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Leitmotif:"The truth about the intellectual state of the modern world... which distinguishes it from other periods of cultural crises, is the fact that what people are seeking is not the answers to problems, but the reassurance that no answers are possible. --Ayn Rand
I Wish I Wrote That (Part I):First, there is this piece by Julian Sanchez at Reason. Here's what I found so brilliant:
There's a famous philosophical puzzle, originally attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, known as the sorites paradox or heaps problem. It goes like this: Two or three grains of sand obviously don't constitute a"heap" of sand. And it seems absurd to suppose that adding a single grain of sand could turn something that wasn't a heap into a heap. But apply that logic repeatedly as you add one grain after another, and you're pushed to the equally absurd conclusion that 100,000 grains aren't a heap either...
It's not a terribly deep puzzle, of course: It simply illustrates that some of our everyday concepts, like that of a heap, are vague or fuzzy, not susceptible to such precise definition. Try to define such concepts in too much detail and absurdity results.
The problem is, concepts like"interstate commerce,""public use,""unreasonable search," and" cruel and unusual" are similarly fuzzy. And stare decisis, the principle that cases are to be decided by reference to previous rulings, means that the Court's interpretation of those rulings looks an awful lot like a process of adding one grain at a time without ever arriving at an unconstitutional heap...
I could also see some fuzzy-headed multiculturalist"re-thinking" the prayer issue, especially in response to some of the"horror stories" of fundamentalist prayers in Alabama. Some school administrator would construct a"multicultural" prayer to be read over the loudspeaker every morning where Jesus is mentioned along with Buddha, Allah, and Hindu Gods like Ganesh and Pagan Gods of the Earth.
Now the fundamentalists who go to such schools would have to listen to such prayers that I think they would regard as blasphemous and worse than having no prayer at all. But if the Constitution outlaws only government actions that cause tangible harms or deny actual privileges or rights, I don't see any difference between a fundamentalist being offended by what he regards as a blasphemous prayer and a Muslim, Jew, Atheist, Polytheist or Freethinker being offend by the reading of a Christian prayer.
From the Trenches: I continue to look for work, firmly convinced that at nearly thirty years old I must be good for something or other.
I just haven't found it yet, and, apparently, nor has anyone else. Yesterday I was writing a resume for myself using a model for people seeking work as foreign language translators. Two questions appeared that I had scarcely considered before:
Relocate?
and
Target location?
What mad luxury is this, that I might choose the place I wish to live? As tactfully as I could, I replied, With appropriate offer and Baltimore/Washington area; Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina; francophone Europe--And I thought myself king of the world, for a moment or two.
Supreme Court Watch: With the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor, I think Catallarchy has the best suggestion so far: Nominate Janice Rogers Brown. Howl all you want, my liberal friends, I would far sooner see on the court a libertarian who happened to be a Christian, than to see same-sex marriage established beside more decisions like Raich and Kelo. (For the record, I've long said that there is no right to same-sex marriage in the U.S. Constitution, or rather, there is no grant of government power that would authorize recognition of those marriages. But then, there is no grant of any government power to recognize any marriage at all in the U.S. Constitution. See grains and heaps again.)
Ever the Spoilsport: A propos of my pessimism on same-sex marriage, commenter Scof writes,
Well I certainly appreciate your sober take on it all, versus, say, Kate Kendell, executive director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights. CNN today has her money quote regarding California's domestic partnership bill: the"anti-gay industry's" reaction to the decision means"they won't stop until essentially the existence of lesbians and gay men is eradicated." Yes that's right, Kate, prepare for genocide! F'in nutball...
Another example he gave was the distinction between earthly horses and twin-earth "schmorses," which look just like the genuine article but which are indeed different, evolved perhaps from reptiles rather than mammals, but still possessing the exterior characteristics and uses of the ordinary horse.
Given that all horses are a bit different, the horses vs. schmorses example bridges the gap somewhat between water and tables, I think.
As to the heaps, you may yet have a point. I am still inclined to think that fuzzy concepts are best resolved by reference to human uses or possibly intents, but clearly that doesn't quite solve the problem.
William Marina -
7/4/2005
I have found the work of Amaury de Riencourt particularly good on this subject.
chris l pettit -
7/4/2005
Its funny...you criticise the Buddhist philosophy...but as I stated above...this is not Buddhist philosophy...you have to contend with hard science as well. You can disagree with Buddhist philosophy all you want...but lets discuss the science...
McDowell's text is a quality one...he is refuted by scientific evidence on many occasions, but he raises good points.
CP
Roderick T. Long -
7/4/2005
I'm familiar with Buddhist philosophy, but I don't agree with it. I think any attempt to step outside what you call "conceptual reality" is inherently self-defeating; on this I recommend Mind and World by John McDowell.
Roderick T. Long -
7/4/2005
Ah, my mistake; I read "would sweep away with a broom and a dustpan" as "could sweep away with a broom and a dustpan."
But I don't see how the "would" version helps. If I'm lazy I might not bother sweeping away a huge pile of sand, yet I might agree, as would everyone else, that it's a heap.
