Blogs > Liberty and Power > on problems with anarcho capitalism

Gus diZerega - 11/17/2005

While the above post is long, I do not see anything in it I want to address because it seems mosty nit-picking - with the one exception of global warming. And there, yes, I do think people who deny global warming are dishonest, biased, or - a possibility you did not mention - incredibly ignorant.

Gus diZerega - 11/17/2005

Roderick quotes me and continues...

Gus wrote:
> As an ethical system, anarcho-capitalism depends on the
> following assumptions, all of which are wrong:
> 1. The market is a neutral means for facilitating voluntary
> exchange, and so simply reflects the values of those entering
> into voluntary transactions.
> 2. People's values are adequately reflected in the exchanges
> they make within a market order.
> 3. Some non-controversial theory of property rights is possible
> that is able to make all possible voluntary exchanges into either
> market exchanges or simple verbal agreements (science, marriage,
> etc.)

I don't think market anarchism depends on any of those assumptions. Re 1 and 2, all anarchism has to say to make its point is that market transactions reflect people's values better than any state system is likely to, not that they do so perfectly.

My quick answer is that this is a false dichotomy for reasons explained in other posts on this place. The choice is not markets or states, and until the case of democracies not being states is rebutted I will just say - read me. (I've published on this plenty of places, from Critical Review to Review of Politics to my book)

Re 3, most market anarchists have thought that a variety of different property systems would coexist under anarchy.

Take this chapter by Kevin Carson (who is a market anarchist, though he wouldn't call himself an anarcho-capitalist because he uses "capitalist" in such a way that it's not synonymous with "free market"). He defends a "mutualist" theory of property rights à la Benjamin Tucker which forbids absentee landlordism. I think he's wrong; I'm much more of a Lockean about property. But I agree with the main point he makes in the chapter, that under anarchy there would probably be different communtiies with different property regimes. Even if community A thinks community B's practices are unjust, peaceful coexistence would be a lot cheaper than fighting about it; it's under states, where the costs of enforcement can be externalised, that disagreements about property rights are more likely to lead to violence.

Anarcho-capitalism as I have encountered it - Rothbard, lefevre, etc. - all assume traditional view of private property in land, even though these days the Lockean proviso knocks a big whole in their theoretical edifice. Whether mutualism or Georgist approaches are better is in all honesty not a major concern of mine primarily because we would almost certainly do more harm to more people by attempting to make all property justly acquired by someone's philosophical argument than trying to improve the justice of future transfers from the existing state of affairs while attempting to provide recompense to those unjustly treated who still exist either as individuals (in which case restore their property) or as corporate entities such as tribes, where the matter is more complex. Having said that, my personal sympathies lie in a Georgist direction.

Carson suggests a use critierion for ownership, if my hurried overview is accurate. So does Locke. The problem with any pure use criteria is - what constitutes use and how do we adjudicate differences in our views such that the loser is willing tom accept the outcome? Carson admits as much but does not seem to realize just how serious the issue is.

Additionally, in a multi-community world with different principles of ownership in different communities how do we deal with disputes between communities? In a Lockean world not far removed from the state of nature the communities could be reasonably autarkic. In an interconnected world opportunities for both gains and disputes grow. And here is where I really am dubious about any anarchist governing system I have read about.

Let me give a personal example. Insurance companies are good things. But they are, reasonably enough, focused on their own bottom line. A few years ago someone in a new car parked in front of mine got into a snit because it is possible that I bumped him when I parked. If so the bump was so slight that I was uncertain. Still am. If so, I had possibly made a dent in his new paint job that was approximately half the size of the interior of this 'o'. Certainly no more than the size of the interior of the 'o'.

Rather than simply driving away in scorn, I gave him my insurance company. I was called by them, and explained that I did not think I did it, that it was possible I had, and that the entire thing was ludicrous.

He received over $500 for a paint job and a car while the paint job was being applied, I was dinged a point on my insurance, and no investigation other than a brief phone call was ever made that involved me.

It was probably cheaper for the company to pay the $500 than to investigate. I paid with a point on my record, a point that potentially cost me future money and them nothing at all.

If I were a major customer I suspect the bias might have been in the other direction.

Of course, governments have LOTS of problems in the courts - I have no problem agreeing with you there. In my view we have only scratched the surface of ways of dealing with justice and free governments. But one thing I am completely sure of - I do not want justice provided by bottom line oriented organizations, especially given the demonstrated fact that the wealthy will take advantage of that even more than they do the current system. There needs to be some way where in a dispute we will finally say the matter is over, and move on. I want that way to not obviously be loaded in favor of maximizing the profit of the company responsible for providing the justice. If it were not profit oriented - a part of civil society - perhaps I would be interested in exploring possibilities. But when it is profit oriented, forget it.

I also don't think that market anarchism is committed to the notion that all voluntary exchanges are marekt exchanges, except insofar as "market" is defiend so broadly that that's a tautology -- certainly not in any narrower sense of "market." (See my and Charles Johnson's libertarian feminist pice on this topic.)

I didn't say that. I said market OR voluntary agreements such as marriages. Given the constraints of time, I will primarily respond to arguments that are at least roughly outlined in responses. I give strong pointers as tom my general approach in my democracies are not states argument - and do so even more below - even though the depth of the case has of necessity to be made elsewhere. I could say to every criticism - read my essays on politics and community in www.dizerega.com. I think that is unfair. But I think that point cuts both ways.

> This creates a severe conundrum for anarcho-capitalists: no
> logical line is crossed to envision a highly profitable enterprise
> serving many consumers ALL of whom wish it had never been
> built. This is so even when we stay entirely within the framework
> of assumptions needed for a pure market economy.
> In short, in this instance anyway the market is NOT a
> means for coordinating voluntary actions in a way to
> serve the values of those acting.

I don't see why this is a problem for anarchists. I agree with you that the situation you describe is coherent and possible. But it's a problem for anarchists only if this sort of thing is more likely to arise under anarchy than under states. I think you both underestimate the resources of anarchism to avoid these problems -- not that they will never happen, but if people really want an area to remain a wilderness thast does create an incentive for entrepreneurs to help them translate that preference into reality, and such entrepreneurial activity will be easier under anarchy than under states -- and underestimate the extent to which states are beset by still worse incentive problems of this sort.

Here is where we may have a really interesting disagreement. I see democracies as basically ways by which communities may make decisions about community wide issues. Their ideal rule is consensus. Rules for less than consensus are purely pragmatic. Like any association, there are always trade offs to be made: if we hire someone to act in our stead, there is no guarantee that representative will see things from our point of view. If we do not, and act ourselves, we will spend time doing things we might prefer someone else to do.

The proto state enters in to a democracy when the representatives seek to manipulate the rules to give themselves independence from their constituents. There are different kinds of states: dictatorships, revolutionary totalitarianism, oligarchies, limited monarchies, etc., etc. There are also different kinds of democracies, and as with states, some work better than others and there is little likelihood that we have perfected them at present - especially when virtually all use a state model to try and understand them.

