Blogs > Cliopatria > same-sex marriage in historical context

May 16, 2005

same-sex marriage in historical context




I refuse to join in the beating up that Eugene Volokh and Jason Kuznicki have given the federal court decision on the Nebraska constitutional initiative against same-sex marriage. It generally follows, as controlling precedent requires, the logic of the Supreme Court in ROMER v. EVANS, a decision Eugene Volokh dislikes. Nor does it require the state to legalize same-sex marriages or permit localities to do so, any more than ROMER required Colorado to pass a statewide non-discrimination law. Nor am I concerned that it will lead to a revival of calls for a Federal constitutional amendment, at least not until the next election season. (Why is it that controversial advances such as Vermont’s civil unions law and Massachusetts marriage law both took effect in Presidential campaign seasons?). Even at that, Nebraska’s law was so broad, in eliminating civil unions and domestic partnership arrangements as well as marriage, that its elimination probably might not make a good casus belli for the Republicans, especially since George Bush has been careful to remain ambiguous on whether he supports civil unions.

What is interesting is that Jason Kuznicki has called, apparently facetiously, for a return to a pre-LOVING v. VIRGINIA situation, where states are free to rule against interracial marriages as well. This prompts me to ponder how the current debates over same-sex marriage reflect the efforts of the state throughout American History to use marriage laws to draw racial lines and define national citizenship. The most visible way in which state and federal authorities used marriage laws to exclude people of African and Asian ancestry, of course, is through laws forbidding racial intermarriage between whites and nonwhites. (It is worth remembering that these laws did not only exist in the South, and they were not only directed against Black equality. In his writings during the 1920s, Franklin Roosevelt justified the exclusion of Japanese immigrants and the discriminatory laws that prevented aliens from naturalizing or owning property on the grounds that these laws protected “racial purity” against intermarriage).

Miscegenation laws did not, in any case, represent by any means the sum total of such methods. Let me briefly discuss several others:

First, the Southern states refused to recognize slave marriages during the antebellum period. This had moral implications, in denying the humanity of enslaved African Americans and fixing their status as the property of the slaveowner, including the Black women victimized by the rape and sexual exploitation of white masters. Even more, the absence of legal bonds between slaves meant that the master’s property interest was unlimited--partners could be sold off and couples divided at his whim and profit. The division of families was a major subject of abolitionist propaganda. In Harriet Beecher Stowe’s UNCLE TOM’S CABIN, the most influential antislavery novel ever published, the slave Eliza risks her life to escape to Canada in order to be reunited with her lover. In fact, many of the slaves who escaped the plantations through the Underground Railroad, were attempting family reunification, and one of the freedoms Canada offered the refugees was equal marriage rights. After the abolition of slavery, thousands of Black couples immediately solemnized their marriages, while countless others wandered the South and elsewhere, trying to find the families from whom they had been cut off.

Another example of the use of marriage laws to exclude nonwhites is Federal policies towards Chinese immigrants. After large-scale immigration from China began in the 1840s, whites in California and the Pacific states objected to the presence of the Asians as degenerated and a threat to white society, both by their alleged willingness to work for lower wages and through the menace of racial mixing. The vast majority of Chinese immigrants were single male laborers. Given this skewed sex ratio, morality leagues and anti-Asian committees argued that the Chinese were barbaric and opposed normal family life. Yet, when Chinese men thought of finding wives, and sex ratios became more balanced, these same committees charged that those Chinese women who immigrated were prostitutes. In 1875, Congress passed the Page Act, which banned prostitutes from entering the United States, and obliged Asian immigrant women—especially unmarried women-- to prove that they were not prostitutes, a difficult and degrading enough procedure to end most Chinese female immigration.

Seven years later, in 1882, Congress banned immigration by all Chinese laborers. Henceforth only small numbers of Chinese from protected categories—teachers, students, ministers and merchants—could legally enter the US. Those immigrants who had entered before exclusion was enacted were permitted to remain if they secured an identification card, were forbidden to bring their wives. Since according to federal law no Asian could become a naturalized US citizen, they were fixed as eternal foreigners, without equal rights. These acts froze Chinese communities as all-male, leading to a homosocial world of what Historian Nayan Shah has called queer domesticity, in which men formed their closest living and working relationships with other men. It also impeded the birth of American citizens of Chinese ancestry, who could enjoy full citizenship rights under the Constitution. Other Asian immigrants (other than Japanese), likewise banned from naturalization, remained in isolated bachelor communities.

