Blogs > Liberty and Power > Politics Against Politics

Oct 16, 2006

Politics Against Politics




[cross-posted at Austro-Athenian Empire]

I’ve argued, some would say ad nauseam, that the libertarian struggle against statist oppression needs to be integrated (or re-integrated) with traditionally left-wing struggles against various sorts of non-state oppression such as patriarchy, racism, bossism, etc.

My position finds support, albeit in a less than straightforward way, in Rothbard’s article “Contempt for the Usual” in the May 1971 issue of Libertarian Forum.

This might seem an odd article for me to cite on behalf of my leftist heresy, since the article is a sustained attack on cultural leftism generally and feminism in particular. But I maintain that Rothbard’s arguments, no doubt malgré lui, actually support my position.

Here are some crucial excerpts:

For apart from the tendency on the Left to employ coercion, the Left seems to be constitutionally incapable of leaving people alone in the most fundamental sense; it seems incapable of refraining from a continual pestering, haranguing and harassment of everyone in sight or earshot. ... The Left is incapable of recognizing the legitimacy of the average person’s peaceful pursuit of his own goals and his own values in his quietly sensible life. Many libertarians who are enamoured of the principles of Maoism point out that, in theory at least, the decentralized communes and eternal self-and-mutual-criticism sessions are supposed to be voluntary and not imposed by violence. Even granting this point, Maoism at its best, forswearing violence, would be well-nigh intolerable to most of us, and certainly to anyone wishing to pursue a truly individualist life. For Maoism depends on a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering of every person in one’s purview to bring him into the full scale of values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of his neighbors. ... The point is that in the Maoist world, even at its most civilized, the propaganda barrage is everywhere.

To put it another way: one crucial and permanent difference between libertarians and the Left is in their vision of a future society. Libertarians want the end of politics; they wish to abolish politics forever, so that each individual may live his life unmolested and as he sees fit. But the Left, in contrast, wants to politicize everything; for the Left, every individual action, no matter how trivial or picayune, becomes a “political” act, to be examined, criticized, denounced, and rehabilitated in accordance with the Left’s standards. ... The Women’s Lib movement, of course, has been in the forefront of this elevating of hectoring and pestering into a universal moral obligation. ...

One would hope that the free society of the future would be free, not only of aggressive violence, but also of self-righteous and arrogant nagging and harassment. “Mind your own business” implies that each person attend well to his own affairs, and allow every other man the same privilege. It is a morality of basic civility, of courtesy, of civilized life, of respect for the dignity of every individual. It does not encompass all of morality, but by God it is a necessary ingredient to a truly rational and civilized social ethic. ...

The crucial point here is that those libertarians whose only philosophy is to oppose coercive violence are missing a great deal of the essence of the ideological struggles of our time. The trouble with the Left is not simply its propensity for coercion; it is also, and in some sense more fundamentally, its hatred of excellence and individuality, its hostility to the division of labor, its itch for total uniformity, and its dedication to the Universal and Permanent Pester. And as it looks around the world, it finds that the main object of its hatred is the Middle American, the man who quietly holds all of the values which it cannot tolerate. ... [O]ne of the great and unfilled tasks of the rationalist intellectual, the true intellectual if you will, is to come to the aid of the bourgeoisie, to rescue the Middle American from his triumphant tormentors. ... In the name of truth and reason, we must rise up as the shield and the hammer of the average American.

So how does all this support my position? Well, notice that Rothbard here treats the principle of minding one’s own business as broader than the non-aggression principle; he criticises “those libertarians whose only philosophy is to oppose coercive violence” for not recognising that minding one’s own business implies a rejection “not only of aggressive violence, but also of self-righteous and arrogant nagging and harassment,” even when such nagging and harassment involve no use of force against person or property.

In short, then, Rothbard in effect agrees that a pervasive attitude of such “intolerable” Maoist-style criticism, even if peaceful, would be a form of oppression, and one that libertarians should be concerned to combat just as much as they combat actual aggression. And this is exactly the sort of thing I’ve been saying too. Restrictive cultural attitudes and practices can be oppressive even if nonviolent, and should be combated (albeit, of course, nonviolently) by libertarians for some of the same sorts of reasons that violent oppression should be combated.