On Dennett's objection: well, of course it doesn't work with tables, because tables are not defined by their chemical composition. The fact that the twin-earth cases are convincing when the example is water and unconvincing when the example is tables shows that "water" and "table" are very different sorts of concepts.
Jason Kuznicki -
7/3/2005
On sweeping the floor, I do not see the vagueness you suggest. Either I find sweeping the floor to be necessary, in which case there was a heap of sand there, or I do not find it to be necessary, meaning that the sand wasn't large enough to be a heap. Definitions of presumably fuzzy things very often proceed from their use.
Incidentally Dennett did not agree with Putnam on the twin earth thought experiments, and I would highly recommend his argument to you. As one counter-example of several, he suggests (p 410), "Try telling the story of Twin Earth with the suggestion that the tables there arent really tables, but just look like tables and are used for tables. It doesn't work, does it?"
chris l pettit -
7/3/2005
what you are referencing is what is referred to in Buddhist and philosophical circles as conceptual "reality" as opposed to the deeper and more sophisticated universal "reality." The difference is this - you are correct in saying that there is a "common language"...or common conceptual understanding of certain aspects of "reality." THis is necessary for efficient and useful structural existence. What you are missing (as do the thought experiments) is that underlying this common conceptual understanding is the fact that no one has the same comceptual understanding when you realise that there is no such thing as inherent existence without interrelatedness and relationships. While this common conceptual understanding is useful...it also gives rise to a great deal of problems unless one realizes that one must realize that it is just conceptual (a tool of sorts) and must be viewed within the context of the fact that nothing has an inherent existence. Without going into a decent depth of Buddhist and philosophical thought, this is difficut to explain and wrap ones head around...but i would be happy to point you to a couple of texts...
The Quantum and the Lotus by Matthieu RIcard
The New Physics and Cosmology by Arthur Zajonc
As I said...once one realizes these concepts and proofs, it greatly alters the way one has to perceive the world, how it operates, and the way one approaches the world and relationships with others...
CP
Roderick T. Long -
7/3/2005
As long as we speak a common langauge I think that puts a limit on the extent to which we can each have a subjective interpretation. The meanings of our words are not determined solely by our own private intentions (indeed, that's part of the moral of those twin-earth thought experiments).
Roderick T. Long -
7/3/2005
But the concept of "sweeping away" isn't any less vague than the concept of "heap"; it just relocates the vagueness.
Also, twin-earth cases weren't introduced as a problem, they were introduced as a solution to a problem (and I think they were the correct solution).
By the way, the problem of "Locke's socks" is originally the problem of the Ship of Theseus; there was an actual ship used in Athenian festivals that was believed to be the ship used by Theseus, but it had been repaired so often that none of the original building materials still remained in it, thus prompting the puzzle as to whetehr it was the same ship. The solution, of course, is that "being the same object" and "being composed of the same materials" are two different concepts, so change of materials is no objection to its being the same ship.
chris l pettit -
7/3/2005
First off...just to pose a conundrum on non-existence and subjectivity that relates to the discussion...and Locke's socks...isnt it interesting that we can all say that "this is a sock" or "that is a sock" and all know what we are talking about...but that there is no such thing as a universal "sock" of which we all reference? We all speak of our own individualistic ideas of "sock," but never realise that we all have different subjective ideas until we come upon a more difficult classification than "sock." Buddhists debate this through an exercise utilizing a table and what exactly is a table. Asking whether something is the same sock then becomes absurd because, even if it was not patched, it is not the same sock because of the fact that it has changed from one instant to the next...it is simply someones subjective interpretation that it is the same sock according to the categorical rules that they apply to the situation. TO someone else, adding a patch might make it a different sock...and both interpretations are correct because of the fact that there is no universal sock that can be referred to (or even rules governing socks). THis is why what is being discovered and articulated by quantum physics is so interesting and (if people were actually anything other than ideological entities for the most part stuck in their little individualistic ruts) has major ramifications in terms of the radical changes that need to occur in society when one finally realizes that there is no such thing as an individual entity and that they only exists because of relationships with others and the universe. THis interrelatedness means that the relationships give rise to the entities...not the other way around (a very disturbing thought for some libertarians...who will no doubt simply deny the scientific proof).
Secondly...the problem you raise with the grains of sand is one of the problems rights theorists (particularly Dworkin) deal with when looking at the importance of precedent. At what point does a judiciary have the ability to overturn a decision...how do we factor in historical and social movements...since we cannot speak of absolute rights (but can speak of universalisms and interrelatedness) when can a judiciary overturn a decision (for instance the non-allowance of gay marriage) that is very clearly a universal right that individuals are violating due to their ideological ignorance and prejudice, but that is supported by a "majority" (another subjective entity). When can precedent simply be overturned, and what allows it to reach that point?
CP
Jason Kuznicki -
7/2/2005
A good point. The problem is similar to that of Locke's socks, and I favor distinguishing fuzzy concepts not by establishing an arbitrary boundary in number or measurement, but by looking at how the item or items in question are used or treated.
The question of whether Locke's often-patched socks really are the same pair of socks he began with years ago may be answered with a resounding yes: Throughout the entire span of their existence, they retained the same use value and hence the word "sock" refers to the use one gets or could get out of the thing. The very fact that they were continually patched (ie, continually treated like socks) is another indicator of the same.