> We will disagree. And when we disagree we will need some
> means to come to as settlement. If all are considered equal
> in rights, all will have to consider whatever means are selected
> as fair.

Absolutely. But this is an argument for anarchism, not aganst it. Polycentric legal orders are far better at this sort of thing than monopoly states. The movement from "consent" to "democracy" presupposes centralisation, but that's precisely what anarchists deny.

What needs to be “centralized” is a means for ending disagreements such that both parties move on with enough acceptance of the outcome that social peace is maintained and that if someone believes the outcome was wrong, that they have a fair opportunity to try and convince others that this was so and act to prevent such unfair outcomes in the future. Beyond that we cannot reasonably ask. I do not see how anarcho-capitalism can accomplish even this.

> Second, in the context of the market, which privileges money
> oriented values

That's the claim I challenge. Why assume that a market anarchist society would privilege money-oriented values? I don't find that claim at all plausible. See Phil Jacobson's essay here.

Again - I only briefly looked at his piece. He says that in a market economy we can have the following: cash for profit, cash for charity, and labor charity. This is true - but does not really address my point.

I developed the point I will briefly make below at much greater length in my Hayekian theory of Commodification in the Review of Politics, Summer, 2004.

Every system of coordination uses some means of feedback to signal actors as to whether in systemic terms they are succeeding or failing. This, in a market, loss indicates market failure, even if the person regards what he or she is doing as a great success from their own subjective perspective. Market failure or success and personal failure or success are not the same, though for some they over lap.

But one can continue to be active within the market only to the extent one has money or what will acquire money because money is the resource that signals how we are doing in market terms. Money is a systemic resource in the market. Unlike, say, an apple, it would be useless on a desert island. Its value stems from its being in a market, where it plays a crucial role in any complex economy.

Maximizing money resources is not for most of us the same as maximizing the resources we want for our lives. Most of us want money, but not only money and what money will buy. So we will often make choices that cost us money in return for other personal resources we want more. Free time, for example.

Take two people of utterly equal intelligence, good fortune, and creativity but with a different desire for the relative trade off of money to time. One will work as much as he or she possible can - and end up with lots of money and no free time. The other will deliberately not work as much as he or she can, and so will have less money and more time. At the level of individual resources, no problem - each has maximized them and each is pleased with the outcome.

But the first now has more systemic resources than the other. That person is more able to influence the market at a systemic level than the second, regardless of whether or not that was the intent of either. It is an impersonal outcome. The market will tend, over time, to transfer systemic resources from those who value them less to those who value them more. Systems of organization such as joint stock corporations are designed to be attentive only to systemic resources. Individual business people often have more complex value choices. When they compete against corporations they will be at a disadvantage to the degree they subordinate making money to other values, assuming equal competence on both parts.

A concrete example - in Kansas City during the Depression a furniture store owner managed to hold on and keep all his people employed at the cost of lowering wages and taking far smaller profits - perhaps on occasion none at all. He believed he had ethical relationships with the people who worked for him, relationships more complex than simply instrumental ones. Today corporations will close down profitable operations and lay everyone off if they think they can make more by relocating in a different region or country. They operate in an ethically more shallow environment where only market resources count and all employees are of purely instrumental value. This is neither bad nor good, it simply is.

As a system of coordination through prices, the market tilts the playing field in favor of those who seek only money as their personal resources because those people are in perfect harmony with market values. To the degree we are simply consumers this is all to the good., But most of us are not only consumers, and so there is the possibility for serious lack of fit between the values of the market order and of the people acting within it. Thus it is not neutral.



And as for Madisonian democracy, see my comments on your previous post, here.

Gus: Roderick wrote there:

“But I think Madison made a fundamental error in trying to embed this ideal in a state system -- and I do think it's a state system, because it establishes a monopoly of power. The disanalogy between the occupants of business firms and the occupants of Congress, the White House, etc. is that in a free market I am free to start up in competition with a business firm whereas I will be shut down by force if I attempt to compete with Congress. So even Madisonian democracy is a condition in which the occupants of government office (along with those special-interest groups that manage to win their favour) constitute a minority faction, enjoying rights themselves that they deny to others -- which to my mind makes it a system of domination.”

He also writes in a place he linked:
“Mr. Bidinotto expresses incredulity at my claim that a 'final arbiter' is by definition lawless, but he never responds directly to my argument.”

I will not get into the debate he has with Bidinotto - it is interesting and he makes some valid points. I will confine these observations to how they impact my own arguments. If I missed something relevant I am sure it will be pointed out - but please, tell me what it is and not simply link to as very long article (or three of them in this case!)

The Madisonian monopoly of power is a very strange kind of monopoly. It does make final determinations as to individual issues and cases - as any legal system must. But every case is always open to new challenges with respect to future cases through political channels - voting, debates, etc. This is precisely analogous to science. Evolutionary theory enjoys a monopoly among competent scientists, as Newtonian theory once did. A scientist today who rejects evolutionary theory will as a rule not get a job in science. And that is in my opinion desirable.

At the same time, evolutionary theory, like Newtonian mechanics, always enjoys only a provisional monopoly. It depends upon its persuasive power among people who are not required to agree. Perhaps at some future date problems will arise within evolutionary theory that will lead to its being replaced by, or more likely subsumed within, another more all encompassing theory. The monopoly exists at a certain point in time, but not over time.

The only monopoly of power that a democracy necessarily has is that it offers a means to end a dispute for the moment. Its monopoly of power is procedural, not substantive. No definable interest, group, or party has the monopoly. The process is where the monopoly exists - just as with science. This is different from a market because science seeks to discover universally reliable knowledge - and so has a “monopolistic” goal built into its enterprise. Markets only seek to serve agreements between two parties in very delimited contexts. Even so, the contract is a kind of power monopoly - once agreed to it dominates the parties. A contract is also a procedure for ending disputes - and a monopolistic one in its context of application.

Democracies deal with problems in many ways as universal as science - such as issues confronting a society as a whole. But unlike in science, not acting is itself a outcome that will aid one party to a dispute at the cost of another. Science is in no hurry. That quantum mechanics is not strictly compatible with relativistic theory is a problem and challenge to science, not a threat. By contrast, sometimes a democracy needs to act. Madisonian principles (and Aristotelian before him) suggest ways to act without leaving the system in the hands of a monopolistic interest rather than simple a monopolistic procedure.

Stephan Kinsella - 11/16/2005

I didn't define anarcho capitalism because I figured its meaning was reasonably obvious on this list: a society without any universally or near universally recognized final authority for settling disputes, and where all transactions were based on formal agreement, either mediated through rules of market contract or through verbal agreement.

Well. I would say that anarcho-capitalism is a society with widespread recognition of the right to private property, so widespread that institutional--public--forms of aggression are seen as illegitimate and are not tolerated. That is, it is simply a society that does not have a state. It is not necessarily completely crime-free--there may still be some degree of private criminality in an anarchist society, so long as it is not seen as legitimate and not institutionalized.

