with absurd situations, such as people with severe allergies to multiple things demanding that no one else occupy a public space when they wish to be there.


Anthony Gregory - 3/5/2007

OK, I agree, but what about this example?

Let's say someone has a disease that will instantly kill about half the people that comes in contact with him.

Let's say someone else has a bag of peanuts that will kill a tiny minority of those people he comes into contact with —- those who are deathly allergic to peanuts.

Would the average person be able to use defensive force against the diseased person on unowned land? I don't see how. Couldn't the diseased person declare the sphere around him to belong to him?

But even if the average person would be justified in using force, would the peanut-allergic person be justified using force to isolate people with peanuts? Or does the fact that his allergy is so rare mean that the deadly threat presented to him in the form of peanuts is no justification to use force, unlike the similarly deadly threat of a disease?


Roderick T. Long - 3/4/2007

Anthony -- thanks for the kind words.

But re public property -- since I think there would/should be some public property in a libertarian society, I can't just say that since everything will be private property that will settle everything. And in any case, even those libertarians who don't agree with me that there would/should be public property will have to agree that there will still be unowned property -- i.e., most of the universe. So we need some principles to govern interactions among people who meet on non-private land.


Anthony Gregory - 3/3/2007

Roderick, doesn't your approach still run into problems as it regards public property? Why do you have a right to be healthy on public property any more than someone else has a right to be on public property? Surely, you couldn't use force against a sick person on his own property, if it's no threat to you. Isolation is only necessary to protect yourself from him if you are in the same space — but that space is either going to be private property, in which case the private owners should get to make the rules, or on public property, where no solutions is quite right.

I do think, however, that you punishment views and view on intention not being the main point are just downright brilliant.


Roderick T. Long - 3/3/2007

Well, I'm against using any more force than is necessary for defense. If he consents to treatment and so no longer requires isolation, great. But if he doesn't consent to treatment, I see no grounds for forcing treatment on him when he can be isolated instead.


Lisa Casanova - 3/3/2007

Dr. Long,
Suppose he doesn't want to comply with quarantine or be treated for his infection. What about forcing him to undergo treatment (this is done for TB, and some of the drugs are not so friendly) in order to end the need for isolation? On the one hand, forcing someone to take medicine is an egregious rights violation. But on the other hand, he could be quarantined for as long as he lives- TB doesn't just go away, and that seems terrible too.


Roderick T. Long - 3/3/2007

For some reason my last sentence got caught off. It was:

Hence I can’t see that isolating a Typhoid Mary poses any problem for libertarian rights theory.


Roderick T. Long - 3/3/2007

I disagree. I don’t define aggression as an intentional action; as I see it, what makes an action a rights-violation has more to do with what a person does than with why she does it. Only overt acts fall under the jurisdiction of the law – not inner thoughts; hence there’s no basis for treating intentional violations differently from uninetnneional ones. (That’s also why I’m against punishment, i.e., any coercive treatment that goes beyond what’s needed for restraint and restitution.)

If I assault someone while sleepwalking or hypnotised, they have as much of a right to defend themselves as if I’d acted deliberately. If I unknowingly walk off with a valuable document because it’s stuck to my shoe, you have as much right to demand it back from me as if I’d voluntarily stolen it. If I break your vase, I owe you compensation whether I did it accidentally or deliberately.

So likewise, if by entering a room I will thereby unintentionally cause people to die, they have as much right to defend themselves against me, to confine me, as if I were a cold-blooded killer. (Of course they don’t have a right to subject me to cruel or degrading treatment; but they don’t have a right to do that to the cold-blooded killer either, IMHO.)


Anthony Gregory - 3/2/2007

Under a system of much more robust private property and contractual, rather than statist, legal and protective services, it would be easier to justify isolating someone — not on a particular piece of propery, but perhaps off of most private property open to the public. It is tragic that the state makes such solutions impossib