The Atomic Bomb: A Different Perspective

Each year on August 6, the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima is accompanied by a mass reflection on atomic warfare. This year, in preparation for the 60th anniversary of these tragic events, HNN has put together a large selection of pieces discussing whether the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima was a wise and necessary decision. Already Leo Maley III and Uday Mohan’s article, in particular, and that of Herbert Bix have sparked considerable discussion. I do not wish, by any means, to discount debate over the morality of the bombing of Hiroshima or the very real issues involved in that tragic event. However, this controversy has a paradoxical effect of cutting off debate on the atomic bomb and obscuring a vital issue—namely, the bombing of Nagasaki. To me, the United States committed a far greater crime in the dropping of an atomic bomb on Nagasaki than on Hiroshima. Whatever one’s opinion of the bombing of Hiroshima, there are at least various arguments that have been raised in support: the uncertainty that the bomb would work, the need to give Japan a shock, the need to avert an invasion that would be costly in lives, etc. Yet all of these arguments fall down in judging the Nagasaki bombing. Consider the situation: a bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima three days previously, to devastating effect. The United States had thereby proven that it had the capacity to make and deliver such weapons. (It is not clear how much their effects in the way of radiation were understood at the time by American military or political leaders). Furthermore, the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan on August 8th. There was no reason that the United States could not have waited to determine the Japanese reaction to these events, or to threaten further action, before dropping another bomb.

It is interesting to think of why the bombing of Nagasaki is not generally considered in discussions of Atomic warfare, and the implications of its omission. No doubt the most important reason is that historians, like other people, are fixated on firsts and questions of origins. The Hiroshima bombing ushered in the Atomic age, and is therefore the touchstone of debate. This not only leaves a void in analysis of what happens afterwards, but impoverishes analysis even of the first events. That is, while it can be dangerous to read backwards from later events to earlier ones, sometimes it is very useful. To cite an example from my own work, Franklin Roosevelt’s failure to act promptly to protect the property of evacuated Japanese Americans speaks volumes about the indifference to the fate of Japanese Americans that informed his signing of Executive Order 9066. The fact that the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki without significant debate beforehand tends to indicate that it was part of a predetermined plan or momentum, which nobody saw fit to interrupt. This suggests that a similar inertia, at least in the minds of certain figures, may have played a role in bringing about the Hiroshima bombing—the bomb was available, the United States had gone to enormous trouble to produce it, it would harm Japan, there was no way it was NOT going to be used.