Of course, Rothbard’s point might seem to support mine only generically, not specifically – since he identifies feminism, rather than patriarchy, as an instance of the form of oppression he’s concerned to combat. As Rothbard sees it, “the Middle American, the man who quietly holds all of the values which [the Left] cannot tolerate,” is inoffensively minding his own business, while feminists and other leftists who attack his values are refusing to mind their own business, and are instead subjecting the ordinary mainstream American to “a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering ... to bring him into the full scale of values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of his neighbors.”

I think this is the wrong way to understand the nature of the complaints that feminists and other leftists are bringing. That’s not to say, of course, that we feminists et al. are never guilty of the sort of thing Rothbard is referring to; any ideology can be, and every ideology surely has been, defended in obnoxious, officious, and intrusive ways, and feminism is no exception. But the question is whether that’s the whole story, or even the main story, with the feminist criticisms that Rothbard is talking about, and I claim it isn’t. The way to understand the criticisms that we feminists bring is to see that from our point of view it is patriarchy that refuses to leave people alone – that the process by which patriarchal attitudes are promoted, inculcated, and reinforced amounts precisely to “a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering of every person [especially women] in one’s purview to bring [her] into the full scale of [patriarchal] values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of [her] neighbors.”

The point of feminist criticism is thus not to politicise the reproduction of male supremacy but rather to identify the political character it already possesses, and the aim of a feminist political movement (understanding “political” here to denote any organised movement for social change, whether peaceful or violent) is to defend women against such oppression, to serve as their “shield and hammer.” And ditto, mutatis mutandis, for the defence of workers, gays, ethnic minorities, etc., against various forms of oppression which, while indeed often supported by violent means (statist or otherwise), are by no means confined to such means. To whatever extent Rothbard’s “Middle Americans” are complicit in such oppression, they are to that extent not minding their own business – and leftist attempts to correct their attitudes are then strictly defensive, in service rather than violation of “a morality of basic civility, of courtesy, of civilized life, of respect for the dignity of every individual.”



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Roderick T. Long - 10/23/2006

Roughly, systematic and oppressive power differentials between the relevant groups, plus those attitudes and/or practices that contribute to such.


Mark Brady - 10/19/2006

What exactly do you mean by (a)patriarchy, (b) racism, and (c) bossism?


Albert Esplugas - 10/19/2006

Well, I think we don’t agree in the issue of morality / foundation of ethics, but I will study it more carefully.

This objection seems to cut at least as much for me as against me, though. For there are plenty of people who have an aversion to libertarianism because they think it’s indifferent to nonviolent oppression.

But they are mistaken because libertarianism does not mandate a specific set of values, but permit individuals to promote / campaing against values that they consider morally wrong. A lot of people think that libertarians are morally neutral or amoral persons, we are not of course. We oppose only agrressive actions qua libertarians, but like the rest of human beings we also have our preferences and values, and like those people that oppose “oppression” we (or nearly all of us) also oppose “oppression” in our every day life. The fact others don’t interpret all that in this way I think is a reason to explain it to them, not a reason to include the fight against “oppression” in the libertarian realm.

Because of the three kinds of thickness. Strategic thickness: I claim that a racist society is unlikely to stay libertarian, since it lacks the kind of respect for personhood that a libertarian society depends upon. (Thus as Anonymous2 predicts, I’m skeptical of your “no risk that it will disappear” claim.) Application thickness: I claim that a society that’s confused about respectful treatment in that way is likely to make more mistakes in the application of libertarianism even if they don’t abandon the principle. Grounds thickness: even if they don’t abandon the principle and don’t misapply it, I think their position is unreasonable because there’s a conflict between their racism and the best reasons for being a libertarian, so that even if their racism doesn’t actually undermine their libertarianism, it logically ought to.

ok, it makes sense. Let me add what I have said to Rad Geek: I think that, in a way, all fight against what you call oppressive values at the most should be instrumental to the achievement, application or justification of the NAP, and this has to be made clearly explicit every time. (I think this post fails in this respect, which is the reason I have stepped in). Qua libertarians we are not against these peaceful values per se, but (at the most) because they can undermine libertarianism / the NAP in one way or another.


