Dennis Stute: Brzezinski ... West Must Avoid Russia's Mistakes in Afghanistan (interview)
[Dennis Stute works for Deutsche Welle.]
DW-WORLD.DE: While almost all political parties in Germany want the troops to remain in Afghanistan, a majority of the population would prefer a withdrawal. What should the West do -- withdraw, stay the course or increase the number of troops?
Zbigniew Brzezinski: I don't think any of these options can be the answer. Withdrawal means that Afghanistan will plunge immediately into a major crisis with unpredictable consequences. Simply putting more troops is not the solution to the problem. Staying the course is obviously unsatisfactory because right now there is mounting evidence that the situation is deteriorating.
As Jimmy Carter's Security Advisor in 1979, you orchestrated the arming of the mujahedeen against Afghanistan's left-wing government, eventually drawing the Soviet Army into what you later referred to as the "Afghan trap." Has the West now fallen into that trap?
ZB:The West should not repeat the mistakes that the Soviets made. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on the illusion that a bunch of Marxist Afghan intellectuals could help them create a communist satellite using a foreign army to impose its will. When the US reacted to the outrageous terrorist attacks of September 11, which originated from Afghanistan, it required only 300 American soldiers to overthrow the Taliban. The reason for that was that the Afghans were genuinely grateful for the American support and the support of other countries.
We are now running the risk of unintentionally duplicating what the Soviets were doing: Instead of capitalizing on that goodwill and leaving fairly soon thereafter while giving a lot of economic assistance to the Afghans, we are trying to create a modern state -- and a democratic version thereof -- through a large foreign military presence. I do not think that is a wise strategy.
What you are suggesting seems to be exactly what the Soviet Union did: Before it withdrew its troops, it tried to transfer the burden of fighting to the Afghan forces -- and failed. Why should NATO succeed, given that it has much less Afghan soldiers to rely on than the Soviets had?
ZB:The Soviets did that after devastating the Afghan society and creating massive ill will. One should not underestimate the enormous damage and incredible suffering that the Soviets imposed in the Afghan society by a ruthless military campaign, which drove millions of Afghans out of the country and killed hundreds of thousands of them. We have not done that yet. But I think the risk is that the longer we rely on a military solution, the more likely it is that the resistance to us will become stronger and stronger. I don't think that it is in any way comparable to the resistance against the Soviet occupation yet...
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DW-WORLD.DE: While almost all political parties in Germany want the troops to remain in Afghanistan, a majority of the population would prefer a withdrawal. What should the West do -- withdraw, stay the course or increase the number of troops?
Zbigniew Brzezinski: I don't think any of these options can be the answer. Withdrawal means that Afghanistan will plunge immediately into a major crisis with unpredictable consequences. Simply putting more troops is not the solution to the problem. Staying the course is obviously unsatisfactory because right now there is mounting evidence that the situation is deteriorating.
As Jimmy Carter's Security Advisor in 1979, you orchestrated the arming of the mujahedeen against Afghanistan's left-wing government, eventually drawing the Soviet Army into what you later referred to as the "Afghan trap." Has the West now fallen into that trap?
ZB:The West should not repeat the mistakes that the Soviets made. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on the illusion that a bunch of Marxist Afghan intellectuals could help them create a communist satellite using a foreign army to impose its will. When the US reacted to the outrageous terrorist attacks of September 11, which originated from Afghanistan, it required only 300 American soldiers to overthrow the Taliban. The reason for that was that the Afghans were genuinely grateful for the American support and the support of other countries.
We are now running the risk of unintentionally duplicating what the Soviets were doing: Instead of capitalizing on that goodwill and leaving fairly soon thereafter while giving a lot of economic assistance to the Afghans, we are trying to create a modern state -- and a democratic version thereof -- through a large foreign military presence. I do not think that is a wise strategy.
What you are suggesting seems to be exactly what the Soviet Union did: Before it withdrew its troops, it tried to transfer the burden of fighting to the Afghan forces -- and failed. Why should NATO succeed, given that it has much less Afghan soldiers to rely on than the Soviets had?
ZB:The Soviets did that after devastating the Afghan society and creating massive ill will. One should not underestimate the enormous damage and incredible suffering that the Soviets imposed in the Afghan society by a ruthless military campaign, which drove millions of Afghans out of the country and killed hundreds of thousands of them. We have not done that yet. But I think the risk is that the longer we rely on a military solution, the more likely it is that the resistance to us will become stronger and stronger. I don't think that it is in any way comparable to the resistance against the Soviet occupation yet...