Filling the Void

In 1936, as the German army moved across the Rhine, no British soldiers were in Cologne to confront them. No Belgian troops were in Aachen to prevent them from reaching the border. No French troops were in Trier to control the crowds. And no American troops were in sight to protect the rights of minorities and foreigners. They had already left.

The remilitarization of the Rhineland is a contentious memory, a point at which Hitler might have been confronted. With the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza it is not surprising that people would use 1936 to judge the prudence of Israeli actions. Unfortunately, the remilitarization was perhaps another failure of the Allies to prevent Germany from reconstituting its military strength than a point of no return.

At Belmont Club, Wretchard argues that British and French politicians surrendered too much to Hitler. (HT: Ralph Luker) Giving Germans the justice of sovereignty over their entire territory “[gave] the Nazis the key to Europe.”

I have, of course, argued in the past that the remilitarization was broadly popular with Rhinelanders because it ended eighteen years of perceived vulnerabilty. Because of its success, the occupation allowed Hitler to gain legitimacy with segments of the population that did not theretofore support him.

1936 is hardly the decisive event that many historians have made it. The former allies had already acquiesced much of their control over the left bank. American and British participation in the occupation was often a formality to give a more international face to French interests. The internationalization of the Saar under mostly French administration was a paltry effort at reining in the German war machine’s relationship with heavy industry (Saar coal was, unfortunately, of such a low grade that it was unsuitable for heavy industry anyway, and was completely useless to France). The occupation of the Ruhr Valley by French and Belgian troops might have constrained German policy (already returning to its imperial belligerence) had America and Britain given in political support. American and British troops withdrew from the Rhineland well ahead of the date stipulated in Versailles, undermining the legitimacy of the French and Belgian presence. The rearmament was the final step of a process almost completed before the Machtergreifung. (It has been long believed that the Wehrmacht was order to beat a retreat if it confronted French or British forces. While this is likely true, more recent historiography suggests that the Wehrmacht was prepared to fight.)

Did the rearmament of the Rhineland prevent Britain, France and America from acting against Hitler in 1939? They did nothing to a front on France’s eastern/Germany’s western border. When the war began in Poland, the inaction in the West (the so-called Sitzkrieg) was a lost opportunity against the undermanned forces in the Rhineland. It could be asked whether they could have been more effective had German forces not been there. The answer is likely no. French military policies avoided any confrontation that could turn into trench warfare along its territory (as Nicole Jordan has point out). Many decisions that would affect how 1939 played out were made before 1936. Finally, the longest part of the French-German border, along the Rhine River itself, was not subject to the terms of disarmament of Versailles -- the Wehrmacht was already in Baden.

The remilitarization of the Rhineland resembles the pullout from Gaza only on the surface. The allies surrendered no land. Israelis were much more entrenched – and exposed – in Gaza than the Allies in the Rhineland. France was already putting its faith in Maginot.

The greatest difference is that the Allies who were victorious in 1918 allowed Hitler to fill a void; Sharon took action to remove the Israeli presence, choosing what risks are acceptable, and gaining political leverage. (Time will tell if the heavy artillery moves into Gaza.)

Wretchard’s point, that is possible to compromise too much to an aggressive power on legitimate grounds, is not lost. The Allies, however, did not surrender land in the same way that Israel has. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was another link in the chain of Allied diplomatic failures, one for which the ground had already been prepared. If Wretchard wants to use a Nazi-era event to compare with then pullout, issue of the Sudeten Germans has many more similarities.