Roderick T. Long - 10/18/2006

You are, may I say it, begging the same question that you are posing to me: how do you prove that my subjective moral aversion to take drugs or to prostitute myself are objectively wrong?

The way we prove anything to be right or wrong is through moral philosophy. One of the central methods of moral philosophy is reflective equilibration, about which see my discussion here.

Besides, if all moral values are objective, why tolerate wrong values if you discover they are wrong? I think you are somewhat endangering your own libertarian position, since you are saying that all people’s subjetive ends (or moral values in particular, but I think that all conducts have a moral component) can be categorized wrong or right objectively. Others will say: “well, if I determine objectively that taking drugs is wrong, I don’t see why I have to respect the use of drugs”.

This is a common argument, that there's some connection between moral skepticism/relativism/subjectivism on the one hand and toleration on the other. For example, Milton Friedman has said it's a good thing we don't know what sin is, because if we did we'd have to ban it.

But I think that reasoning is completely wrong. Suppose I say (as I do) that, say, racism and aggression are both objectively wrong. Now if someone says "so if racism is objectively wrong, why can't we make it illegal?" the answer is that aggression is also objectively wrong. So objective values don't threaten freedom if freedom is itself one of those objective values.

By contrast, suppose moral values were subjective, so that being for or against racism were merely a subjective preference. Would that tend to make people less likely to ban racism? I don't see why -- not if they think a preference for or against freedom is subjective too. It's worth remembering that the Nazis were moral relativists; they explicitly claimed that there were different values for different groups, and that was right according to Jewish values was wrong according to Aryan values and so on, without there being any universally valid morality. That didn't make them tolerant and freedom-loving, though; instead the Nazis said, "peace may be your bag, dude, but conquest is our bag, so hey, we're going to conquer you." (not an exact quote)

People with these non-agressive values (but nonetheless oppressive) will feel threatened not by your particular values / personal views but by your very own political philosophy. They will think that a libertarian order will be a menace to their non-agressive conducts, and actually it’s not.

This objection seems to cut at least as much for me as against me, though. For there are plenty of people who have an aversion to libertarianism because they think it's indifferent to nonviolent oppression. So if we follow your advice to avoid alienating the pro-oppression folks, the result will be that we alienate the anti-oppression folks. Now if I have to choose between alienating the pro-oppression folks and alienating the anti-oppression folks, well, being anti-oppression myself it's obvious which way I'm going to choose.

Imagine that in this libertarian society all individuals are passionate rothbardians. But some ot them are racists (discriminate in their property against people of other races because of that). And others have patriarchal values. But all of them are libertarians and we live in a libertarian order. Would you say still that qua libertarians we have to fight against the values of that group of "oppressive" libertarians? Why, if libertarianism has been achieved and, since its inhabitants are rothbardians, there is no risk that it will disappear any time soon?

Because of the three kinds of thickness. Strategic thickness: I claim that a racist society is unlikely to stay libertarian, since it lacks the kind of respect for personhood that a libertarian society depends upon. (Thus as Anonymous2 predicts, I'm skeptical of your "no risk that it will disappear" claim.) Application thickness: I claim that a society that's confused about respectful treatment in that way is likely to make more mistakes in the application of libertarianism even if they don't abandon the principle. Grounds thickness: even if they don't abandon the principle and don't misapply it, I think their position is unreasonable because there's a conflict between their racism and the best reasons for being a libertarian, so that even if their racism doesn't actually undermine their libertarianism, it logically ought to.

In a libertarian order, why we have to appeal to libertarianism to combat some non-agressive values instead of human decency and virtue?

Well, of course human decency and virtue are what we're ultimately appealing to, since libertarianism and antiracism are both specific applications of decency/virtue. But my claim is that these applications are connected to each other. (No surprise, since as an Aristotelean I accept the unity of virtue.)


