Jul 11, 2005
Chappell on Nozick and Absolutes
Not long ago, I noted the following passage from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia:
We might likewise argue by Chappell's own reasoning that the context of government agenthood actually shrinks the domain of legitimate moral action rather than expanding it, moral context being important and all. Neither one seems a priori true; a closer look at the nature of government is required to determine whether Chappell (on the larger-government side), Nozick (a minarchist), or, say, Murray Rothbard (who argued in effect that the context of government made all acts immoral), is ultimately correct.
As a different approach to the problem, I consider that ethical imperatives are contextually absolute. By this I mean that given the same exterior circumstances, two individuals of differing cultures, temperaments, inclinations, and characters are equally obliged to act according to the dictates of the same ethical injunctions. Such rules are always relative to the situation; they are never relative to what we happen to think or feel about them.
Now admittedly, finding just what these rules should be is at times be quite difficult, but without at least contextual absolutism, it is nearly impossible for ethics to be anything other than a purely descriptive activity.
Given my understanding of ethics as a contextual absolute, Nozick's statement may be rephrased as follows:
To give an example that I find particularly compelling, I would argue that if I were somehow to find myself in the state of nature (an elusive state, I know, but Nozick deals with this objection elsewhere), I would have no moral authorization to enter my neighbor's home, destroy his marijuana crop, and seize his growing equipment under the theory of asset forfeiture. Given that acts like these cannot conceivably be justified for individual actors in the absence of government, then if we accept Nozick's claim, it also follows that government may not do them either.
One possible way to refute Nozick's statement, I think, would be to come up with some activity that an individual or group of individuals could not do in the state of nature, but that they incontestably could do if ever they were lucky enough to become government agents. I suspect that for many liberals, social welfare programs and wealth redistribution systems would fall into this category, though for me they do not.
Other such activities might include taxation of nonconsenting individuals or a prohibition on vigilante justice (Nozick's comments on the latter are particularly interesting but off-topic at the moment).
I repeat my original point, then: Whether one agrees with the statement or not says more about your politics than it does about the truth of the statement itself. I still think it stands. Any takers?
[Crossposted at Positive Liberty.]
What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the apparatus of a state, or to do to establish such an apparatus.I was mildly critical as follows:
Perfect. It's succinct, crystal-clear, and altogether principled. Indeed, it's virtually the whole of libertarianism in a single sentence--so much so that I doubt if many non-libertarians would ever agree with it. To my non-libertarian readers: Do you accept Nozick's claim? Or do you find that agents of the state may do more than ordinary individuals acting in the state of nature?The very intelligent and avowedly non-libertarian Richard Chappell has taken up the challenge, arguing that Nozick's claim has no real meaning:
It is either trivially true, or patently false. For once we reject absolutism, the question of"what persons may and may not do to one another" will be influenced by situational factors (e.g. what the consequences of performing a particular action would be). And if one is acting through the apparatus of the state, then one is in a different situation than one would be in the state of nature.This, though, is not a valid logical inference: Because contexts as a class can influence the rightness or wrongness of actions as a class, it does not follow that this particular context will influence the rightness or wrongness of any individual action. Nor does it follow that the direction of influence will lie as you think it does. Some acts may well become immoral where previously they were permitted (consider an IRS auditor making sexual advances, for just one example!).
Now, this factor will influence what it is morally permissible for the person in that situation to do. The"all things considered" conclusion yielded by our moral theory will take this factor into account. On this interpretation, Nozick's claim is trivially true: of course what government agents may do is going to be limited by what they may do. It's tautological.
Alternatively, the claim might be that what individuals may do in different situations limits what they may do in this situation. And this claim, if we reject absolutism, is quite obviously false.
We might likewise argue by Chappell's own reasoning that the context of government agenthood actually shrinks the domain of legitimate moral action rather than expanding it, moral context being important and all. Neither one seems a priori true; a closer look at the nature of government is required to determine whether Chappell (on the larger-government side), Nozick (a minarchist), or, say, Murray Rothbard (who argued in effect that the context of government made all acts immoral), is ultimately correct.
As a different approach to the problem, I consider that ethical imperatives are contextually absolute. By this I mean that given the same exterior circumstances, two individuals of differing cultures, temperaments, inclinations, and characters are equally obliged to act according to the dictates of the same ethical injunctions. Such rules are always relative to the situation; they are never relative to what we happen to think or feel about them.
Now admittedly, finding just what these rules should be is at times be quite difficult, but without at least contextual absolutism, it is nearly impossible for ethics to be anything other than a purely descriptive activity.
Given my understanding of ethics as a contextual absolute, Nozick's statement may be rephrased as follows:
The moral character of an act is never affected by the context that the actor happens to be an agent of the government.It's not a statement about all contextual elements in ethics--merely about one, the quality of government agenthood. As such, I still think the statement has a meaning that may be debated. (I do concede that it has lost some of the apparent force of law that the previous formula had, and that it now requires a good deal of further support. I don't think, though, that the statement has been refuted outright.)
To give an example that I find particularly compelling, I would argue that if I were somehow to find myself in the state of nature (an elusive state, I know, but Nozick deals with this objection elsewhere), I would have no moral authorization to enter my neighbor's home, destroy his marijuana crop, and seize his growing equipment under the theory of asset forfeiture. Given that acts like these cannot conceivably be justified for individual actors in the absence of government, then if we accept Nozick's claim, it also follows that government may not do them either.
One possible way to refute Nozick's statement, I think, would be to come up with some activity that an individual or group of individuals could not do in the state of nature, but that they incontestably could do if ever they were lucky enough to become government agents. I suspect that for many liberals, social welfare programs and wealth redistribution systems would fall into this category, though for me they do not.
Other such activities might include taxation of nonconsenting individuals or a prohibition on vigilante justice (Nozick's comments on the latter are particularly interesting but off-topic at the moment).
I repeat my original point, then: Whether one agrees with the statement or not says more about your politics than it does about the truth of the statement itself. I still think it stands. Any takers?
[Crossposted at Positive Liberty.]