Struggle in Context
President Bush's speech to the NED contains two bits that are particularly interesting to historians: a comparison of the current struggle to the Cold War (which is quite effective, I think) and a decontextualization of terror attacks (which is historically suspect).
The core of the speech, though the reportage has largely been about the"ten serious Al Qaeda terrorist plots" thwarted by the US and its allies, is a comparison of the radical Islamist jihadi movement to the totalitarian Communist regimes of the 20th century:
The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century. Yet in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century.Like the ideology of communism, Islamic radicalism is elitist, led by a self-appointed vanguard that presumes to speak for the Muslim masses.
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Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy teaches that innocent individuals can be sacrificed to serve a political vision. And this explains their cold-blooded contempt for human life.
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We have seen this kind of shameless cruelty before, in the heartless zealotry that led to the gulags and the Cultural Revolution and the killing fields.Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy pursues totalitarian aims. Its leaders pretend to be in an aggrieved party, representing the powerless against imperial enemies.
In truth, they have endless ambitions of imperial domination and they wish to make everyone powerless except themselves.
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Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy is dismissive of free peoples, claiming that men and women who live in liberty are weak and decadent.
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And Islamic radicalism, like the ideology of communism, contains inherent contradictions that doom it to failure.By fearing freedom, by distrusting human creativity and punishing change and limiting the contributions of half the population, this ideology undermines the very qualities that make human progress possible and human society successful.
These parallels are pretty strongly drawn, and though there is a selectivity at work in this history, it isn't a fatal flaw. Perhaps the deepest flaw in this parallel is the lack of discussion of how totalitarian communism was defeated (where it was defeated; sometimes it just mutated).
A more liberal version of this speech might have admitted that there is often at least some truth to the criticisms of radicals, that there are causes for aggrievement which make the radical leadership palatable to those they claim to lead. Just before the above-quoted section, though, Bush specifically challenges the idea that terrorism has any cause other than terrorists. This section is, shall we say, highly selective in its historical presentation
Some have also argued that extremism has been strengthened by the actions of our coalition in Iraq, claiming that our presence in that country has somehow caused or triggered the rage of radicals.I would remind them that we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001, and Al Qaida attacked us anyway.
The hatred of the radicals existed before Iraq was an issue and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse.
We were not, technically, in Iraq, except perhaps in the form of UN monitors. But we were in the tenth year of an embargo, a"no fly" regime, and military presence just outside of Iraq that was widely criticized and specifically cited by Al Qaeda. There is a distinction between" caused" and"strengthened" and a distinction between pre-9/11 terrorists and post-invasion recruits that need to be considered. He continues:
The government of Russia did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom, and yet militants killed more than 180 Russian school children in Beslan. Over the years, these extremists have used a litany of excuses for violence: Israeli presence on the West Bank or the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia or the defeat of the Taliban or the crusades of a thousand years ago.
Russia has its own problems with Islam, which pre-date 9/11 and which are ongoing: starting with (for sake of convenience) the invasion of Afghanistan and (US-supported) Taliban insurgency there and the-now constant vicious war in Chechnya which involves, much like the Iraq situation, a mix of Chechen patriots -- some now radicalized -- and radical outsiders.
In fact, we're not facing a set of grievances that can be soothed and addressed. We're facing a radical ideology with unalterable objectives: to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the killers, and no concession, bribe or act of appeasement would change or limit their plans for murder.
It's not entirely clear to me that the sharp distinction between those who believe the grievances he cites are real and the leadership of the radical/terrorist movements is justified. It's entirely possible, in fact I think probable, that a pretty high percentage of the Islamist movements' core supporters really do consider these"excuses" to be substantial and motivating factors. (see Manan Ahmed's ruminations on this here and here for a subtler discussion) That doesn't mean that they are right about the nature of the grievances or the solution through terror.
But it does mean that, without some good faith attempt to consider separate from our fear of terrorism the nature and effects of our actions, we are not likely to prevail in the most important long-term sense. There are good arguments against terror, against Islamism, for putting real effort (including patience) into Iraqi success. There are good arguments for multilateralism, for multiculturalism, for imperial restraint. Honestly, there's a middle ground here, somewhere.