Yet even American citizens of Asian ancestry faced legal obstacles to reproduction, in the form of the Cable Act. Out of fear that foreign men would control American women whose creatures they were, legally speaking, in 1906 Congress enacted a law that stripped American citizen women of their citizenship if they married male aliens. It was assumed that they henceforth were citizens by marriage of their husband’s countries. Following a campaign led by congresswoman Ruth Bryan Owen, daughter of statesman William Jennings Bryan, who had married an Englishmen lost her citizenship and been forced to go through naturalization proceedings to regain citizenship, the law was amended in 1921 to strip women of their American citizenship only if they married male aliens “ineligible to citizenship.” The law remained on the books until the 1930s, and limited community size and citizen political power by discouraging marriage between native-born Americans of Asian ancestry and Asian aliens. Yet, in spite of women being considered attachments of their husbands, Asian women, even those who married White men, remained excluded from entering the United States, let alone from citizenship.

Ironically, even after immigration laws ceased to exclude minorities, marriage became the prime factor in the ways the state viewed immigration, and in how the federal government drew national boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable immigrants. In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act, which granted immigration and naturalization rights to Asians, although it was not until 1965 that the discriminatory system of national quotas that favored Western Europeans was finally abolished. Both these laws gave priority in immigration to “family reunification, “ meaning those wishing to bring husbands or wives (or parents or children) had first shot at immigration visa slots. The law thus created a hierarchy of family relationships based on a heterosexual nuclear couple, rather than the extended families or informal kin units that have made up traditional family units. Ironically, the immigration Laws passed in part because of the popularity of these Family Reunification provisions. Though officially the laws opened up immigration on an equal basis to the entire world, they were in fact designed to maintain existing racial patterns and reconfirm white hegemony, since Euro-Americans were the largest fraction of US residents, and it was assumed that they would have most of the families that would benefit from such a law. Thanks to chain migration by Latin American and Asian families, however, non-European immigrants became the largest fraction coming in through such provisions.


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Carl Patrick Burkart - 5/17/2005

John,

Of course the law forbids many things that do no involve perversion or mental disorder. However, if homosexuality is legitimate, bans on recognizing same sex domestic partnerships clearly discriminates based on sex. If homosexuality is legitimate, traditional definitions of domestic partnerships that limit it to male/female couple collapses.

Laws against polygamy do not discriminate based on sex. The state only limits the number of people who may be involved in a legally recognized domestic partnership.

Laws against prostitution do not discriminate based on sex. They mearly state that sex cannot be exchanged for money.

Laws against underage marriage do not discriminate based on sex. Instead they rely on legal definitions of free consent and the age of majority.

Laws against loitering do not discriminate based on sex.

I'm not arguing that only gay _marriage_ (as opposed to domestic partnerships) would satify principals of equal protection, nor am I arguing that the Nebraska decision was right on the legal merits. My point is that withholding domestic partnerships from homosexuals can only be justified if homosexuality itself is illegitimate enough to be actively discouraged by the state.

The only other option for anti-gay right folks would be to make marriage or domestic partnerships available only to people who are currently raising their biological offspring.


chris l pettit - 5/17/2005

The fact that we have to deal with a "rational basis" test at all...

I had a brilliant Constitutional Law professor in law school who basically demonstrated how bunk constitutional legal theory has become at this point. The system is archaic, the reasoning is ambiguous, and the categories (strict scutiny v. rational basis, etc) makes no sense given the historical context of today. i am sure there will be those who claim that is the way it is and we have to analyze it as such. Well, yes, it needs to be analyzed within the non-sensical and broken politico-legal framework, but one also needs to realise that this debate won't get anywhere because we are dealing with a non-sensical and broken system. We need to acknowledge that the system needs to be blown up and redesigned. Now, I am realistic enough to know that this won't happen anytime soon (at least not until the fall of the US empire and need for a redesigning of the whole system of government...which is decades to centuries away)...but we at least have to have the discussion about what is wrong and why it needs to be totally redone.

By the way, jason, i think your use of the word legitimate is getting highly ideological. For instance, if you subscribe to Nozick's theory of rights, you are already running into huge problems regarding your basic premise. liberty cannot be the foundation upon which one builds, as it ultimately allows exactly that which you would protest against. Nozick presupposes that which Dworkin makes the foundation of his theory, equality and justice (or the right to equal concern and respect). These things do not come from liberty, which does not consider historical, cultural and societal inequalites and power relationships. There is a lot to like about Nozick, and I am a fan of the rights as sidebars argument, but the libertarian position on economic social and cultural rights is just untenable.

