William Rees-Mogg: Georgia ... another Sarajevo moment avoided
[William Rees-Mogg is former editor-in-chief for The Times.]
Who has heard of Freiherr von Musulin, apart from a few historians of Austria-Hungary and students of the diplomatic causes of the First World War? In 1925, he published his memoirs, which were reviewed in The Times Literary Supplement by the eminent historian, Lewis Namier. Musulin called his memoirs Das Haus am Ballplatz, which was the name of the Austrian Foreign Office.
Baron Musulin is not an outstanding figure in the history of European diplomacy; he was infinitely far from being a Metternich or a Talleyrand, yet perhaps he reshaped European history to a greater degree than either of them. From 1910 to 1916 he held the comparatively unimportant post of Chief of the Department for Church Affairs. In the summer of 1913, he took his holiday in Croatia, the country of his birth; on his return to Vienna he wrote a report on the Serbian problem, a subject on which he had not previously been regarded as an expert.
At some time in July 1914 he was asked to draft a diplomatic ultimatum to Serbia: “Wherein, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of June 28 [the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand] certain demands would be addressed to her for the suppression in future of Great-Serb propaganda.” He believed himself to have a reputation for “abilities for office work and stylistic skill”. He drafted the note on the assumption that the Serbians would accept it.
He was surprised when the note was rejected. He comments that: “It is altogether difficult to foresee the effect which any one political action may produce abroad.” Considering that the effect of his miscalculation was the First World War, 20 million dead, and all that has followed, that seemed an understatement.
Since 1914, the major powers have been concerned to avoid another Sarajevo moment, in which the world tumbled into war by accident. However, the war was not altogether an accident or a miscalculation. The more significant memoirs of Field Marshal Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, a grander and more aggressive figure than von Musulin, provide his real reasons for wanting a war. “Two principles were in sharp conflict: the maintenance of Austria as a conglomerate of various nationalities and the rise of independent national states claiming their ethnic territories from Austria-Hungary... For this reason, and not with a view to expiating the murder [of Franz Ferdinand], Austria-Hungary had to go to war against Serbia.”
No two historic events are identical, but there are disquieting resemblances between the Serbian crisis as it stood in July 1914 and the Georgian crisis as it stands in August 2008. There is the Russian factor that is central to both crises; there are conflicting nationalisms; there is the widespread feeling of anxiety. In 1914, Austria-Hungary was afraid of being let down by Germany, Germany was afraid of the growing strength of Russia, Russia was afraid of being let down by France, France was afraid of being let down by Britain, and Britain was alarmed by the growth of the German Navy. Every major power felt threatened. In the event, Serbia's rejection of the Austrian note pulled all of them into a war that few had wanted. The weakest power took the biggest decision...
Read entire article at Times
Who has heard of Freiherr von Musulin, apart from a few historians of Austria-Hungary and students of the diplomatic causes of the First World War? In 1925, he published his memoirs, which were reviewed in The Times Literary Supplement by the eminent historian, Lewis Namier. Musulin called his memoirs Das Haus am Ballplatz, which was the name of the Austrian Foreign Office.
Baron Musulin is not an outstanding figure in the history of European diplomacy; he was infinitely far from being a Metternich or a Talleyrand, yet perhaps he reshaped European history to a greater degree than either of them. From 1910 to 1916 he held the comparatively unimportant post of Chief of the Department for Church Affairs. In the summer of 1913, he took his holiday in Croatia, the country of his birth; on his return to Vienna he wrote a report on the Serbian problem, a subject on which he had not previously been regarded as an expert.
At some time in July 1914 he was asked to draft a diplomatic ultimatum to Serbia: “Wherein, on the basis of Serbia's moral responsibility for the events of June 28 [the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand] certain demands would be addressed to her for the suppression in future of Great-Serb propaganda.” He believed himself to have a reputation for “abilities for office work and stylistic skill”. He drafted the note on the assumption that the Serbians would accept it.
He was surprised when the note was rejected. He comments that: “It is altogether difficult to foresee the effect which any one political action may produce abroad.” Considering that the effect of his miscalculation was the First World War, 20 million dead, and all that has followed, that seemed an understatement.
Since 1914, the major powers have been concerned to avoid another Sarajevo moment, in which the world tumbled into war by accident. However, the war was not altogether an accident or a miscalculation. The more significant memoirs of Field Marshal Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, a grander and more aggressive figure than von Musulin, provide his real reasons for wanting a war. “Two principles were in sharp conflict: the maintenance of Austria as a conglomerate of various nationalities and the rise of independent national states claiming their ethnic territories from Austria-Hungary... For this reason, and not with a view to expiating the murder [of Franz Ferdinand], Austria-Hungary had to go to war against Serbia.”
No two historic events are identical, but there are disquieting resemblances between the Serbian crisis as it stood in July 1914 and the Georgian crisis as it stands in August 2008. There is the Russian factor that is central to both crises; there are conflicting nationalisms; there is the widespread feeling of anxiety. In 1914, Austria-Hungary was afraid of being let down by Germany, Germany was afraid of the growing strength of Russia, Russia was afraid of being let down by France, France was afraid of being let down by Britain, and Britain was alarmed by the growth of the German Navy. Every major power felt threatened. In the event, Serbia's rejection of the Austrian note pulled all of them into a war that few had wanted. The weakest power took the biggest decision...