Roderick T. Long - 10/18/2006

Right, they're willingly contributing to an oppressive situation, they're supplying bars to the birdcage -- so they're not minding their own business.


Roderick T. Long - 10/18/2006

I'm not sure whether by the "same argument" you mean that my position is like Mill's or that Albert Esplugas's is like Mill's. Actually there's some unclarity as to what Mill's position is, but assuming for the moment that it really is that "that society has no right to express even outright disapproval of views or actions which do not harm another," then neither I nor Albert is defending that position. I'm not saying that people have no right to express oppressive attitudes, and Albert isn't saying that people have no right to attack those who do.


Albert Esplugas - 10/18/2006

ok Roderick, I see it. But anyway I think that the racist owner of the business or the patriarchal man are minding their own business, and your post suggest that (because of their racism / patriarchal values) they are not.


Albert Esplugas - 10/18/2006

Yes, of course I think all those issues are objective. Your tone above is incredulous, but suppose someone said to you: do you really think all rights are objective? For or against taxation, for or against gun control, for or against securities and exchange laws, for or against zoning laws, for or against drug laws .... Presumably you'd say that of course all those are objective. So what's the difference?

The difference, I think, is that rights don’t incorporate the subjetive ends of someone in particular but permit the peacefully realization of all of them. The objectivity of economics is related to its value free nature. Similarly, ethics is in a sense value free too, because says “whatever the subjective values of people, if they want to pursue them they should have rights / follow the NAP”. Ok, what if someone don’t want to pursue them peacefully / respecting the NAP? Well, why argue at all with that person, if he is not willing to respect you? Why take him seriously if he is not demanding, by his very own actions, any reciprocity at all? Anyway, I don’t see why endorsing the end / value that all people can realize his own ends / values implies that I have to endorse that all people’s ends / values are objective. And you don’t solve the question of rights by saying that all morality is objective. You are, may I say it, begging the same question that you are posing to me: how do you prove that my subjective moral aversion to take drugs or to prostitute myself are objectively wrong?

Besides, if all moral values are objective, why tolerate wrong values if you discover they are wrong? I think you are somewhat endangering your own libertarian position, since you are saying that all people’s subjetive ends (or moral values in particular, but I think that all conducts have a moral component) can be categorized wrong or right objectively. Others will say: “well, if I determine objectively that taking drugs is wrong, I don’t see why I have to respect the use of drugs”. On the other hand, if you say “people’s subjective ends are subjectively wrong or right. If someone values taking drugs, I can object and say that it will be harmful to him, that it is a vice or whatever, but as long as it satisfies him it is not wrong for him, and I’m in no better position to assert that his conduct is objectively wrong”. In this second case, the drug user won’t feel threatened by your position. You are not pretending to have “the objective truth”, may be some kind of loosely truth. I don’t know if I’m expressing myself clearly, I have troubles speaking in English.

Because it would be very odd if it were a horrible horrible thing for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it's done in one way, but perfectly okay and dandy for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it's done in some other way. If people don't matter enough for us to oppose their being oppressed, why should they matter enough for us to oppose their being aggressed against?

I think it’s the other way around. By caring too much for the non-agressive values of people qua libertarian you are endangering your own libertarian positions. People with these non-agressive values (but nonetheless oppressive) will feel threatened not by your particular values / personal views but by your very own political philosophy. They will think that a libertarian order will be a menace to their non-agressive conducts, and actually it’s not. You are saying to them “libertarians, qua libertarians, will fight against your personal non-agressive values, but you are welcomed in a libertarian order”. It doesn’t make much sense to me. I think it’s better to fight against these oppresive values simply as moral agents and decent human beigns, not as libertarians. Furthermore, if you as a libertarian promote not only the NAP but also other kind of values, other libertarians with different values will be tempted to promote, qua libertarians, his own values, and the distintion between rights and value will be blurred.

