Max Hastings: The allies fight the 'wrong' war in Afghanistan
[The writer is an FT contributing editor.]
It is frustrating for the US government to be making strategy for a battlefield while knowing that the strategic outcome will be decided on another one. The current redeployments in Afghanistan are taking place in the knowledge that Pakistan matters much more. The most important change in the thinking of Washington and its allies over the past year derives from recognition they are fighting the wrong war, or at least running a sideshow.
The purpose of the 2001 US invasion was to deny sanctuary to terrorists based in Afghanistan. Yet al-Qaeda today plays only a marginal role in that country, while being deeply rooted in Pakistan. Western forces find themselves engaged in an ill-defined campaign to stabilise Afghan tribal society, while being unable to use troops across the border, where most Pakistanis are bitterly hostile to the US.
This is not a predicament likely to promote happy policy-making. The British are doing their utmost to forge a common strategy with the US. The maintenance of the Atlantic alliance is, as always, the Brown government’s foremost objective. The Obama administration is sincerely grateful for British support, which has become especially important as conditions in Afghanistan have worsened.
Tensions and differences are inescapable, however. First, the prestige of the British army has suffered severely from what the US army perceives as British defeat in southern Iraq. Last month’s dignified disengagement ceremony at the British base outside Basra should not disguise the fact that the UK is thought to have failed there.
In Afghanistan, Britons and Americans are sharply critical of each other’s military performance. Some US soldiers believe the British in Helmand have become cautious, casualty-averse, and handle relations with the Afghans insensitively. The British, in their turn, think the Americans much too careless about inflicting “collateral damage” on civilians, especially through air strikes.
They question whether Hellfire missile strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan justify the political damage which these inflict, by rousing popular Pakistani anger. They are sceptical about whether a key element of US policy, ambitious expansion of the Afghan army, can work. They perceive the pool of credible Afghan officers and NCOs as almost exhausted.
The “surge” of 21,000 US troop reinforcements is taking place in advance of coherent operational objectives being identified. Is the aim to enable President Hamid Karzai’s creaking and corrupt central government in Kabul to extend its influence throughout the country? Or should the allies endorse and subsidise local warlords and tribal leaders, if they forswear insurgency and abandon support for al-Qaeda?..
Read entire article at Financial Times (UK)
It is frustrating for the US government to be making strategy for a battlefield while knowing that the strategic outcome will be decided on another one. The current redeployments in Afghanistan are taking place in the knowledge that Pakistan matters much more. The most important change in the thinking of Washington and its allies over the past year derives from recognition they are fighting the wrong war, or at least running a sideshow.
The purpose of the 2001 US invasion was to deny sanctuary to terrorists based in Afghanistan. Yet al-Qaeda today plays only a marginal role in that country, while being deeply rooted in Pakistan. Western forces find themselves engaged in an ill-defined campaign to stabilise Afghan tribal society, while being unable to use troops across the border, where most Pakistanis are bitterly hostile to the US.
This is not a predicament likely to promote happy policy-making. The British are doing their utmost to forge a common strategy with the US. The maintenance of the Atlantic alliance is, as always, the Brown government’s foremost objective. The Obama administration is sincerely grateful for British support, which has become especially important as conditions in Afghanistan have worsened.
Tensions and differences are inescapable, however. First, the prestige of the British army has suffered severely from what the US army perceives as British defeat in southern Iraq. Last month’s dignified disengagement ceremony at the British base outside Basra should not disguise the fact that the UK is thought to have failed there.
In Afghanistan, Britons and Americans are sharply critical of each other’s military performance. Some US soldiers believe the British in Helmand have become cautious, casualty-averse, and handle relations with the Afghans insensitively. The British, in their turn, think the Americans much too careless about inflicting “collateral damage” on civilians, especially through air strikes.
They question whether Hellfire missile strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan justify the political damage which these inflict, by rousing popular Pakistani anger. They are sceptical about whether a key element of US policy, ambitious expansion of the Afghan army, can work. They perceive the pool of credible Afghan officers and NCOs as almost exhausted.
The “surge” of 21,000 US troop reinforcements is taking place in advance of coherent operational objectives being identified. Is the aim to enable President Hamid Karzai’s creaking and corrupt central government in Kabul to extend its influence throughout the country? Or should the allies endorse and subsidise local warlords and tribal leaders, if they forswear insurgency and abandon support for al-Qaeda?..