Fareed Zakaria: This is not a cold war
[Fareed Zakaria is the editor of Newsweek International and author of "The Post-American World".]
I'm sure you've heard the news. The cold war is back. Or history has returned. Or we're now in the 19th century world of great power politics. Russia's attack on Georgia has unleashed a barrage of cliches. Globalisation and integration have been exposed as shams. Our naive idea that we were living in a benign international environment has been shattered.
Most of this commentary is a massive overreaction. Who in the past few decades believed that international life has been problem-free? John McCain ominously intoned that the Russian attack was the "first serious crisis since the end of the cold war". Really? What about the attacks of 9/11, not to mention the Iraq war, the Balkan wars, the genocide in Rwanda?
There has been a deep yearning for a return of history. We all miss that world of good and evil, ideological struggle and high stakes. And it's certainly true that international life has changed. But what is new is the acceleration of global capitalism and trade, and the remarkable growth this is producing across the globe.
In 2006 and 2007, 124 countries recorded economic growth of 4% a year or more. This is utterly unprecedented, and is giving rise to a new, genuinely global international order. After two decades of unipolarity - with America dominating the globe economically, politically, culturally, and militarily - we are moving into a post-American world, one shaped in many lands and by many people. Within a period of one month, India flexed its muscles to derail the global trade talks, China put on the greatest show on earth in Beijing, and Russia attacked its neighbour.
But in order to understand properly the age in which we live, we must stop making bad analogies. This is not a return to the 19th century, when Russian actions would have been standard operating procedure for a great power. In fact, only 50 years ago Britain and France clung to their empires - in Algeria, Vietnam, Kenya, Cyprus - with more determination and violence than Moscow. This is the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union that Moscow has sent troops into a neighbouring country (a country that it had ruled since 1801). Its actions are deplorable but the reaction to them - worldwide - is a sign of how much the rules have changed.
The countries bordering Russia all condemned the move and rallied around Nato, the European Union, and the US. Even Belarus is making some friendly gestures westward.
Far from revealing a new "alliance of autocracies", as Robert Kagan had prophesied, the crisis has shown how divergent are the interests of China and Russia. Beijing expressed dismay at the attack and helped provide loans to Georgia. Central Asia's dictatorships also distanced themselves from Moscow's actions. And Russia's stock market has been battered, its currency has sunk, foreign investment has dried up, and for years to come businessmen will view it as a great risk to do business there.
Why is this happening? Poland is doing well, Kazakhstan is a natural resource power, the Baltics are booming. They are connected to a larger world and will not meekly accept Russia's "privileged sphere".
It has always been possible for big countries to push around their neighbours - something the US has not been exempt from itself. What's new now is that there are growing political, economic, and financial costs to such actions, unless they have widespread legitimacy. That will not always deter a great power, but it certainly will make them think. There are already signs that some in Russia's ruling elite are wondering whether 70,000 South Ossetians have been worth all this.
We are not entering a new cold war. And if we do, the second time will be farce. Russia is a much smaller part of the world than it was when it launched the first one. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had the world's largest army and comprised between 15% and 20% of global GDP. Today Russia has a much smaller armed force and makes up a bit more than 2% of global GDP. If there is to be a period of tension between Russia and the west, the outcome is predetermined.
The forces of globalisation are, in fact, producing an extraordinary degree of integration around the world. The broader challenge is that growth being produced by this globalisation is everywhere producing political nationalism and assertiveness. These forces can be benign and constructive - when we like them we call them patriotism and cultural pride - but they can also be aggressive and xenophobic. The central tension of the world we live in will be between the forces of global integration on the one hand and those of nationalism on the other.
But history doesn't repeat itself. It only seems to do so to people who don't know the details...
Read entire article at Guardian (UK)
I'm sure you've heard the news. The cold war is back. Or history has returned. Or we're now in the 19th century world of great power politics. Russia's attack on Georgia has unleashed a barrage of cliches. Globalisation and integration have been exposed as shams. Our naive idea that we were living in a benign international environment has been shattered.
Most of this commentary is a massive overreaction. Who in the past few decades believed that international life has been problem-free? John McCain ominously intoned that the Russian attack was the "first serious crisis since the end of the cold war". Really? What about the attacks of 9/11, not to mention the Iraq war, the Balkan wars, the genocide in Rwanda?
There has been a deep yearning for a return of history. We all miss that world of good and evil, ideological struggle and high stakes. And it's certainly true that international life has changed. But what is new is the acceleration of global capitalism and trade, and the remarkable growth this is producing across the globe.
In 2006 and 2007, 124 countries recorded economic growth of 4% a year or more. This is utterly unprecedented, and is giving rise to a new, genuinely global international order. After two decades of unipolarity - with America dominating the globe economically, politically, culturally, and militarily - we are moving into a post-American world, one shaped in many lands and by many people. Within a period of one month, India flexed its muscles to derail the global trade talks, China put on the greatest show on earth in Beijing, and Russia attacked its neighbour.
But in order to understand properly the age in which we live, we must stop making bad analogies. This is not a return to the 19th century, when Russian actions would have been standard operating procedure for a great power. In fact, only 50 years ago Britain and France clung to their empires - in Algeria, Vietnam, Kenya, Cyprus - with more determination and violence than Moscow. This is the first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union that Moscow has sent troops into a neighbouring country (a country that it had ruled since 1801). Its actions are deplorable but the reaction to them - worldwide - is a sign of how much the rules have changed.
The countries bordering Russia all condemned the move and rallied around Nato, the European Union, and the US. Even Belarus is making some friendly gestures westward.
Far from revealing a new "alliance of autocracies", as Robert Kagan had prophesied, the crisis has shown how divergent are the interests of China and Russia. Beijing expressed dismay at the attack and helped provide loans to Georgia. Central Asia's dictatorships also distanced themselves from Moscow's actions. And Russia's stock market has been battered, its currency has sunk, foreign investment has dried up, and for years to come businessmen will view it as a great risk to do business there.
Why is this happening? Poland is doing well, Kazakhstan is a natural resource power, the Baltics are booming. They are connected to a larger world and will not meekly accept Russia's "privileged sphere".
It has always been possible for big countries to push around their neighbours - something the US has not been exempt from itself. What's new now is that there are growing political, economic, and financial costs to such actions, unless they have widespread legitimacy. That will not always deter a great power, but it certainly will make them think. There are already signs that some in Russia's ruling elite are wondering whether 70,000 South Ossetians have been worth all this.
We are not entering a new cold war. And if we do, the second time will be farce. Russia is a much smaller part of the world than it was when it launched the first one. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union had the world's largest army and comprised between 15% and 20% of global GDP. Today Russia has a much smaller armed force and makes up a bit more than 2% of global GDP. If there is to be a period of tension between Russia and the west, the outcome is predetermined.
The forces of globalisation are, in fact, producing an extraordinary degree of integration around the world. The broader challenge is that growth being produced by this globalisation is everywhere producing political nationalism and assertiveness. These forces can be benign and constructive - when we like them we call them patriotism and cultural pride - but they can also be aggressive and xenophobic. The central tension of the world we live in will be between the forces of global integration on the one hand and those of nationalism on the other.
But history doesn't repeat itself. It only seems to do so to people who don't know the details...