Richard Beeston: Facts paint a different picture of Britain's role in Iraq
[Richard Beeston has written articles published in The Times (Foreign Editor, Diplomatic Editor) and The Sunday Times (Diplomatic Editor).]
With a few months to go before British Forces withdraw from Iraq, a fierce debate is under way over the legacy of Britain's six-year military engagement in the country.
The British military is determined that when the last soldier goes he will leave with his head held high and the Army's reputation intact. According to Lieutenant-General John Cooper, Britain deserves praise for helping to turn around what seemed a hopeless campaign into one where Iraq now enjoys a functioning democratic government and improving security.
Unfortunately, history offers a less flattering conclusion.
The British went into Iraq confident that their counter-insurgency experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere was perfectly suited to the post-invasion occupation. At first their confidence seemed well founded. British troops moved quickly to adopt a sensitive approach to their operations, unlike their American allies, who used heavy-handed methods to quell an intensifying insurgency in the north.
As violence spread to southern Iraq, the British were found wanting. They had neither the troops, the equipment nor the political support from London to fight a campaign, establish security and begin real reconstruction work...
Read entire article at Times (UK)
With a few months to go before British Forces withdraw from Iraq, a fierce debate is under way over the legacy of Britain's six-year military engagement in the country.
The British military is determined that when the last soldier goes he will leave with his head held high and the Army's reputation intact. According to Lieutenant-General John Cooper, Britain deserves praise for helping to turn around what seemed a hopeless campaign into one where Iraq now enjoys a functioning democratic government and improving security.
Unfortunately, history offers a less flattering conclusion.
The British went into Iraq confident that their counter-insurgency experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere was perfectly suited to the post-invasion occupation. At first their confidence seemed well founded. British troops moved quickly to adopt a sensitive approach to their operations, unlike their American allies, who used heavy-handed methods to quell an intensifying insurgency in the north.
As violence spread to southern Iraq, the British were found wanting. They had neither the troops, the equipment nor the political support from London to fight a campaign, establish security and begin real reconstruction work...