Blogs > Liberty and Power > Not a War, But An Imperial Venture

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

I don't see the relevance of your claims about the Taliban or northern Pakistan to anything I've said. In my scenario, the Taliban come to have full control over Afghanistan, and Pakistan as such comes under the control of Islamists. You've described a situation in which that has partially come to pass. If this is how bad things are with an alliance with both countries and US forces nearby, things would be worse if we withdrew, and my scenario might more easily come to pass. So it's completely unclear how your claims constitute a rebuttal of anything I said.

I don't see why I'm assuming so much with respect to an Islamist take-over. Pakistan has already had one Islamist take-over under Zia targeting a popular and politically potent leader (Bhutto), so what prevents a second one under a politically weak and unpopular leader like Musharraf?

Pakistan has a first-strike nuclear doctrine with respect to India. Would it alarm you at all if that first-strike doctrine were put into action? Or is a nuclear confrontation in South Asia the sort of problem that can just be waved away?

For that matter, imagine that Pakistani scientists collaborate over the long-haul with terrorists to produce a small-size atomic weapon without a ballistic delivery system. No problem?

WMD aside, there is the general problem of simply allowing Pakistan and Afghanistan to become bases for Al Qaeda, with the resources at their disposal that states can provide. It is generally a bad idea to allow an enemy to have sanctuary and bases. I'm assuming, perhaps overcharitably, that you regard Al Qaeda as an enemy.

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

Sorry, on the first issue, there's a typo in my sentence that arose from my thinking more quickly than I was typing. I meant to write, "destruction of an American city."

On the rest, my arguments stands.

I didn't say anything about the probabilities of occurrence of the events I was describing. Who's putting words in whose mouth?

Richman's claim was that a coup in Pakistan was a high probability event because of the virulent hatred "sown" by Bush's policies. Note first that this contradicts your expressed view that a coup is a low probability event. So you might want to get straight on that before criticizing me for criticizing it.

But Richman's claim assumes that Pakistanis believe what they believe because they react deterministically to American policy. What is the evidence for that claim? He presents none. Neither do you. So what is it?

Of course, to present evidence, you would need access to Pakistani beliefs. And to do that, it would help to be able to talk to them. To do that, it would help to speak their language. So the language issue is only a red herring if the need to present evidence for one's claims is a red herring. I don't think it is.

You don't need to speak someone's language to know that they are autonomous, but you need to know something about their beliefs if you're going to make predictions about future actions they might take, based on beliefs about American policy. Richman was making the latter prediction, not the former about autonomy.

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

I don't think the grand strategy of the United States ought to depend on your powers of imagination.

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

My grounds are your statement:

The virulent anti-Americanism sown by the Bush policy makes internal regime change in Pakistan entirely foreseeable.

This sentence presupposes that Pakistani actions are a deterministic response to Bush's policies. That is also the implication of the metaphor of "sowing," which suggests that Pakistanis are passive conduits for external forces. It ignores the obvious fact that if regime change took place, it change could take place for totally different reasons, and that even if it took place in response to what its proponents called "American policy," it would be misleading to describe those policies as the cause--which is what you've prospectively done.

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

That isn't a correction, it's just an arbitrary assertion.

You haven't given an iota of evidence to suggest that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal worries you. In response to the scenario I've posed, you've blathered on and on about your fantasy of a decentralized and privatized military, but there is zero evidence of the efficacy of such a thing, because it has nowhere existed--even on paper.

You don't pretend to offer any evidence, you simply think that your compatriots here will take you on faith. Unfortunately, for your argument, I don't. You allude to "relative risk" but you've presented not a single shard of evidence to suggest that the relative risks would be lower under your favored military system--which you can't even manage to describe.

According to your article,

But is this really war? To say “we are at war” implies that we the American people are at risk. That’s ridiculous. The integrity of our society is unthreatened. The government’s grip on power is (alas) safe.

Why is it ridiculous? No answer seems required there, and none is given. This is typical of the mode of argument here, apparently. Gigantic claims can be made without even the pretense of argument--the more gigantic the claim, the less evidence is needed to back it up.

The fact is, the "integrity of our society" would be unthreatened if one atomic bomb were detonated in one city. The integrity of that city would suffer, to be sure, but not of the society as such. By your standard, then, we shouldn't worry about it--which is why I said what I said. "The integrity of our society" would remain perfectly in tact if one city went by the boards. By your own standard, then, you can't worry about something as piddling as the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. It isn't (yet) big enough to annihilate the whole of the United States, after all. When it gets that big, you'll just blame it on the state and leave it at that. As for what to do, well you haven't come up with a single viable foreign policy prescription in the last two decades, so why assume you'll come up with one then?

Such assumptions are what explain your cavalier reliance on something that doesn't even exist in the form of a theoretical fantasy--a privatized defense force sufficient to deal with war-like threats. There isn't even the beginnings of a competent literature on that topic, much less real-world evidence of a sort that would support empirical hypotheses.

No matter, though. Your prescriptions don't rely on evidence at any point; why should they rely on it there?

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

OK. Suppose we withdraw from Afghanistan tomorrow, and ratchet back--abolish--our aid to Pakistan. Soon, whether incrementally or suddenly, the Taliban (or their heirs) reconstitute themselves and establish Afghanistan as a base of operations, inviting Al Qaeda to reconstitute their bases there. Meanwhile, whether by coup or by incremental pressure, Islamists begin to establish control over the Pakistani government. The ISI reconstitutes relations with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and questions start to arise over the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

Would you regard that as a threat, or not?

I realize you were (kinda) talking about Iraq (though you referred more vaguely to "the Middle East"). But since the real topic is the war on terrorism, not "the Middle East," I'm curious about your position on South Asia. Is your view that we should withdraw from the Arab Near East and increase our presence in South Asia, or is it that we should withdraw from both?

In the first case, I don't see why the one withdrawal is justified and the other not. In the second case, I wonder what you would do to deal with the scenario I described in my first paragraph.

Irfan Khawaja - 8/4/2006

You write:

Assuming that the structure of the U.S. "defense" establishment remains as it is, the keepers of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, whoever they may be, would know that they face destruction if one of their weapons were used against Americans.

Nonsense from start to finish.

First of all, your position is that the US defense establishment shouldn't remain as it is, so you're not entitled to invoke the "remains as it is" claim.

But even if it remained as it is, you're assuming that any Pakistani military-intelligence official who passed nuclear material to Al Qaeda would be strategically rational. Nice try, but no.

It wasn't strategically rational for Pakistan to have developed nuclear weapons in the first place. Nor was it rational to have invested in the jihad in Kashmir. Nor was it rational to have given power to the MMA. Pakistani grand strategy is thoroughly irrational, and its irrationality is no guarantee of our security. It is hardly beyond conceivability that anyone who would give nuclear weapons away might in fact welcome being blown up himself. It's called a "death wish" and lots of Muslim militants seem to have it.

Further, you're assuming that if a nuclear weapon was used against Americans, the US intelligence services would be able to trace it to its source. False four times over. (a) First, if the detonation destroyed all relevant evidence, there would be no way to trace the weapon back to anything. (b) Second, US intelligence on WMD is simply not that good: they were wrong about Iraq, they don't know what's going on in Iran or N Korea, and they've had trouble tracing back what appears to be American-based weaponized anthrax to account for the anthrax killings, among other things. There is no reason to assume that they could trace back WMD used against us. (c) Your anarchist views lead to the abolition of the intelligence services anyway, so you can't rely on their existence to make claims about what they would discover if WMD were used against Americans. (d) It is entirely possible that having traced WMD back, the American people could lose their will, and balk at the idea of using nuclear weapons. This would especially the case if there was uncertainty in the evidence, as there very likely would be.

The funny thing is that I don't even see how a nuclear detonation of an American even amounts to a real threat on your view of threats. One little nuclear attack on Americans wouldn't undermine the "integrity" of the nation, would it? And if it did, it might destroy the government--something you'd welcome. So maybe your best response should be that you don't really care if Pakistani nukes were used against us. Correct me if I'm wrong.

You then write:

Of course, there is nothing to rule out your scenario under the current interventionist policy. The virulent anti-Americanism sown by the Bush policy makes internal regime change in Pakistan entirely foreseeable.

There's nothing to rule out my scenario under current policy, but much to make it much less likely than on yours. On an interventionist policy, we have some leverage over the Pakistani government and some connection with relatively anti-Islamist elements. On your policy we have none. Something is better than nothing.

As for the anti-Americans "sown" by Bush, you're assuming that Pakistanis are deterministic automatons driven exclusively by reactions to American policy. They're not. And if they're not, they could be anti-American regardless of our policies. Their views can have autonomy from our actions. Of course, it helps to know some Pakistanis and speak their language to know things like this.

As for the "innovative ways of protecting ourselves under privatization," it's little more than an under-described fantasy. The sum total of your policy advice for now is: "do nothing and hope we don't get blown up; when we do get blown up, minimize what's happened by focusing on what wasn't blown up." That doesn't strike me as a position from which you can dispense very much useful advice or make any cogent criticisms.

Sheldon Richman - 4/7/2006

A final point: much of the power is taken out of the question when we realize that the state's protection is largely a myth. Now there's a premise that needs checking.

Sheldon Richman - 4/7/2006

Your question is fair. We live in a risky world, made more risky by many years of U.S. interventionism. There is no logical proof to show that ending intervention would end all possible risks from hostile states and nonstate organizations. It's a question of relative risks. Under the current state system, a noninterventionist U.S. government would presumably maintain its threat to retaliate against anyone who attacks the territory of the United States. Tracing the origins of an attack may be difficult, but I doubt that it's impossible. Also, we shouldn't ignore the security-inducing effects of a doctrine of nonintervention. As Jeff Hummel has discussed, the ultimate battle is ideological. As he puts it, force does not rule the world. Ideas do, because ideas determine in which direction people aim their guns. (No one aims guns at Switzerland.) Our conduct should show (a la Washington and Jefferson) that we will not interfere with other people and that we offer trade and other peaceful interaction to all. This would put us on the road to reducing threats.

Ideally, as I suggested above, we should privatize and decentralize defense so that the power of entrepreneurial discovery can be put to the task of making us safer.

The logic of intervention as a path to security is flawed, because it creates the very threats we seek to avoid. As I said, we are in the position of having to weigh relative risks. I think the scales are definitely on the side of nonintervention.

Tom G Palmer - 4/6/2006

No doubt you're right about the negative effects of foisting unpopular or brutal governments on other people. Still, can you foresee any positive role for the American or European governments if al Qaeda were to get nukes (and I don't mean "dirty bombs," which are hardly more dangerous than the conventional bombs they are, but warheads such as those in the Pakistani arsenal)? What would you do to avoid that and what would you do if it were to come to pass? Those don't strike me as crazy questions at all. Moreover, I'd ask both what you would not have done in the past and, since the past cannot be undone, what you would do in the future, given the past that we have. (I agree with the thought that is no doubt already forming -- don't make more enemies needlessly --, but what about the enemies that have already been made for us?)

Sheldon Richman - 4/5/2006

We can't see the future, but it cannot help for the U.S. government to be foisting unpopular governments on, or to be seen as brutalizing, other people. The world is dangerous, and it strikes me as odd that at this late date we are still looking to government to protect us.

Tom G Palmer - 4/5/2006

There certainly would be a problem if the Pakistani arsenal of warheads were to be released into a network of radical Islamist groups. I take that to be what Irfan has in mind and it certainly worries me. They wouldn't need a ballistic missle to deliver a package to Oakland or Long Beach or Baltimore. The question is, what is more likely to make such an awful prospect less likely? (And I admit that I also worry about such a package being delivered to Israel, India, Russia, or any other country. Indifference to the fate of others is not a requirement of libertarian thought.)

Sheldon Richman - 4/5/2006

"So maybe your best response should be that you don't really care if Pakistani nukes were used against us. Correct me if I'm wrong."

You're wrong. There, you've been corrected. And this is rather silly.

Sheldon Richman - 4/5/2006

"But Richman's claim assumes that Pakistanis believe what they believe because they react deterministically to American policy."

Huh? What are your grounds for that statement? What's determinism have to do with it?

William J. Stepp - 4/4/2006

For that matter, imagine that Pakistani scientists collaborate over the long-haul with terrorists to produce a small-size atomic weapon without a ballistic delivery system. No problem?

I'm imagining it happening--about the time Newton is resurrected and invents his fourth law of motion.

William J. Stepp - 4/4/2006

Again, you're making highly questionable assumptions (e.g., about the nuclear distruction of an American--where? in Chicago? in Tel Aviv?), more or less assuming they have a high probability of happening, then saying that someone (Sheldon in this case) who thinks otherwise is out to lunch or "doesn't care."

Then you write:
As for the anti-Americans "sown" by Bush, you're assuming that Pakistanis are deterministic automatons driven exclusively by reactions to American policy. They're not. And if they're not, they could be anti-American regardless of our policies. Their views can have autonomy from our actions. Of course, it helps to know some Pakistanis and speak their language to know things like this.

Regarding the automaton crack, Sheldon assumes nothing of the sort.
You're putting words in his mouth and knocking down a straw man of your own making.
The language point is also a red herring.
You don't have to know other peoples' language to know they have their own goals and autonomy.

William J. Stepp - 4/4/2006

Apparently you missed it, but according to a recent article in The Economist (which had a map), the Taliban are firmly in control of three provinces in Afghanistan near the Pakistan border.
It has also been widely quoted in the media (not just in the NY Times) that the territory outside the Afghanistan capital is no man's land, even close to where US forces are.

You are also assuming a lot by positing an Islamist takeover of the Pakistan state.
But say it happens. So what?
I'm not going to lose any sleep over their nuclear arsenal, such as it (might) be.
As one Pakistani nuclear scientist was quoted, they have no way to deliver a nuke to the U.S. Israel, maybe. That's their problem, not ours, or at least it should not be ours.
Last time I checked, Israel is not the 51st state, although I suppose I could be forgiven for being confused on this issue.

Sheldon Richman - 4/4/2006

Withdraw, withdraw, withdraw. Assuming that the structure of the U.S. "defense" establishment remains as it is, the keepers of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, whoever they may be, would know that they face destruction if one of their weapons were used against Americans. Of course, there is nothing to rule out your scenario under the current interventionist policy. The virulent anti-Americanism sown by the Bush policy makes internal regime change in Pakistan entirely foreseeable.

Ideally, we would couple withdrawal with the privatization and decentralization of defense so that the American people, for once, could find some innovative and effective ways to protect themselves. The state has proved itself a pathetic bumbler. Wasn't that the Defense Department's own command post that was hit by a civilian airliner back in 2001?

Jonathan Dresner - 4/3/2006

Also liked the Condi thought bubble below. Just thought I'd pop in and say something nice for a change....