CP


chris l pettit - 5/17/2005

What you are delving into is another pet project of mine...theories of deviance. it is more of a theory of criminology thing but it is definitely applicable here. RIghts theory does away with much of the labelling (to use Howard Becker's classification) that goes on in society due to ideologically based arguments. It does not allow moral entrepreneurs based in political power bases and religion to stir up moral panics that whither under critical analysis (such as this whole homosexual marriage debate). It is key to Dworkin's arguments concerning external preferences. If we allow society to continue to do things "democratically" or for the "greater good" we do not talk of law at all, we talk of rules, power relationships, and the abandonment of rights. For something to be a right it must be universal and able to be accessed by all. For instance, at the moment, there is no such thing as a right to marriage, there is a rule that is imposed by those in power allowing those who they think should be able to marry to marry. Now, I think marriage as an institution is meaningless beyond the tax benefits and green card possibilities...it does not pass the critical analysis test and relies on blind faith arguments. But this is an internal preference, and I do not impose it on others. Since marriage is a historically defensible institution that involves the internal preferences of those making the decision, no one should be able to impose their external preferences to restrict a practice based in the rights of individuals. To do so is to admit that such a right does not exist and that the rule is based on power...not the fact that one has the right because one is human (or part of the social contract, or whatever rights theory you want to subscribe to).

In answer to your question, there is a lot of what normal people call law that is not law at all...it is perversion of the "democratic" process and is simply the result of power relationships in society. THis is ok in the realm of the rule of man, which exists to give stability and ensure efficiency in the day to day workings of society (rules). Everyone acknowledges at some level that it is necessary. But the rule of law exists to protect those rights that we have simply because we are human that have developed historically and culturally and can be traced back to the first inklings we have of societal organisation. Democracy, as I note above, has no place in these discussions. What is needed is a highly trained, educated, impartial and ideologically free judiciary that is designated a human rights protectorate (like they are here in South Africa) to articulate the rule of law and allow it to be flexible. Utiltarians and democracy theorists still have their say and input in the process, but, as Dworkin would put it, rights are trumps...or, from the other side of the aisle, Nozick would tell you that rights are sidebars...both agree.

I always wondered how utilitarians and positivists got around the fact that rights have been acknowledged and articulated in almost every society since the beginning of recorded history (at some level taking into consideration breadth of knowledge and historical context)...how can one still make a utilitarian argument when it is obvious that it is in the "greater good" or is the "will of the majority" throughout history that there be a rights based system? It seems to contradict the very foundation of utilitarian theory...I still have not heard a good answer to that one. By the way...it is one of the questions I pose as an option on my final exam in the Theory of Rights class that I lecture...i still have not had a student try and answer it...

CP

CP


John H. Lederer - 5/16/2005

Is polygamy a perversion or mental disorder? If not how does one justify restrictions on it? Prostitution? Underage marriages? Loitering?

I think we prohibit lots of things that are neither perversions or mental disorders. Generally we look to harm to others or more generally to the social fabric as a reason.

I express no opinion on gay marriage-- just asking about your reasoning.


Jason Kuznicki - 5/16/2005

I was of course being facetious about Loving v. Virginia, but the real problem I have with this decision is that it either proves way too much or way too little.

If we are going to place it in the framework of conventional, mainstream jurisprudence, then its use of the rational basis test is way out of line, as was Romer's.

If we are going to place it in the framework of a more libertarian jurisprudence--which believe me, I'd love to do--then we need to show what legitimate government aim is being furthered here, with the understanding that either encouraging or discouraging marriage is an illegitimate aim. The judge did nothing of the kind.

Still, the beefed-up rational basis test being employed here could call into question many other government actions, particularly in the economic realm. This is where the decision stands to do far more than it intended, because if the rational basis test becomes significantly harder to pass, then many more legislative acts will be struck down in the future. (Generally speaking, a this is a fine thing for a libertarian but not what I suspect a Clinton appointee set out to do.)

The rational basis standard can't be difficult when we want it to be, like with homosexuals or the mentally retarded, yet ridiculously easy at all other times like with eminent domain, among others.


Carl Patrick Burkart - 5/16/2005

Opponents of gay rights argue that homosexuality is a perversion and a mental disorder. If they are wrong, it is hard to see how restrictions on gay partnerships or civil unions can be justified. Of course, there are arguments about prudence, the proper pace of social change, etc., but those are questions of tactics, not principals.


John H. Lederer - 5/16/2005

"Here's what I don't understand...how can anyone who is against gay marriage make a claim that they favor human rights or the rule of law in any way, shape or form?"

Maybe they just are having trouble deciding whether the right is revealed by the glow of the emanation of the Constitution or by its glimmer within the penumbra of the glow?

Just because I, you, or a majority of people think that something should be a right, doesn't make it part of the "rule of law". The Consitution has ways to make rights part of the "law". They have not been used here. In their absence, it seems to me, that one could be justified in arguing that the argument for a gay right is essentially a violation of the rule of law.










Greg James Robinson - 5/16/2005

I think you are probably right, Chris, that the language about a Bill of Attainder should be ignored. However, it seems to me that it does represent some attempt, and a useful one, to get at the issue of punitive legislation prompted by hostility towards an identifiable class (and Gays and Lesbians are no less identifiable in this case than, say, Jews), something that received an interesting exposition in Justice O'Connor's (not totally convincing or consistent) concurrence in LAWRENCE v. TEXAS. Short of granting heightened scrutiny to sexual oreintation as a category, which they clearly do not want to do, how can courts "pierce the veil" in constitutional interpretation and act on a law that, even if it has an arguably reasonable purpose, is meant primarily to express hostility or stigmatize an unpopular group?


chris l pettit - 5/16/2005

I am as uncomfortable as both K and V about the decision in that it will open the gates to sniping on both sides of the aisle. It is almost as bad as the "ends justifies the means" argument utilized by many academics in regards to humanitarian intervention and the war in Iraq. The court should have just come out and thrown out the amendment as being unconstitutional under the federal constitution on so many different reasons.

We should really have a discussion about the reasoning...no one seems to have a firm grip on the attainder stuff. The problem is that it really did have no place in this decision...so why even try and analyse it in this context? J raises this point and I totally concur...it is a criminal matter that can sometimes come into civil cases, but not here. We should just leave it aside as bad law and analyse the other points instead.

CP


chris l pettit - 5/16/2005

Here's what I don't understand...how can anyone who is against gay marriage make a claim that they favor human rights or the rule of law in any way, shape or form? Supporting a utilitarian, majority rule position is just absurd in this context...this whole marriage thing is something that has to do with individual rights and internal preferences. (For those unfamiliar with rights theory, I am employing terms utilized by Dworkin in his argument...though I am by no means a follower of Dworkin) External preferences are those that involve imposing your ideology (usually indefensible) on others through legislating and "democratic" processes. Now, Dworking makes the argument that only internal preferences should be taken into consideration when making political decisions, but this is problematic because there are those ideological hacks who make the argument that this is somehow internal. Also, the elimination of external preferences wipes out any decisions based in altruism (not like Americans would make any of those). This is why the judiciary and the rule of law exists to prevent those in power, religious bigots, prejudicial majorities who are miseducated and misinformed, and other ideologically based individuals who cannot defend their arguments once they are critically examined from coming up with these abominations. If any libertarian supports this ban on gay marriage, they should give up their card and sign on with the conservatives. This whole sorry process is one of the great examples of why democracy has no place in human rights and peace studies...ideologically biased individuals simply can't make arguments that don't impose their ideology on others. What this court did is protect the rights of those that deserve to have them protected. I am definitely willing to give up on human reason and critical analysis, but it would involve a tradeoff...there could be no more talking by anyone in terms of rights, objectivity, law, or anything else of that nature since we would then descend into an arena based only in power, societal manipulation, imposition of ideology, and might makes right. It is absurd to talk of law or rights unless they are universal and apply equally. To use another of Dworkin's examples, the basis of rights theory and democratic societies is the pursuit of equality and justice...which means basic universal rights for everyone...not just for those your archaic, indefensible, based on blind faith or fundamentally flawed assumptions ideology says should have it.

Thankfully there is ample historical evidence that these ignorant amendments, like race laws and laws opposing the teaching of evolution, will eventually fall by the wayside and will later be ridiculed by historians as we ridicule those who thought the earth was flat. Unfortunately, the flat earthers could blaime the primative nature of their instruments...we can only blame the primative nature of our ideologues...

CP


Hugo Schwyzer - 5/16/2005

Thanks, Greg -- you've made some points I'll keep in mind when I teach my gay and lesbian history survey class next fall...