Iraq: The Political Fight Begins

The political battle to gain more power in Iraq has now come out into the open. The two most important Shia contenders -- the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) & Moqtada al-Sadr have each their own army, of course. But there are crucial differences in the regional coverage of their power-bases. SCIRI’s followers are in the Shia-majority -- & oil-rich -- southern provinces, but al-Sadr has an extremely large following in Baghdad*. This is why he opposes regionalism & prefers a strong centre: to obtain oil revenues to dispense amongst his followers in the central provinces , where there are no oil resources. By mobilising a crowd of some 100,000 in Baghdad, & by pitched battles in Najaf with the SCIRI troops, he has shown that he is not negligible -- & he has in effect put in a bid for _increasing_ his share of power.

The Sunnis mainly occupy the central oil-poor provinces, & so their political leaders have to continue to use violence. This last is directed mainly against two targets: (1) the Shia -- whose mosques & gatherings they bomb regularly & (2 ) govt functionaries (eg, policemen) & offices (eg, army recruitment centres.) Through such methods, they continue their battle for _further_ political power. Over the last few weeks Sunni politicians have shown clearly that they are dissatisfied with the amount of power they now have, & definitely want more. But Shia & Kurd politicians are not willing -- as yet -- to give them more.

The Kurd-majority provinces are also oil-rich, & Kurdish politicians have de facto autonomy. These provinces also contain several important minorities -- Arabs & Turkmen, in particular. Kurdish politicians of course use their power to favour their own followers, since such permanent minorities must be generally helpless. Where Saddam Hussain planted his Arab followers into key cities in these provinces & forcibly displaced Kurds, Kurdish politicians naturally do the opposite: they evict Arabs & Turkmen, to turn their properties over to Kurdish followers. It would appear that Kurdish politicians are generally secure in their exercise of power; the real struggle will be further south.

Thus the ‘referendum’ is the next stage in this power struggle. The important question is whether all the politicians will be satisfied with whatever power shares they obtain afterwards. Al-Sadr & the Sunni politicians clearly would like to increase their shares -- but will the other Shia rulers & the Kurdish rulers be happy with this? Alternatively, could the southern Shia & the Kurdish rulers simply go their own way with their provinces? The problem here is that Al-Sadr _also_ has a strong following in the southern provinces; & Sunni politicians would simply extend their violence in both directions.

In short: the long-suffering Iraqi people will continue to have an ‘interesting’ time (as in the old Chinese curse.)

(What? The constitution? Oh that. The outcome of the power struggle will be recorded in whatever document comes out afterwards. )

(*Amendment: That should read: Baghdad & a number of other cities throughout Iraq, from Basra in the south to Kirkuk in the north.)

Addendum: Other Shia politicians also oppose regionalism; & Turkmen politicians in the north have come out very strongly against regionalism, for obvious reasons.