Libertarianism is a political philosophy and it is only concerned about justice / the legitimate use of force. Agreed, libertarianism is not only the NAP in the sense that justifiying it requires to go deeper and reason about the nature of human beings (subjective preferences, human action...) and the world (scarcity...) and to contrast the merits of a peaceful / conflict-free social order with that of a violent / conflict enhancing social order. And I tend to agree that libertarianism can go beyond the NAP in the sense that to implement the NAP may be it’s strategically useful to promote / oppose certain values. But the end of all that, qua libertarians, it’s only the NAP.

Imagine we are in a libertarian society. The NAP reigns. Do you consider libertarians have achieved our objective, or is there something else? Imagine that in this libertarian society all individuals are passionate rothbardians. But some ot them are racists (discriminate in their property against people of other races because of that). And others have patriarchal values. But all of them are libertarians and we live in a libertarian order. Would you say still that qua libertarians we have to fight against the values of that group of “oppressive” libertarians? Why, if libertarianism has been achieved and, since its inhabitants are rothbardians, there is no risk that it will disappear any time soon? In a libertarian order, why we have to appeal to libertarianism to combat some non-agressive values instead of human decency and virtue?


Jonathan Dresner - 10/18/2006

I seem to recall JS Mill making the same argument, actually, that society has no right to express even outright disapproval of views or actions which do not harm another.

One could argue about whether these various behaviors are in fact harmless to others, but the principle seems congruent.


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

And here's the especially relevant passage from the Frye piece:

Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. Furthermore, even if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected each wire, you still could not see why a bird would gave trouble going past the wires to get anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny could discover, that will reveal how a bird could be inhibited or harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. It will require no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.

It is now possible to grasp one of the reasons why oppression can be hard to see and recognize: one can study the elements of an oppressive structure with great care and some good will without seeing the structure as a whole, and hence without seeing or being able to understand that one is looking at a cage and that there are people there who are caged, whose motion and mobility are restricted, whose lives are shaped and reduced.


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

See this piece by Marilyn Frye.


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

Do you think that all moral values are objetive? For or against altruism, for or against love, for or against honesty or integrity, for or against promiscuity, for or against fidelity, for or against family, for or against using force to seek restitution, for or against caring for animals, for or against caring for ecology etc etc. Do you think there is an objective response for every one of these moral issues?

Yes, of course I think all those issues are objective. Your tone above is incredulous, but suppose someone said to you: do you really think all rights are objective? For or against taxation, for or against gun control, for or against securities and exchange laws, for or against zoning laws, for or against drug laws .... Presumably you'd say that of course all those are objective. So what's the difference?

Elaboreting on this, given the nature of human beings and the world in wich we live, rights are necessary for every one to pursue his subjetive ends and live according to its values without conflicting with each other.

But why is that an objective value? Suppose someone says: "I like conflict." How can you say anything against him, if you don't believe in objective morality?

Neither I see why to justify libertarianism consistently on terms of rights one has to opposse what you call oppression (racism, bossism, patriarchy).

Because it would be very odd if it were a horrible horrible thing for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it's done in one way, but perfectly okay and dandy for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it's done in some other way. If people don't matter enough for us to oppose their being oppressed, why should they matter enough for us to oppose their being aggressed against?


Albert Esplugas - 10/17/2006

For what (a) says is that libertarians need to embrace a mind-your-own-business principle that’s broader than the non-aggression principle.

Let me add another question: If a racist person discriminate against blacks (as consumers or laborers) in his own business, do you think he is not minding his own business? If a man marries four women and they consent happily (and also consent to do domestic work etc.) do you think he is not minding his own business because he is exhibiting a patriarchal attitude?


Albert Esplugas - 10/17/2006

By contrast I think all of morality is objective — that morality as a whole is “not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in which they live.” Indeed, I don’t think it’s possible to justify a theory of rights in isolation from a broader set of values. So my question to you is: why do you draw this bifurcation in the moral realm, making justice objective and all the rest of morality subjective?

Do you think that all moral values are objetive? For or against altruism, for or against love, for or against honesty or integrity, for or against promiscuity, for or against fidelity, for or against family, for or against using force to seek restitution, for or against caring for animals, for or against caring for ecology etc etc. Do you think there is an objective response for every one of these moral issues? I think not, and I really doubt you think otherwise. May be we are talking about different things.

