Douglas J. Feith: How to Win the 'Long, Hard Slog'
[Mr. Feith, a former under secretary of defense for policy (2001-05), is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is the author of "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism" (HarperCollins, 2008).]
Gen. David Petraeus, chief of Central Command, has said that Taliban extremists are threatening "the very existence of the Pakistani state." And now that Pakistani, U.S. and coalition forces are fighting the Taliban in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan, the military dimension of the challenge is front and center. But more than combat is required to prevent Islamist extremists from taking over those countries and acquiring Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Greater civilian efforts to counter Taliban influence are being urged by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen. They pointedly note that our local partners need help stopping the extremists from winning popular support in the first place. This makes sense.
In fact, it recalls a famous remark by Donald Rumsfeld. In his widely publicized "long, hard slog" memo back in October 2003, the former Secretary of Defense asked if the U.S. is "capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas [religious schools] and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism of March 2005, issued by Gen. Mullen's predecessor, Gen. Richard Myers, likewise highlighted the importance of civilian activities to counter ideological support for terrorism.
Yet the U.S. government is not well-organized for civilian national-security operations abroad. Dean Acheson even complained about the problem when he was at the State Department dealing with post-World War II fiascos in the Truman administration. U.S. laws make it much harder than it should be for our military commanders to use cash instead of bullets in their theaters of operation. And the president does not have the capabilities he needs for rapid overseas deployment of civilians with specialized skills to assist our armed forces in stabilization and reconstruction.
This last problem may be on the way to being solved. In 2004, at the Pentagon's urging, President George Bush created a new State Department office for civilian stabilization and reconstruction missions. He directed that office to create a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) so the president can mobilize trained civilian volunteers the way he already can mobilize volunteers for the military reserve. President Barack Obama is supporting this effort, and the Corps will receive $323 million if Congress approves the budget Mr. Obama submitted last week...
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Gen. David Petraeus, chief of Central Command, has said that Taliban extremists are threatening "the very existence of the Pakistani state." And now that Pakistani, U.S. and coalition forces are fighting the Taliban in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan, the military dimension of the challenge is front and center. But more than combat is required to prevent Islamist extremists from taking over those countries and acquiring Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Greater civilian efforts to counter Taliban influence are being urged by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen. They pointedly note that our local partners need help stopping the extremists from winning popular support in the first place. This makes sense.
In fact, it recalls a famous remark by Donald Rumsfeld. In his widely publicized "long, hard slog" memo back in October 2003, the former Secretary of Defense asked if the U.S. is "capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas [religious schools] and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism of March 2005, issued by Gen. Mullen's predecessor, Gen. Richard Myers, likewise highlighted the importance of civilian activities to counter ideological support for terrorism.
Yet the U.S. government is not well-organized for civilian national-security operations abroad. Dean Acheson even complained about the problem when he was at the State Department dealing with post-World War II fiascos in the Truman administration. U.S. laws make it much harder than it should be for our military commanders to use cash instead of bullets in their theaters of operation. And the president does not have the capabilities he needs for rapid overseas deployment of civilians with specialized skills to assist our armed forces in stabilization and reconstruction.
This last problem may be on the way to being solved. In 2004, at the Pentagon's urging, President George Bush created a new State Department office for civilian stabilization and reconstruction missions. He directed that office to create a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) so the president can mobilize trained civilian volunteers the way he already can mobilize volunteers for the military reserve. President Barack Obama is supporting this effort, and the Corps will receive $323 million if Congress approves the budget Mr. Obama submitted last week...