I would not agree with your characteristics, if only b/c they are unnecessary in view of what I listed above, which seems complete enough on a basic level. But to take some of your comments:

"a society without any universally or near universally recognized final authority for settling disputes"

Well. There is no "final authority" for settling disputes in today's world. There are 200 countries; and even in a given country, it's not clear what the "final authority" always is. But we do not have true anarchocapitalism today, do we?

"where all transactions were based on formal agreement"

Oh, I am not sure about that. "Formal agreement"? If I hand you a coin for a candy bar, and thereby purchase it, is this transaction "based" on a "formal agreement"? If two guys meet in the wilderness and share a meal together, then go their own ways, is this transaction based on a formal agreement? IF I shoot a robber, is that based on a formal agreement? Etc.

"either mediated through rules of market contract or through verbal agreement"

technical point: do you mean oral agreement? All contracts are verbal--both written and oral are made of words ("verbal").

It sees the world of impersonal social relations in terms of people as consumers.

That's why I try to focus on what the essentials are of being an anarchocapitalist: it means simply to oppose aggression, and to recognize the state necessarily employs widespread, systematic aggression. That is all. The other things are side-points or rhetorical flourishes or redundant or unnecessary.

I do not want to debate global warming here - if people want to ignore science because it doesn't fit their ideological beliefs, fine.

If you do not want to debate it here, why drop a loaded comment like that, which presupposes that those who oppose global warming are biased and dishonest? Rather it is largely the opposite; so even if there is global warming the skepticism of those who trot it out and have an axe to grind, is understandable. The anti-industrialists have ruined their credibility and have cried wolf too many times. So if we ignore the threat is is more their fault than it is the skeptics'.

Anarcho capitalism has nothing to say. Governments are bad enough, but they MIGHT eventually be able to do something about it. An anarchist society could not.

this is just an assertion: that governments can solve a problem, and that free people could not. In any event, I fail to see its relevance. Does this point establish (a) that aggression is not bad? or (b) that states do not employ aggression? If not, then I fail to see its relevance to the issue of anarcho-capitalism.

Aggression by definition is illegitimate. The critical question is: what constitutes aggression. What looks simple often isn't.

No disagreement her.e I am focusing now on the abstract, general point.

States do employ aggression. I do not defend states.

If you admit aggression is unjust; and that states employ it; and that you don't defend it--guess what, my friend, you are an anarchist. So what exactly do you mean in saying you oppose it?

States are instrumental organizations, like criminal gangs, the Catholic church, WalMart, and the Red Cross. Unlike these others they claim legitimate use of a monopoly of force, and for the most part the claim is granted b y those against whom they employ this force. I dislike states a great deal.

Just like your other fellow anarchists. Good.

I have argued that democracies are fundamentally different: they are spontaneous orders rather than instrumental organizations.

IF you define "democracy" to not includes states, then anarchists do not oppose it. But to the extent it is a form of a state, then it is aggressiv by nature. Which one, exactly, are you advocating?

Am I an anarchist? It depends on what one means by the word. Read PPP. I am most certainly not a statist.

I think you are necessarily either a statist, or an anarchist. Idon't see an in-between. You either believe institutionalized aggression is legitimate, or you do not. IF you do not, you are an anarchist, and I am thus confusd at what exactly it is you are trying to critique.

Despite your doubts, my position is ultimately an ethical one - but an ethical one that takes its inspiration from Hume and Smith, and not from either utilitarianism, which does not recognize intrinsic value or something akin to it in beings, nor rights and deontological theories, which tend not to take into consideration the effects of their principles.

dunno what "doubts" you are referring to, but I don't see the relevance of any of this philosophizing to the basic isseu: do you or do you not, endorse the legitimacy of institutionalized aggression. I think it's kind of a simple issue. Most people support a degree of public coercion--governemnt. THey are to that extent statists, and not anarchists. YOu seem to want to resist endorsing aggression, which makes you an anarchist; yet you want to resist accepting that label too. ARe you an anti-labeler by any chance? :)

Gus diZerega - 11/15/2005

I really do look forward to your reaction to the book. The book starts relatively mainstream and becomes more radical in each of the three main sections. The last, A Theory of Contractual Federalism, is what you will find most congenial, but it builds on the earlier analyses. It is not anrchy - but you might be surprised how close it gets - and leaves the door at least open to anarchy.

I was once reasonably close to Murray Rothbard, and read P&M several times, at first in anticipation of my questions being answered and my anarcho-capitalism being reinforced. Later to try and understand what I didn't like.

I agree with you about Athenian democracy and Aristotle's horrendous views about slavery. And you are right, he was no proponent of anarchy, or even of the kind of whatever it could be called that I end my book with. But it is in an Aristotelian farmework. You'll see what I mean - whether you are convinced or not.

William J. Stepp - 11/15/2005

I just checked the Bobst Library online catalog. The library has a copy of PPP, not checked out, so I will read it. It does sound interesting.
Rothbard has a critique of democracy in _Power and Market_.
Marriage, friendship, etc. are important but not especially relevant to anarcho capitalism per se.
Don't forget that Athenian democracy supported slavery and that Aristotle held that slavery is a natural condition. He was not a proponent of anarchy.

Gus diZerega - 11/15/2005

Looks like I may end up with an article as a result of my initial post. Here goes another installment.

I didn't define anarcho capitalism because I figured its meaning was reasonably obvious on this list: a society without any universally or near universally recognized final authority for settling disputes, and where all transactions were based on formal agreement, either mediated through rules of market contract or through verbal agreement. It seems to me that if this minimal definition can be shown to be unrealistic, anarcho capitalism in general can be shown to be unrealistic.

I have two basic theoretical arguments with the position.

My chief theoretical argument with anarcho-capitalists is they have no strong sense of public values. Anarchy per se need not have this lack. Kropotkin certainly has such a sense. But anarcho-capitalism as I have always encountered it (Rothbard, LeFevere, David Friedman in the Machinery of Freedom, to name a few) does not. It sees the world of impersonal social relations in terms of people as consumers. We are all, of course, consumers, and the market is by far the best way to serve us in this necessary role. Where we are not consumers we enter into personal face to face relationships: friends, marriage, etc. But we are more than this, as Aristotle correctly pointed out long ago. (He develops a theory of non-coercive politics that should but does not interest libertarians.)

My second theoretical argument has to do with the nature of disputes and their resolution. The more interrelated we become the greater the number and complexity of possible disputes. A world of settlers in a wilderness would likely have relatively few disputes once basic property lines were established. Downtown Manhattan is another matter. I believe one reason so many libertarians are vehemently anti-environmental is that they intuit that to the extent that environmentalist worries are valid, traditional anarcho-capitalist approaches are implausible. I do not want to debate global warming here - if people want to ignore science because it doesn't fit their ideological beliefs, fine. But it is not intrinsically impossible for global arming to be human induced. So let us for the sake of the challenge I am making grant that it is human induced and that its impact will on balance be quite bad for many innocent people.

Anarcho capitalism has nothing to say. Governments are bad enough, but they MIGHT eventually be able to do something about it. An anarchist society could not. Many smaller environmental problems are similarly difficult to address within a framework focused on discrete property rights coordinated by market processes, including air pollution, non-point water pollution, preserving salmon and other anadromous fish, light pollution, and the role of key stone species in complex ecologies.

