Glenn Greenwald: John McCain’s Vietnam-Based View of War
[Glenn Greenwald was previously a constitutional law and civil rights litigator in New York. He is the author of the New York Times Bestselling book “How Would a Patriot Act?,” a critique of the Bush administration’s use of executive power, released in May 2006. His second book, “A Tragic Legacy“, examines the Bush legacy.]
Former Army Captain and military analyst Phillip Carter writes today in his Washington Post blog of the “stabbed in the back narrative” of Vietnam in the context of a new book advancing that narrative by Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of coalition forces during the disastrous 2003-2004 period when, among other things, the Abu Ghraib abuses occurred. That narrative, says Carter, “is popular among American military officers of a certain age, who believe if only they’d had gutsy political leadership, support from the homefront, and a willingness to steamroll North Vietnam with overwhelming force, we might have won the war.” As Carter documents (emphasis in original): “It’s a good story, but it’s wrong. No amount of America firepower could have crushed the North Vietnamese people’s will.”
What almost always goes unmentioned when this myth is discussed is that one its most faithful adherents is John McCain, and he applies this mentality not only to Vietnam but also to every subsequent military conflict, including the current one in Iraq. During the debate in late 1990 over whether Congress should authorize the first President Bush to use military force against Iraq to repel the invasion of Kuwait, Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and had the following exchange with McCain:
MCCAIN: You know, one of the things I regret more than anything else when we ever hear there’s a chance of conflict or a possibility of a conflict, is we always re-visit the Vietnam War as some sort of role model when, in fact, the model of the Vietnam War is exactly what not to do in the conduct of war, including actions on the part of Congress. But to say that there was, quote, “fifty-two thousand casualties in the surgical strikes of North Vietnam” is just darn foolishness. The fact is, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, that in 1972, for the first time, there was significant bombing which was not constrained by either congressional or presidential mandate which virtually brought that nation to its knees with a minimum of casualties despite the hue and cry over one bomb that hit one hospital which seemed to be the biggest attack in the history of warfare, which still angers me. The Vietnamese and North Vietnamese themselves have stated that there was minimum casualties — in the 19 — in the Christmas ‘72 bombing raids. And the fact is, to purvey the idea that somehow — that airpower failed in Vietnam because airpower was not capable certainly is an insult to the experience and the intelligence of those of us who served there. . . . .
The — and Mr. Kissinger, isn’t it true that the reason why the North Vietnamese came back to the bargaining table at Christmas in 1972 was because they were virtually brought to their knees by the bombing of North Vietnam?
MR. KISSINGER: They certainly agreed after the bombing to things that they had not agreed before, and were very eager to settle. I believe they were brought back to the bargaining table — yes.
SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that 52,000 casualties over a seven-eight period or eight — let’s see, ‘65 — eight-year period is some kind of exorbitant number of casualties?
MR. KISSINGER: I have no — I have no independent knowledge of that figure one way or the other although it sounds credible to me.
That’s the very embodiment of the “stabbed-in-the-back” Vietnam narrative. We had our greatest success when we could bomb North Vietnam “not constrained by either congressional or presidential mandate.” That’s when we almost brought them “to their knees.” But incessant complaints about civilian casualties and anger over irrelevant matters such as the bombing of hospitals is what prevented us from winning — “which still angers him,” because the number of dead North Vietnamese wasn’t really “exorbitant.” There was room for plenty more. Ponder what that means for Iraq, Afghanistan and any other new countries on which a President McCain decides to wage war.
This simplistic message is all McCain has been saying for years about Iraq as well. One of the greatest myths about McCain now — mostly propagated by the candidate himself and then amplified by his media allies — is that, since 2004, he had been calling for the surge strategy to be used in Iraq. That’s just false. McCain wasn’t calling for the counter-insurgency strategies implemented by Gen. Petraeus. As surge advocates endlessly argue, the “Surge” isn’t exclusively or even primarily about more troops, but rather, is defined by its shift to a “population-centric approach.”...
Read entire article at Salon
Former Army Captain and military analyst Phillip Carter writes today in his Washington Post blog of the “stabbed in the back narrative” of Vietnam in the context of a new book advancing that narrative by Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of coalition forces during the disastrous 2003-2004 period when, among other things, the Abu Ghraib abuses occurred. That narrative, says Carter, “is popular among American military officers of a certain age, who believe if only they’d had gutsy political leadership, support from the homefront, and a willingness to steamroll North Vietnam with overwhelming force, we might have won the war.” As Carter documents (emphasis in original): “It’s a good story, but it’s wrong. No amount of America firepower could have crushed the North Vietnamese people’s will.”
What almost always goes unmentioned when this myth is discussed is that one its most faithful adherents is John McCain, and he applies this mentality not only to Vietnam but also to every subsequent military conflict, including the current one in Iraq. During the debate in late 1990 over whether Congress should authorize the first President Bush to use military force against Iraq to repel the invasion of Kuwait, Henry Kissinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and had the following exchange with McCain:
MCCAIN: You know, one of the things I regret more than anything else when we ever hear there’s a chance of conflict or a possibility of a conflict, is we always re-visit the Vietnam War as some sort of role model when, in fact, the model of the Vietnam War is exactly what not to do in the conduct of war, including actions on the part of Congress. But to say that there was, quote, “fifty-two thousand casualties in the surgical strikes of North Vietnam” is just darn foolishness. The fact is, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, that in 1972, for the first time, there was significant bombing which was not constrained by either congressional or presidential mandate which virtually brought that nation to its knees with a minimum of casualties despite the hue and cry over one bomb that hit one hospital which seemed to be the biggest attack in the history of warfare, which still angers me. The Vietnamese and North Vietnamese themselves have stated that there was minimum casualties — in the 19 — in the Christmas ‘72 bombing raids. And the fact is, to purvey the idea that somehow — that airpower failed in Vietnam because airpower was not capable certainly is an insult to the experience and the intelligence of those of us who served there. . . . .
The — and Mr. Kissinger, isn’t it true that the reason why the North Vietnamese came back to the bargaining table at Christmas in 1972 was because they were virtually brought to their knees by the bombing of North Vietnam?
MR. KISSINGER: They certainly agreed after the bombing to things that they had not agreed before, and were very eager to settle. I believe they were brought back to the bargaining table — yes.
SEN. MCCAIN: Do you believe that 52,000 casualties over a seven-eight period or eight — let’s see, ‘65 — eight-year period is some kind of exorbitant number of casualties?
MR. KISSINGER: I have no — I have no independent knowledge of that figure one way or the other although it sounds credible to me.
That’s the very embodiment of the “stabbed-in-the-back” Vietnam narrative. We had our greatest success when we could bomb North Vietnam “not constrained by either congressional or presidential mandate.” That’s when we almost brought them “to their knees.” But incessant complaints about civilian casualties and anger over irrelevant matters such as the bombing of hospitals is what prevented us from winning — “which still angers him,” because the number of dead North Vietnamese wasn’t really “exorbitant.” There was room for plenty more. Ponder what that means for Iraq, Afghanistan and any other new countries on which a President McCain decides to wage war.
This simplistic message is all McCain has been saying for years about Iraq as well. One of the greatest myths about McCain now — mostly propagated by the candidate himself and then amplified by his media allies — is that, since 2004, he had been calling for the surge strategy to be used in Iraq. That’s just false. McCain wasn’t calling for the counter-insurgency strategies implemented by Gen. Petraeus. As surge advocates endlessly argue, the “Surge” isn’t exclusively or even primarily about more troops, but rather, is defined by its shift to a “population-centric approach.”...