I am no expert, but I tend to think that justice is objective because, in a sense, it doesn’t take part on behalf of one’s particular values but permit the pursuing of every one’s subjetive values / ends avoiding violent conflict between them. Elaboreting on this, given the nature of human beings and the world in wich we live, rights are necessary for every one to pursue his subjetive ends and live according to its values without conflicting with each other. I think I am not grounding rights in subjective values, unless favor that every one can pursue his subjetive ends peacefully is a moral value by itself. If it is, then may be I’m guilty of favoring only that broad moral value qua libertarian, but I don’t see why endorsing it would mean that I have to endorse that all morality or moral values are objective. Neither I see why to justify libertarianism consistently on terms of rights one has to opposse what you call oppression (racism, bossism, patriarchy).


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

Sorry, that last paragraph should read:

Aha! This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement. You think one part of morality — namely justice (i.e., respect for rights) is objective, and that all the rest of morality is subjective! But why should anybody believe that?

By contrast I think all of morality is objective — that morality as a whole is “not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in which they live.” Indeed, I don’t think it’s possible to justify a theory of rights in isolation from a broader set of values. So my question to you is: why do you draw this bifurcation in the moral realm, making justice objective and all the rest of morality subjective?


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

Roderick, I think that your (and Charles Johnson's) point coincides – partially -- with my contention: "May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it's not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it's not "oppression" what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental." But in your insistence to fight against "oppression" qua libertarians I don’t perceive-- at least not in every case, this time for exemple- a recognizition of its instrumental nature.

So, if I understand you correctly, you're saying that you accept instrumental/strategic thickness, but you think it applies less broadly than I do. Okay, but then what about grounds thickness and application thickness? Do you accept or reject those?

What you call oppresive attitudes or values may be others (libertarians included) consider proper or defensible values. We are not talking about rights now, but moral values.

Well, yes, libertarians can, and obviously do, disagree about which values are oppressive. Of course libertarians also can and do disagree about which actions are rights-violating. Thus libertarians disagree about abortion, intellectual property, and so on. But in both cases, the question is: which position is correct?

Whatever your moral values, I think you can -- at least theoretically -- fully grasp libertarianism and its implications.

Okay, that I deny -- since I think the various thicknesses are among the relevant "implications."

Rights are objective, moral values are subjective. You can justify objective rights (and adhere consistently to them) whatever your subjetive values (provided your values don’t champion agression), since objective rights are not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in wich they live.

Aha. This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement. You think one part of morality -- namely justice (i.e., respect for rights) and all the rest of morality is subjective! By contrast I think all of morality is objective -- that morality as a whole is "not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in which they live." Indeed, I don't think it's possible to justify a theory of rights in isolation from a broader set of values. So my question to you is: why do you draw this bifurcation in the moral realm, making justice objective and all the rest of morality subjective?


Albert Esplugas - 10/17/2006

Roderick, I think that your (and Charles Johnson’s) point coincides –partially- with my contention: “May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it’s not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it’s not “oppression” what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental.”
But in your insistence to fight against “oppression” qua libertarians I don’t perceive –at least not in every case, this time for exemple- a recognizition of its instrumental nature. Rather, it seems that libertarianism imply opposing and challenging oppression, that we should confront it because it is objectively evil, injust per se, and I don’t buy it. What you call oppresive attitudes or values may be others (libertarians included) consider proper or defensible values. We are not talking about rights now, but moral values. Whatever your moral values, I think you can –at least theoretically- fully grasp libertarianism and its implications. Rights are objective, moral values are subjective. You can justify objective rights (and adhere consistently to them) whatever your subjetive values (provided your values don’t champion agression), since objective rights are not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in wich they live. Thus, I think that challenging “oppression” is not a libertarian task except to the extent that “oppression” fuels statists positions. Libertarians can oppose “oppression” for the same reason they favor political decentralization: because it may contribute to the expansion of liberty. A decentralized political organization is also illegitimate, but it is preferable because its incentive structure can promote more freedom. Likewise, patriarchal, racist... values are legitimate, as any other attitude or value, but because they usually lead to statist positions they must be confronted by libertarians. Do you agree with that analogy?