I have just finished a book on these matters and hopefully it will soon be published, though to be honest, I suspect libertarians will accord it as much attention as they did my Persuasion, Power and Polity, A Theory of Democratic Self-Organization, which shows just how very close you can get to some kind of anarchy and still address public values and the strengths of the market. I know of no published review anywhere.

Given the existence of complex disputes, a society needs a way of settling them so that everyone can move on. Ideally it is settled perfectly justly. But if perfect justice took, say, ten years on average to settle disputes, and an imperfect but reasonably workable system took one month, most all of us would choose the latter. Since we will also never agree as to what constitutes perfect justice in specific cases, we are required to choose this latter strategy anyway. Justice always will have a practical dimension when it is applied to human affairs.

However, because this approach would not guarantee justice, and may on occasion lead to serious injustice, we would also want a way to challenge principles of settlement, so that future disputes might be settled differently and more acceptably. And we would want such a means of challenging unjust principles to be ideally open to all, that is, to be fair. Ideally the method we would use for such challenges would depend on persuasion, not force.

In my opinion that is remarkably close to the democratic ideal, and no model of anarchy I have encountered can do as well even at a theoretical level, given that people are poor judges in their own case and inequalities of power over resources will exist..

On to your point about aggression.

Aggression by definition is illegitimate. The critical question is: what constitutes aggression. What looks simple often isn't. That is why we need some recognized means for settling the issue, even if we settle it imperfectly. Are you aggressing on my lungs when you drive your car? To some extent you are. Is the extent worthy of redress for me? Who decides? What if competing defense agencies disagree and one has far more resources than another? What if the result is lung damage because of millions of small acts of aggression each of which is unimportant on its own?

States do employ aggression. I do not defend states. States are instrumental organizations, like criminal gangs, the Catholic church, WalMart, and the Red Cross. Unlike these others they claim legitimate use of a monopoly of force, and for the most part the claim is granted b y those against whom they employ this force. I dislike states a great deal.

I have argued that democracies are fundamentally different: they are spontaneous orders rather than instrumental organizations. The argument is complex, has been published in many places, and has never been critiqued in print so far as I know. I look forward to someone taking the time to do so. Maybe someone could read PPP?

The issue here is more than semantical. Two major practical differences between democracies and states are that democracies have never fought wars (major violent conflicts) with one another (the American South was not even close to being a democracy before the Civil War - or afterwards for a long time either). Further, democracies sometimes voluntarily allow secession - as Sweden did for Norway. This peacefulness carries over to the fact that democracies disproportionately create and enter into international associations where they voluntarily give up portions of sovereignty in the name of cooperation and dispute settlement. States do not do this.

Second, there is no clear record that the growth of democratic government leads to reduced negative freedom. The evidence on behalf of states is overwhelming that it does.

Much understanding of democracies by all sides of political debate is vitiated by their being classified as states. One of the great ironies these days is that classical liberals allied to “conservatives” have done more to try and turn the American democracy into a state than liberal progressives ever did.

Because democracies do offer a final point for settling disputes for the moment, they attract the kind of aggressive parasites that flourish most fully within states. The governmental part of a democracy is an organization that if it could free itself from democratic processes, would become a state. How to keep this from happening and thereby minimize the damage they do is an ongoing problem. But it is of a kind with minimizing the damage done by those who would turn any organization in any context to their ends at the cost of others.

Am I an anarchist? It depends on what one means by the word. Read PPP. I am most certainly not a statist. I call myself a left-Hayekian when I want to be both accurate and mess with people's categories… ;-)

Despite your doubts, my position is ultimately an ethical one - but an ethical one that takes its inspiration from Hume and Smith, and not from either utilitarianism, which does not recognize intrinsic value or something akin to it in beings, nor rights and deontological theories, which tend not to take into consideration the effects of their principles.

Roderick T. Long - 11/14/2005

Sorry about that link screwup. Here's a second try:


> I tried to access the comments on my post
> below and failed.

It wasn't working for a while; try now.

> As an ethical system, anarcho-capitalism depends on the
> following assumptions, all of which are wrong:
> 1. The market is a neutral means for facilitating voluntary
> exchange, and so simply reflects the values of those entering
> into voluntary transactions.
> 2. People's values are adequately reflected in the exchanges
> they make within a market order.
> 3. Some non-controversial theory of property rights is possible
> that is able to make all possible voluntary exchanges into either
> market exchanges or simple verbal agreements (science, marriage,
> etc.)

I don't think market anarchism depends on any of those assumptions. Re 1 and 2, all anarchism has to say to make its point is that market transactions reflect people's values better than any state system is likely to, not that they do so perfectly. Re 3, most market anarchists have thought that a variety of different property systems would coexist under anarchy.

Take this chapter by Kevin Carson (who is a market anarchist, though he wouldn't call himself an anarcho-capitalist because he uses "capitalist" in such a way that it's not synonymous with "free market"). He defends a "mutualist" theory of property rights à la Benjamin Tucker which forbids absentee landlordism. I think he's wrong; I'm much more of a Lockean about property. But I agree with the main point he makes in the chapter, that under anarchy there would probably be different communtiies with different property regimes. Even if community A thinks community B's practices are unjust, peaceful coexistence would be a lot cheaper than fighting about it; it's under states, where the costs of enforcement can be externalised, that disagreements about property rights are more likely to lead to violence.

I also don't think that market anarchism is committed to the notion that all voluntary exchanges are marekt exchanges, except insofar as "market" is defiend so broadly that that's a tautology -- certainly not in any narrower sense of "market." (See my and Charles Johnson's libertarian feminist pice on this topic.)

> This creates a severe conundrum for anarcho-capitalists: no
> logical line is crossed to envision a highly profitable enterprise
> serving many consumers ALL of whom wish it had never been
> built. This is so even when we stay entirely within the framework
> of assumptions needed for a pure market economy.
> In short, in this instance anyway the market is NOT a
> means for coordinating voluntary actions in a way to
> serve the values of those acting.

I don't see why this is a problem for anarchists. I agree with you that the situation you describe is coherent and possible. But it's a problem for anarchists only if this sort of thing is more likely to arise under anarchy than under states. I think you both underestimate the resources of anarchism to avoid these problems -- not that they will never happen, but if people really want an area to remain a wilderness thast does create an incentive for entrepreneurs to help them translate that preference into reality, and such entrepreneurial activity will be easier under anarchy than under states -- and underestimate the extent to which states are beset by still worse incentive problems of this sort.

> We will disagree. And when we disagree we will need some
> means to come to as settlement. If all are considered equal
> in rights, all will have to consider whatever means are selected
> as fair.

Absolutely. But this is an argument for anarchism, not aganst it. Polycentric legal orders are far better at this sort of thing than monopoly states. The movement from "consent" to "democracy" presupposes centralisation, but that's precisely what anarchists deny.

> Second, in the context of the market, which privileges money
> oriented values

That's the claim I challenge. Why assume that a market anarchist society would privilege money-oriented values? I don't find that claim at all plausible. See Phil Jacobson's essay here.