But the moment the observer ceases to find the same use in the item is the moment that it ceases to be a sock and now becomes a rag.
With a heap, the use value is harder to detect, but perhaps we could still find it: Wouldn't a heap of sand be that quantity of sand which we would sweep away with a broom and a dustpan? And wouldn't something less than a heap be a negligible amount, not worthy of our attentions when cleaning the porch?
This solution came to me via Daniel Dennett in chapter fourteen of Darwin's Dangerous Idea. He uses it to answer the "twin earth" problems in philosophy, which I had alwas found much sillier and less interesting problems than Locke's socks or the sorites. Beyond that, I am unsure of its provenance, but from what little I know of Quine, it seems to bear his fingerprints.
Jason Kuznicki -
7/2/2005
Perhaps. But going by mainstream jurisprudence, the Fourteenth doesn't say this (yet).
Going by most libertarian comments on marriage, in an ideal world, governmental recognition ought never to exist at all (and there is certainly a good case to be made here).
My own theory of marriage is that as far as the state is concerned, it is merely a bundle of contracts that are placed together for convenience and that ought to have nothing sacred about it at all. (Church marriage is of course another matter.) Going by what I think would be proper constitutional principles (though not by a strictly ideal libertarianism), the states have plain mandates in their constitutions to deal with marriage, while the federal government does not. Accordingly, there ought to be no federal marriage whatsoever, only marriage as recognized by state governments.
Jonathan Dresner -
7/2/2005
Your last link, to that chilling stencil, fits very nicely with what David Neiwert has been saying for some time.
"Scof" should look into the sexual reeducation camps, some time.
Roderick T. Long -
7/2/2005
> I've long said that there is > no right to same-sex marriage > in the U.S. Constitution
I think you can get one out of the 14th Amendment's equal-protection clause. (Or, more precisely, you can get a provision that if states offer hetero marriage they must offer same-sex marriage as well.)
Roderick T. Long -
7/2/2005
While this is a sidepoint, I have to disagree with Sanchez's claim that the Sorites is "not a terribly deep puzzle." I think it's one of the deepest and most intractable problems in metaphysics. Just saying that a concept has a fuzzy application does nothing to solve the puzzle. It's clear that two pebbles is not a heap and that two thousand pebbles is; if you say that somewhere between two and two thousand there's a fuzzy area where there's no definite answer as to whether it's a heap or not, fine, but that just relocates the problem; now the question is: at what point is the cut-off between definitely-being-a-heap and neither-definitely-being-a-heap-nor-definitely-not-being-a-heap? If you say that that boundary is fuzzy too, that just pushes the problem back a further iteration.
William Marina -
7/2/2005
Dear Jason,
I can understand how trying the quest for finding the right position must be.
In my day that was not such a great problem, even for a radical.
I always knew I could make it as a builder, a kind of poor man's Howard Roark, even when I was almost canned because of my civil righta and anti-war activities. Building always took my mind away from what I saw as the increasing failings of the Imperial, Corporatist, University in our society.
It was a comfort to know that my friend, WA Williams, was also a union carpenter, and that C. Wright Mills, a fellow Hispanic, but on his mother's side, and some of whose papers I have, could also work proudly with his hands.
I appreciate the fact that my former student, Joe Stromberg, has also worked as a builder.
I have come to feel that is essential to the Taoist position, which is, as Rothbard suggested, more fundamental than libertarianism.
I wish you well on your quest, and may the Tao be with you!
Regards,
Bill Marina
Jason Kuznicki -
7/2/2005
Fair enough. I had been thinking of some discussions I had offline, where it was claimed that the slippery slope (or rather, the gathering heap) was an unavoidable problem. Deep down, I don't believe in any such thing as an unavoidable problem.
My runner-up for leitmotif was an old favorite from Camus: "Happiness is a long patience." If only I had one, I'm sure even the job hunt would be walk in the park.
William Marina -
7/1/2005
Dear Jason,
I don't think that I would agree with the Rand quote. I believe that most people do seek answers to help solve their problems, but make assumptions that make it almost impossible to find a solution in the paradigmatic framework they have thus erected for themselves.
Carroll Quigley, in The Evolution of Civilizations (1961, 1979), the later printing for which I did a Bibliographical Note, after suggesting Liberty Fund publish it, opens with some insightful observations drawn from the Ionian scientist-philosophers, one of which was cited by Sanchez. Q's discussion of continua, using the color orange, is essential to understanding the whole outlook of the Ionians who opposed the reactionary Pythagoreans in the Ancient World, and to Q's whole methodological, scientific approach.
In a separate piece, using that analysis to some extent, I shall be making my own more extended comments about the role of the courts in the development of the Empire Syndrome.
It’s a pity that Bill Clinton, who probably owed a part of his Rhodes Scholarship success to Quigley, his mentor at GU, seems to have taken away mainly the way in which Q taught him to cat nap, and reenergize himself before exams. Perhaps not an unimportant thing, but rather miniscule considering what he might have learned from Q.