Roderick T. Long - 10/17/2006

My claim is not that a libertarian with patriarchal values doesn't count as a libertarian. Of course he (or she) does. But I do claim that such a libertarian hasn't fully grasped the implications of libertarian values.

Charles Johnson, in this piece, distinguishes five different "levels on which you might claim that libertarianism ought to go along with some thicker bundle of social and cultural commitments, practices, or projects." Let me quote just three of them:

Charles Johnson: There might be cases in which the bundle could be rejected without a formal contradiction to the non-aggression principle, but not without in fact interfering with its application. There are cases in which people disagree over the line where my rights end and yours begin; and libertarians might argue that some thick bundles need to be preferred over others in order to avoid conceptual blinders against certain rights or forms of aggression. Think of the feminist criticism of the traditional division between the "private" and the "political" sphere and those who draw it in such a way that systematic violence and coercion within "families" are justified, or excused, or ignored, as something "private" and therefore less than a serious form of violent oppression. Or the way in which garden-variety collectivism prevents many non-libertarians from even recognizing taxation or legislation by a democratic government as a form of coercion in the first place. Here the bundle of commitments that libertarians need to have isn't just a special application of libertarian principle; the argument calls in resources other than the non-aggression principle to determine just where and how the principle is properly applied. In that sense the thickness called for is thicker than entailment thickness; but the cash value of the "thick" commitments is still the direct contribution they make towards the full and complete application of the non-aggression principle. Call this application thickness.

There might be cases in which a bundle is neither strictly entailed by the non-aggression principle, nor necessary for its correct application, but may be a causal precondition for implementing the non-aggression principle in the real world. Thick libertarians might suggest cases in which it's difficult or even impossible for a free society to emerge, or survive over the long term, or flourish, without the right bundle of commitments, because the wrong bundle (say, blind obedience to traditional authority), without logically conflicting with libertarianism, might still make it very hard for libertarian ideas to get much purchase in our actual society, or for a future free society to resist a collapse into statism or civil war. Since this offers instrumental grounds for, say, individualist self-reliance to be bundled along with libertarianism, call this "instrumental thickness." [Note: more recently Charles calls this "strategic thickness."]

Some bundles might be consistent with the non-aggression principle, but might undermine or contradict the deeper reasons that justify libertarian principles in the first place. Here it would be claimed that the you could accept libertarianism without the thicker bundle consistently, but that you couldn't do so reasonably, because rejecting the bundle means rejecting the grounds for your libertarianism. Call this "grounds thickness."

So when I claim that libertarians qua libertarians need to oppose patriarchy and other nonviolent (or at least not-necessarily-violent) forms of oppression, what I'm claiming is that libertarianism is tied to feminism, and to cultural leftism more broadly, by application thickness, instrumental/strategic thickness, and grounds thickness. (And for some reasons why feminism in particular might count as one of the values thickly bound with libertarianism, see our piece on libertarian feminism.)


Albert Esplugas - 10/17/2006

Roderick,

I don’t see why patriarchy, bossism or even racism is necessarily unlibertarian. And if it’s not, then I don’t see why we should, qua libertarians, oppose those things. Sure I oppose these attitudes / values, but if they are not, per se, incompatible with libertarianism, I can’t oppose them qua libertarian. It is conceivable a libertarian with patriarchal values, how you reconcile that with your position? He too is a libertarian, why as a libertarian has to abandon or fight against these values that are his own? Libertarians are against agression, not against “opression” (again, qua libertarians). A libertarian may support or have attitudes that you consider “opressive” and still be a principled libertarian. I think that your reasoning on this matter is confusing and flawed. You don’t need to appeal to libertarianism to oppose those things, you have to appel to human decency, common sense, moral virtue or something else. May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it’s not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it’s not “oppression” what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental.