William Rees-Mogg: Georgia: Another Sarajevo Moment Avoided
Who has heard of Freiherr von Musulin, apart from a few historians of Austria-Hungary and students of the diplomatic causes of the First World War? In 1925, he published his memoirs, which were reviewed in The Times Literary Supplement by the eminent historian, Lewis Namier. Musulin called his memoirs Das Haus am Ballplatz, which was the name of the Austrian Foreign Office.
Baron Musulin is not an outstanding figure in the history of European diplomacy; he was infinitely far from being a Metternich or a Talleyrand, yet perhaps he reshaped European history to a greater degree than either of them. From 1910 to 1916 he held the comparatively unimportant post of Chief of the Department for Church Affairs. In the summer of 1913, he took his holiday in Croatia, the country of his birth; on his return to Vienna he wrote a report on the Serbian problem, a subject on which he had not previously been regarded as an expert.
At some time in July 1914 he was asked to draft a diplomatic ultimatum to Serbia: “Wherein, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of June 28 [the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand] certain demands would be addressed to her for the suppression in future of Great-Serb propaganda.” He believed himself to have a reputation for “abilities for office work and stylistic skill”. He drafted the note on the assumption that the Serbians would accept it...
...The new Russia of Vladimir Putin is nationalist in the old tsarist fashion, and is determined to protect Russian interests. In the 1990s, the Yeltsin years, Russia could not assert these traditional Russian positions, because it was too weak. They are being reasserted now, and this reassertion is backed by Russia's growing importance as a provider of oil and gas.
In 1914 Europe had six major powers, Germany, France, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia, all of which had imperial possessions. Most of these countries were coalitions of different nations, with domestic problems of nationalism. Britain, for instance, had the Irish problem.
In 2008, there are six major groupings in the world, the US, China, the EU, India, Russia and Japan. Islam is another matter. These groupings are all, to some degree, concerned about economic or political weaknesses in their own positions.
Some of these groups are rising powers, but others are in relative decline. Russia probably lacks the economic or population base to maintain Putinism in world competition. The US may well have another generation as the leading world power, but its lead is narrowing. Europe has not resolved the cultural differences of its membership. China and India are emerging superpowers. But these groupings are almost as uncertain as the European powers were in 1914, and the scarcity of future energy supplies makes them feel insecure.
In these circumstances, it was rash of the Government of Georgia to try to regain control of South Ossetia by force. How did it imagine that Russia would respond? Georgia is a candidate to join Nato, but the European members of Nato, particularly Germany, may feel that Georgia's Government is too impetuous to be given the Nato guarantee. In a world of uncertainty, the major powers cannot risk minor wars in case they become big ones.
Read entire article at The Times
Baron Musulin is not an outstanding figure in the history of European diplomacy; he was infinitely far from being a Metternich or a Talleyrand, yet perhaps he reshaped European history to a greater degree than either of them. From 1910 to 1916 he held the comparatively unimportant post of Chief of the Department for Church Affairs. In the summer of 1913, he took his holiday in Croatia, the country of his birth; on his return to Vienna he wrote a report on the Serbian problem, a subject on which he had not previously been regarded as an expert.
At some time in July 1914 he was asked to draft a diplomatic ultimatum to Serbia: “Wherein, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of June 28 [the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand] certain demands would be addressed to her for the suppression in future of Great-Serb propaganda.” He believed himself to have a reputation for “abilities for office work and stylistic skill”. He drafted the note on the assumption that the Serbians would accept it...
...The new Russia of Vladimir Putin is nationalist in the old tsarist fashion, and is determined to protect Russian interests. In the 1990s, the Yeltsin years, Russia could not assert these traditional Russian positions, because it was too weak. They are being reasserted now, and this reassertion is backed by Russia's growing importance as a provider of oil and gas.
In 1914 Europe had six major powers, Germany, France, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia, all of which had imperial possessions. Most of these countries were coalitions of different nations, with domestic problems of nationalism. Britain, for instance, had the Irish problem.
In 2008, there are six major groupings in the world, the US, China, the EU, India, Russia and Japan. Islam is another matter. These groupings are all, to some degree, concerned about economic or political weaknesses in their own positions.
Some of these groups are rising powers, but others are in relative decline. Russia probably lacks the economic or population base to maintain Putinism in world competition. The US may well have another generation as the leading world power, but its lead is narrowing. Europe has not resolved the cultural differences of its membership. China and India are emerging superpowers. But these groupings are almost as uncertain as the European powers were in 1914, and the scarcity of future energy supplies makes them feel insecure.
In these circumstances, it was rash of the Government of Georgia to try to regain control of South Ossetia by force. How did it imagine that Russia would respond? Georgia is a candidate to join Nato, but the European members of Nato, particularly Germany, may feel that Georgia's Government is too impetuous to be given the Nato guarantee. In a world of uncertainty, the major powers cannot risk minor wars in case they become big ones.