And as for Madisonian democracy, see my comments on your previous post, here.

Roderick T. Long - 11/14/2005

> I tried to access the comments on my post
> below and failed.

It wasn't working for a while; try now.

> As an ethical system, anarcho-capitalism depends on the
> following assumptions, all of which are wrong:
> 1. The market is a neutral means for facilitating voluntary
> exchange, and so simply reflects the values of those entering
> into voluntary transactions.
> 2. People's values are adequately reflected in the exchanges
> they make within a market order.
> 3. Some non-controversial theory of property rights is possible
> that is able to make all possible voluntary exchanges into either
> market exchanges or simple verbal agreements (science, marriage,
> etc.)

I don't think market anarchism depends on any of those assumptions. Re 1 and 2, all anarchism has to say to make its point is that market transactions reflect people's values better than any state system is likely to, not that they do so perfectly. Re 3, most market anarchists have thought that a variety of different property systems would coexist under anarchy.

Take this chapter by Kevin Carson (who is a market anarchist, though he wouldn't call himself an anarcho-capitalist because he uses "capitalist" in such a way that it's not synonymous with "free market"). He defends a "mutualist" theory of property rights à la Benjamin Tucker which forbids absentee landlordism. I think he's wrong; I'm much more of a Lockean about property. But I agree with the main point he makes in the chapter, that under anarchy there would probably be different communtiies with different property regimes. Even if community A thinks community B's practices are unjust, peaceful coexistence would be a lot cheaper than fighting about it; it's under states, where the costs of enforcement can be externalised, that disagreements about property rights are more likely to lead to violence.

I also don't think that market anarchism is committed to the notion that all voluntary exchanges are marekt exchanges, except insofar as "market" is defiend so broadly that that's a tautology -- certainly not in any narrower sense of "market." (See my and Charles Johnson's libertarian feminist pice on this topic.)

> This creates a severe conundrum for anarcho-capitalists: no
> logical line is crossed to envision a highly profitable enterprise
> serving many consumers ALL of whom wish it had never been
> built. This is so even when we stay entirely within the framework
> of assumptions needed for a pure market economy.
> In short, in this instance anyway the market is NOT a
> means for coordinating voluntary actions in a way to
> serve the values of those acting.

I don't see why this is a problem for anarchists. I agree with you that the situation you describe is coherent and possible. But it's a problem for anarchists only if this sort of thing is more likely to arise under anarchy than under states. I think you both underestimate the resources of anarchism to avoid these problems -- not that they will never happen, but if people really want an area to remain a wilderness thast does create an incentive for entrepreneurs to help them translate that preference into reality, and such entrepreneurial activity will be easier under anarchy than under states -- and underestimate the extent to which states are beset by still worse incentive problems of this sort.

> We will disagree. And when we disagree we will need some
> means to come to as settlement. If all are considered equal
> in rights, all will have to consider whatever means are selected
> as fair.

Absolutely. But this is an argument for anarchism, not aganst it. Polycentric legal orders are far better at this sort of thing than monopoly states. The movement from "consent" to "democracy" presupposes centralisation, but that's precisely what anarchists deny.

> Second, in the context of the market, which privileges money
> oriented values

That's the claim I challenge. Why assume that a market anarchist society would privilege money-oriented values? I don't find that claim at all plausible. See Phil Jacobson's essay here.

And as for Madisonian democracy, see my comments on your previous post, here.

Stephan Kinsella - 11/14/2005

As far as I can tell, the author criticizes "anarcho-capitalism" without defining what it is. I take it to be a position held by some libertarians, namely, the two-part view that states necessarily employ aggression; and that aggression is unjustified and illegitimate. I have argued in favor of this understanding in What It Means to be an Anarcho-Capitalist.

It seems to me Mr. diZerega is making the mistake that many strategy- or tactics-minded libertarians make, in focusing on "practical" issues instead of on ethical principles. Someone who is anti-murder is not necessarily "naive"; they just think murder is illegitimate, immoral, wrong, unjustified. To hold this position does not mean one believes murder will ever be eradicated. Therefore it would not do, to respond to an opponent of murder, "but your view is naive because there will always be murder."

Cannot Mr. diZerega justify his (implied) definition of anarchy?

In short, is Mr. diZerega arguing that states do not necessarily employ aggression? Or, is he arguing that aggression is not always illegitimate? If he does not argue either one of these, then in my view he is also an anarchist even if he is pessimistic about its chances.

Gus diZerega - 11/13/2005

Mark Fulwiler writes:
Well, first of all I would appreciate it, Gus, if you'd spell my name correctly! Thank you.

Gus: My apologies. Given my own last name I am well aware of how irritating it can be to see a name misspelled.

Mark: (snip…)

I take back my comments that ~all~ of your students are/were liars. However, I know that a lot of people lie when they perceive their opinion is not socially acceptable. . . . I suppose your students might enjoy the hypothetical private developments you mentioned, but would prefer a pristine wilderness. No contradiction there. But, that being the case, a pristine wilderness would generally be more profitable, I should think. Imagine the sort of fees a private owner could charge to use Yosemite or Yellowstone.

Gus:
Now we are getting to the core issue. What follows is longer than I anticipated - but hopefully I have made every step in the argument clear.

Your core assumption appears to be that the market is a basically neutral facilitator of voluntary exchange. Hence, if people want one value more than another, and are willing to pay for it, under conditions of pure market relations that value will win out over competing ones. If I agreed, as I once did, I would come much closer to being an anarcho capitalist, as I once was.

If information and organizing costs were zero then the market would perfectly mirror the values people have at the time they make their choices. Because they are not, the market is necessarily a discovery process that cannot be centrally planned. A discovery process makes mistakes, but these mistakes are of two kinds. First are errors in anticipating what people want. These are well known and unavoidable results of operating in an environment where information costs are not zero. Hayek has said probably about all that needs to be said, at least at the most basic level, about this point.

The second issue concerns organization costs. Providing people an option is not free. Further, the rules that enable us to create organizations will bias some strategies over others. The market biases strategies serving values able to be easily expressed in dollars and cents terms. Let's look at the ski resort and wilderness area example again.

The ski resort case is pretty straight-forward - those who benefit from the resort must as a rule use it. Few of us derive much satisfaction from knowing a resort exists that we rarely or never use. Access is easy to monitor. Fees can be charged and collected easily. Once built, even people who would prefer the resort not to exist will in many cases voluntarily come and use it, paying the fees and perhaps ironically providing the margin needed to make it profitable. Free rider problems will be non-existent or virtually so.

By comparison, those bidding against the resort to buy this land for wilderness protection will largely be supporting existence values rather than planning to make frequent use of the land themselves. For them, the major pay off is knowing the place exists in a relatively wild condition. This is clear in that many who do not want the resort will themselves not have visited the area nor do they plan to do so. Even those who do so will for the most part visit relatively rarely compared to the use made by those who would ski and snowboard at a resort built there.

Further, it is difficult for supporters of the wilderness option to find one another. Once it exists, the resort simply advertises and people come and pay to use it. The would be owners do not need to locate enough potential users in advance and collect fees from them to build. Supporters of the area as wilderness are scattered around and often are mutually unknown to one another. Further, they are unaware individually of what their “fair share” is in bidding for protection. Those who organize to bring these people together will have to go out and find supporters in a way that builders of a ski resort will not have to. Finally, there is a more serious free rider problem because it is probable that no single person's contribution will be crucial to saving the area from development. (None of the above problems depend on the view that people are unwilling to pay once they know that their payment is necessary if the area is to be preserved - the problem is getting that information to them along with a clear course of action.)

The two situations are not equal in the kinds of barriers needed to be overcome to realize these competing goals. The problem here is not with imperfections in markets per se but rather that the kinds of values to be served by the two options are radically different.

The resort desires only to make money. Let us assume it will, once built.

The wilderness supporters desire the existence of a value that is not in itself personally profitable to them. While it is certainly possible they can raise the money to buy it, they will have to spend far more in locating the necessary supporters than will the resort organizers, unless perhaps they can convince some very wealthy individual donors or foundations. This is why small scale philanthropy is so expensive today - for example, mailing costs to pay for mass mailings usually take up most of the money raised even when the effort is successful. And the wilderness example is more in the line of philanthropy than business.

From this concrete example let me introduce a theoretical distinction.

The resort serves consumers and does a good job of doing so by operating entirely within the market order. The resort owners do not even need to like skiing - all they need is to be convinced that enough other people do to make their investment profitable. So for them the resort is of purely instrumental value, and it's payoff is in money that they can use privately to pursue the values they care about. (They may take pride in building a good resort, but this is not necessary for the project to go ahead.)

The wilderness area serves people not as consumers or investors but in a different capacity. They will not as a rule use the area much - most will probably not use it at all. Simply knowing it exists gives them satisfaction. Unlike the resort, in theory there is no limit to how many people may enjoy knowing the area is preserved - it cannot be over used in that sense, and needs no pricing mechanism to make sure that knowledge it exists is monitored.

I suggest calling these kinds of values public values. Those who support them do so not primarily as money income sources or as objects of use (the two ways we can relate to ski resorts). A wilderness area is not a public good in the economist's sense because it is in principle possible to enclose it and charge admission. It could be privately supplied. But it is a public value in the Aristotelian sense because it is a good that we can support if we think the world/our society/our community is a better place because it exists.

Sometimes we can support the market as a way of serving public values because it is obviously superior to alternatives. For example, it is a public value for me, and for most people, that everyone has enough to eat. The market is better at achieving this goal than anything else, so it must at least be the foundation, and perhaps all that is necessary, for this goal to be met. But that is because this public value is served best by people in their role as consumers eating food: something that can be produced and distributed easily within the market framework.

Other public values are not of this sort. I have argued I think reasonably that the rules of the market make it difficult for people who support wilderness areas as existence values to come together and act effectively. The interesting question then becomes: what institutional framework works best to serve public values not easily served by the market?

If the choice is simply the market versus government, sometimes I will come down on the side of government. But this is a false dichotomy, rather like those who argue that one can believe in God or in evolution.

Left unexplored are other possibilities: forms of cooperation that are not money oriented, though price signals help actors choose wisely among competing means to their goals. These other kinds of voluntary organizations are rooted in ethically more complex kinds of cooperation than is a corporation, for example. I am thinking of cases such as the Boy Scouts, soccer clubs, the Red Cross, the Masons, and so on.

These are not money profit (a private value) seeking organizations. They are, or can be, public value seeking organizations. To be sure, the soccer team may be simply privately oriented, serving the desires of team members and their close friends. But perhaps the team will decide to offer free or low cost training to poor kids or some such group. At that point they start serving public values because their members have expanded their horizons to encompass more than their community of family and friends. Tocqueville is great here, by the way.

Libertarians have usually so defined public values as to make them all but impossible to comprehend in terms of libertarian theory. They then let this area be monopolized by advocates of government. Most people are well aware that public values exist - and so turn their backs on libertarian theory as being blind to important areas of human experience. Libertarians then get frustrated because they define the market as the realm of all voluntary, or at least voluntary contractual, action, and so wonder what is left out. Their blindness comes from ignoring how rules structuring cooperation privilege some kinds of cooperation over others equally voluntary.

As readers of this list know, government (state or democratic) often serves private values in the name of serving the public - and does so often by exploiting others. When it does serve public values it may do so poorly. But for myself, I'd rather have them poorly served than not at all.

Public values are not necessarily all good. They can conflict. One argument for leaving as much of their provision as possible out of government is to minimize areas of conflict. But to make this case effectively people need to not confuse these kinds of goals with more narrowly economic ones.

I am admittedly dubious that anarcho capitalism can work even in its own terms, but long before that I am dissatisfied with its advocates' efforts to make large areas of human experience and life analytically invisible by discarding as irrelevant any values that cannot be served easily within either a pure market context or among friends and intimates. The costs of this error are hidden by subsuming civil society into the market order, where it doers not really belong.

William J. Stepp - 11/13/2005

I use the New York Public Library, and I'd vote to privatize it immediately. There is no contradiction in my using it and advocating anarchy, as my taxes help pay for it.

M.D. Fulwiler - 11/13/2005

Well, first of all I would appreciate it, Gus, if you'd spell my name correctly! Thank you.

Actually, I do enjoy some publically funded facilities. Central Park in New York is one of my favorite parks, for example. (I would note that the park is anything but a "natural" wilderness , however. It's a carefully designed space.) However, I don't wish it didn't exist---I just wish it was not funded by taxes. And by the way, I'm very happy the entire island of Manhattan was not maintained as a pristine wilderness, although I have no doubt it was lovely in its original state.

Now I would be unhappy if someone bought Central Park and, say, decided to turn it into a race track. I would hope that it would be more valuable to New Yorkers as it is now, more or less. But obviously a free market will not result in a world I like 100%.

I take back my comments that ~all~ of your students are/were liars. However, I know that a lot of people lie when they perceive their opinion is not socially acceptable. (Try asking your students if they enjoy watching hardcore pornography and see how many admit to it!) Frankly, it's not very socially acceptable to delight in the private development of wilderness areas these days. However, I'd be brave enough to say in your class that I like some of the ideas you presented. I suppose your students might enjoy the hypothetical private developments you mentioned, but would prefer a pristine wilderness. No contradiction there. But, that being the case, a pristine wilderness would generally be more profitable, I should think. Imagine the sort of fees a private owner could charge to use Yosemite or Yellowstone.

Gus diZerega - 11/12/2005

Ken writes:
Thanks for your comments above. I've been interested in your epiphany re: free-market anarchism and wondered about its source.

Gus:
Sagoff is not the only source, but he is one of them. Another is the point I make about public and private below. Another is my discovery that democracies are spontaneous orders and not states. Finally, my realization that there are several spontaneous orders in society and while all are formally voluntary, they are not necessarily harmonious in their feedback.

Ken continues:
Since I've been thinking about foreign policy recently, I'd like to look at your example in terms of the current multinational system.

1. If Mineral King Valley or ANWR is in another country, would you support invasion if it were being developed?

No.

2. If the development on sacred ground has already occurred, shouldn't you advocate destruction of it, whether under the U.S. legal system or any other?

Gus:
Not sure what you mean. For example, let's say a Indian tribe believes a certain area is sacred to them. The Lakota and the Black Hills would be an example. We would, all of us I hope, agree the Black Hills were stolen from the Lakota (regardless of how they got them).

Should we give them back?

If the original robbers were still in possession, the answer is simple in my mind: give it back. But that is no longer the case.

The tribe is a corporate entity. It was injured and it most certainly still exists. So letting bygones be bygones is not really appropriate either.

And so the matter gets complex and I think the question is best answered rather pragmatically.

I believe property rights are justified by their utility as well as their evidencing respect for people. Not just for the right holder, but for all people who might be influenced by that right. Consequently they are damnably difficult to describe abstractly in a universal sense. I am very sympathetic to case law kinds of reasoning as a means for teasing out the complexities of individual cases.

So - broadly, I think the Lakota have a right to have a say in how the Black Hills are used - but are no longer the sole legitimate owners.

3. If development is bad here as well as bad elsewhere, why is there an issue regarding the legal system used in the first place?

Not sure of your point.

4. Don't you consider private conservation methods far superior than the national park system, which is subject to the vagaries of politics?

Gus:
If by private you mean rooted in civil society, yes! Yes! YES! Most of my work in environmental policy has focused on finding ways to remove land from government control and place it within the context of civil society.

5. (snip…)

To be honest, Gus, with the dwindling budgets for National Parks, privatization and profit centers such as a "destination ski resort in Mineral King valley" may be the only way to keep the park system afloat and open to ordinary people.

Gus:
I am very sympathetic to where you are coming from - but I think you are caught in a false dichotomy, as I once was. The dichotomy is a result of equating public with government and private with the market.

The reality is different. Government can serve public or private values. Organizations in the market can serve civil society or narrowly economic values (I distinguish between them). The former I term the market place, the latter the market order. Organizations in civil society - that part of society that is neither government nor dominated by the market order, can serve either public or private values.

For example, democratic trusts rooted in civil society are almost certainly far superior ways to manage public values in land and water than either traditional private or governmental control. Not being governmental, such trusts would have no power to tax, but neither would they be biased in favor of making money profit, as are corporations, or limited in security by the duration of a life, as is private property owned by a person. The National Trust of England, Wales and Northern Ireland is a rough approximation. Another rough approximation is the Wenominee Forest Enterprises in Wisconsin.

I recently gave a paper at the 8th World Wilderness Conference in Anchorage on Democratic Forest Trusts as alternatives to national forests. I am happy to mail a file of that paper to all who ask. I will email you a copy since you gave your email. Anyone else: simply email me a request for the paper and I'll send it to you.

I will give my email address in a way to prevent its being caught up by spam spies - and recommend everyone else do so as well when publishing an email address:

Gdizerega(AT)stlawuDOTedu.

Gus diZerega - 11/12/2005

William Stepp writes:
The main problem with your critique is that it's mostly aimed at property rights and the market (despite your qualification), except for the jibe about AC being on about the same moral level as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Presumably the other part of your argument would also apply to a limited state government or even to a larger one, such as the monstrosity in Washington D.C.

Gus replies:
As readers of this list know, I am no fan of what currently exists. Most of my work is on alternatives - and I think anarcho-capitalist theory is a dead end. Exploring the possibilities within civil society holds far more promise.

Stepp continues:
An argument against AC should focus only on its claim that the key functions of law, courts, and defense can be better supplied by the market. Your argument bringing in the comparison to Hussein's Iraq really skirts this instead of addressing it directly.

Gus replies:

The role of courts in anarcho-capitalism is a major theoretical and practical problem as well, but I was focusing on an issue prior in logic to discussing courts - namely, can the market order serve human values in such a way as to allow us to depend on it alone except for the legal problems involved in enforcing contracts and punishing theft. If it cannot then why on earth should we simply want the legal system to enforce the outcomes of whatever contracts we enter into without regard to a system of property rights or the bias of the rules under which we act?

Stepp continues:
You also invoke Locke, who was not an anarchist. David Friedman makes the case for anarchy, including an interesting article in the Dec. issue of Liberty magazine ("Do We Need Government?"), without mentioning Locke once, to the best of my knowledge. He specifically tackles your point about Hussein (without using the dictator's name), by pointing out that free market defense agencies avoid the problems of state monopoly law enforcement. I suggest you read his piece and then try again based on his arguments.

Gus replies:
Of course Locke was not an anarchist. But he provides one strong ethical foundation for anarcho-capitalism: that any legitimate authority must be based on consent. I actually agree with this in a general way. That Locke thought a democratic republic of some kind was best is secondary to his basic reasoning, which was that property is rooted in self-ownership and that authority over human beings must be based on consent. Do you disagree with either view? If not, Locke is a pretty good place to start for exploring anarcho-capitalist theory. (I personally think the concept of self-ownership is a non-starter, but that is a different and more involved debate.)

I read David Friedman a long time ago. I wasn't convinced then and am way too busy now to try and find that issue of Liberty, to which I no longer subscribe. But if you send me a copy of the article, and if it is not too long, I'll send in a comment to this list. Send it to me c/o Dept. of Government, St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617. Otherwise write a synopsis detailed enough to make his views clear. Maybe they have changed. I will then respond.

Stepp writes:
A couple other comments:
Your claim that for all its problems the government does a better job managing wilderness land than Disney and Weyerhauser is false.

Gus snippily says:
I am impressed with your evidence on behalf of your pronouncement. Perhaps you can show me wilderness areas owned by Weyerhauser or Disney? Does Adventure Land in Anaheim count?

Stepp says:
Second, anyone, whether you, the Sierra Club, or Ted Turner (the largest private landowner in the U.S., and yes he does get subsidies from the Agriculture Dept., as does John Mellencamp--so boycott him!) can buy up wilderness land and have as much of a view as you like.

I reply:
I am again impressed with your recourse to evidence to back up your statement. Please tell me where I may buy up some wilderness in Colorado or Wyoming, Washington or California, Oregon or Montana, Idaho or New Mexico. I am most interested. And if you read me carefully, it is clear that the issue of a view was not involved in that argument.

The rest of what you have written here seems sort of bizarre to me. I'm not sure where to even begin. So I won't.

Stepp writes:
A room with a view costs more than one without, as owners of NYC penthouse apartments can attest.

I reply:
Building a house on a hill required more effort (paying more in energy and planning) in the example I gave - so this point is obtuse.

You are also ignoring the more basic point I was trying to make - that we need a way to establish property rights before we can then begin growing a market order. No property rights, no market order. At most we would have barter and face to face exchange, and I predicated my critique with assuming a high level of technology.

To sell something I need to have reasonably secure control over it and if you are going to buy it from me, you will need the assurance of reasonably secure control over it after you buy it. True, when everything is insecure sales will probably still be made - but at very low prices with very limited chains of production due to uncertainty.

My basic point, however, was that ANY system of property rights will depend on agreements among those having to abide by those rules. Because the principles defining what should and should not be a property right are not self-evident (I used the example you attack to establish this point) some fair means needs to be established to determine what they should be - or else the enforcement will be in the spirit of Hussein, force, not justice.

Maybe you want to begin with property rights as they currently exist. But why? And why should those who believe a more just system is needed agree with starting from the status quo? And that avoids the issue of whether the rules that generate the market have a bias and so do more than simply facilitate peaceful exchanges.

Stepp writes:
Finally, your claim that money is a value is hogwash. Money is simply a medium of exchange and a store of value, but not itself a value. I shudder to think what you're teaching your students, given your understanding of basic economics.

I reply:
Please re-read what I wrote. Why is money a value to people? Because it can be used as a medium of exchange. Value in the economic sense is subjective - yes. Money is valued because people value it. They value it because it can be used in a very wide range of exchanges more conveniently than can barter. Money is therefore an excellent tool for making completely impersonal exchanges, and that is why we use it and seek it. Money does not easily reflect what a person might regard or perceive as an intrinsic value because there can be no expression of intrinsic value in money prices since all prices are convertible into mixes of goods selling for the same amount. That is, money can tell us much about instrumental value and nothing about intrinsic value.

Money is most definitely NOT a “store of value.” That gives the concept of value some independent existence that somehow is stored in money. This works for intrinsic value, but not for money value. The only value money need have is as a medium of exchange - though non-fiat money can have some utility for other uses as well. But it does not necessarily need it so long as it remains easily divisible and relatively scarce. If technology ended the technological superiority of gold as a conductor and it ceased to be valued in jewelry, it could still be useful as money. I suggest reading Mises.

Gus diZerega - 11/12/2005

Mark Fuweiler apparently believes that context makes no difference in our choices and that all who seem to disagree with his views on this issue are either liars, or so fearsome as to successfully threaten several hundred students over many years so that they all lie as well.

As to the former, I am dealing with people on earth, where context does matter. I suggest Furweiler confine his analysis to human beings.

As to the latter, perhaps Furweiler is projecting?

In the logically possible instance that he is not projecting, I shall try one more time to show there is no logical absurdity here.

I drive Trail Ridge Road in Rocky Mountain National Park. I enjoy the drive. Immensely. It is one of the most scenic drives in all the US.

Before it was built there was an older road across the park, through Fall River Pass. This road was not nearly so scenic and did not let one start high country hiking from above the tree line except at the pass itself, where it intersected with what is now Trail Ridge Road.

I can honestly say I wish the road had never been built even though I would have to work harder to make certain hikes and I would not be able to so easily access miles and miles of alpine tundra. However, since it is now there, and hundreds if not thousands of cars drive it daily during the summer, there is no point in boycotting it. None at all.

So I drive it.

But were I to be able to vote on whether Trail Ridge Road should exist or not, I would have then, and would now, vote against it. No contradiction logically at all.

Maybe Furweiler has a drive he likes to take? Or a public park he likes to visit? If so he likely makes use of a publicly funded facility.

Would he vote to establish and fund it?

If he would and he is also an anarcho capitalist, he has some problems with intellectual consistency. If he would not, but now that it exists he makes use of it, his position is rather like mine with regard to Trail Ridge and those students with regard to a hypothetical ski resort.

Kenneth R. Gregg - 11/12/2005

Gus,
Thanks for your comments above. I've been interested in your epiphany re: free-market anarchism and wondered about its source.

Since I've been thinking about foreign policy recently, I'd like to look at your example in terms of the current multinational system.

1. If Mineral King Valley or ANWR is in another country, would you support invasion if it were being developed?

2. If the development on sacred ground has already occurred, shouldn't you advocate destruction of it, whether under the U.S. legal system or any other?

3. If development is bad here as well as bad elsewhere, why is there an issue regarding the legal system used in the first place?

4. Don't you consider private conservation methods far superior than the national park system, which is subject to the vagaries of politics?

5. I will tell you that, living here in Nevada (yes, I'm in Las Vegas), the land of nuclear bomb testing, regular bomb testing, and 90% government control of land, I've seen how government control can devastate vast regions with almost no possibility of return to pristine states, how the eventual use of park lands will be to the rich and powerful with the rest of us only able to view the forests and park from satellite pictures and webcams.

To be honest, Gus, with the dwindling budgets for National Parks, privatization and profit centers such as a "destination ski resort in Mineral King valley" may be the only way to keep the park system afloat and open to ordinary people.

Just a thought.
Just Ken
kgregglv@cox.net

William J. Stepp - 11/12/2005

The main problem with your critique is that it's mostly aimed at property rights and the market (despite your qualification), except for the jibe about AC being on about the same moral level as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Presumably the other part of your argument would also apply to a limited state government or even to a larger one, such as the monstrosity in Washington D.C.
An argument against AC should focus only on its claim that the key functions of law, courts, and defense
can be better supplied by the market. Your argument bringing in the comparison to Hussein's Iraq really skirts this instead of addressing it directly.
You also invoke Locke, who was not an anarchist. David Friedman makes the case for anarchy, including an interesting article in the Dec. issue of Liberty magazine ("Do We Need Government?"), without mentioning Locke once, to the best of my knowledge. He specifically tackles your point about Hussein (without using the dictator's name), by pointing out that free market defense agencies avoid the problems of state monopoly law enforcement. I suggest you read his piece and then try again based on his arguments.
A couple other comments:
Your claim that for all its problems the government does a better job managing wilderness land than Disney and Weyerhauser is false.
Second, anyone, whether you, the Sierra Club, or Ted Turner (the largest private landowner in the U.S., and yes he does get subsidies from the Agriculture Dept., as does John Mellencamp--so boycott him!) can buy up wilderness land and have as much of a view as you like.
A room with a view costs more than one without, as owners of NYC penthouse apartments can attest.
Finally, your claim that money is a value is hogwash. Money is simply a medium of exchange and a store of value, but not itself a value. I shudder to think what you're teaching your students, given your understanding of basic economics.

M.D. Fulwiler - 11/12/2005

"This creates a severe conundrum for anarcho-capitalists: no logical line is crossed to envision a highly profitable enterprise serving many consumers ALL of whom wish it had never been built."

These people are obviously lying to be politically correct. Sort of like the liberals who denounce Wal-Mart and then stop at Sam's Club on the way home, or the preacher who denounces porn and then orders a copy of "Debbie Does Dallas" on the internet.

It's a logical absurdity to say that you would enjoy something that you wish had never been built.

Gus diZerega - 11/12/2005

In the paragraph reading

"This takes us to the second level of our critique. We always choose within a context. For example, given that Mineral King existed WITH A SKI RESORT, so the choice of preserving it no longer existed, people will often choose to go there to recreate. I drive Colorado's Trail Ridge Road every time I can for basically the same reason."

the words in capitals are added because I somehow failed to make what I was getting at clear in the original post.

sorry.