Don Bohning & Jack Hawkins: Kennedy, Bush made similar mistakes in Cuba, Iraq
[Don Bohning is a former Miami Herald Latin America Editor and author of ''The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965.'' Jack Hawkins, USMC (Ret.), is a World War II prisoner of war. He is the author of ''Never Say Die,'' the story of his experiences as a POW, his escape from the Japanese camps and his eventual rescue by an American submarine.]
Don Bohning: I met Jack Hawkins, now 91, for the first time in the fall of 1996 while researching my book, ''The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965''. I quickly came to the conclusion that he had one of the sharpest minds I had ever met. A decorated World War II colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, he was to become the paramilitary chief for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, some 47 years ago on April 17.
We have remained in touch over the last dozen years, and in the course of those exchanges he has expressed criticism of the Bush administration's entry into, and conduct of, the war in Iraq. I asked him recently if he saw any parallels between the Bay of Pigs and the Iraq invasion. He did, and he outlined them for me in his March 28 response that follows.
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Key high-level civilian officials of both the Kennedy and Bush administrations had similar characteristics which caused them to make serious mistakes in the management of the Cuba operation in 1961 and the ongoing Iraq War: They had little or no military experience but were inclined to make important decisions about military operational matters against the advice of experienced military officers. In both administrations, the Secretary of Defense tended to suppress the free expression of opinions by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to isolate them from the President, who needed to know their opinions first-hand and unfiltered.
In the Cuba operation, Richard Bissell, the civilian CIA official in charge, didn't tell the President that the CIA military planning staff had told him a week before the Bay of Pigs began that the air operations as planned were essential to the operation. Without them, the staff said, the plan would fail. Kennedy called off the air operation less than 24 hours before the Bay of Pigs began.
• THE PRESIDENTS: President Kennedy was new in office when confronted with the CIA plan already in progress for overthrowing Castro by clandestine means. From the start, he was dubious and reluctant to make decisions about the project as Bissell continued to brief him every week. Kennedy had some experience in World War II as a Navy lieutenant junior grade in command of a PT boat, but this did not provide him with extensive knowledge of complex military operations. President Bush, while a qualified pilot in the Air National Guard, had no war experience.
• SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: Secretary Robert McNamara in the Kennedy administration and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush administration share several personality traits. Both were sometimes overbearing and arrogant toward subordinates and intolerant of views differing from their own. Neither had military experience. During planning for the Cuba project in 1961, McNamara was new in office and usually remained silent at White House meetings, which I attended as assistant to Bissell. Later, in meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara showed little respect for these distinguished military officers and sometimes treated them in a demeaning manner. I witnessed this on occasions when I was at the meetings as assistant to then Maj. Gen. Victor Kurlak, of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Rumsfeld ruled the Pentagon with an iron hand. Any military officer who expressed an opinion differing from his own risked being fired. When Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, estimated just before the war began in 2003 that about 400,000 troops would be needed to control Iraq, he was promptly removed from office. This was the single most damaging error in the Iraq War to date. The fate of Gen. Shinseki undoubtedly had a chilling effect on other senior officers until Rumsfeld's departure in November 2006....
Read entire article at Miami Herald
Don Bohning: I met Jack Hawkins, now 91, for the first time in the fall of 1996 while researching my book, ''The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba 1959-1965''. I quickly came to the conclusion that he had one of the sharpest minds I had ever met. A decorated World War II colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, he was to become the paramilitary chief for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, some 47 years ago on April 17.
We have remained in touch over the last dozen years, and in the course of those exchanges he has expressed criticism of the Bush administration's entry into, and conduct of, the war in Iraq. I asked him recently if he saw any parallels between the Bay of Pigs and the Iraq invasion. He did, and he outlined them for me in his March 28 response that follows.
***
Key high-level civilian officials of both the Kennedy and Bush administrations had similar characteristics which caused them to make serious mistakes in the management of the Cuba operation in 1961 and the ongoing Iraq War: They had little or no military experience but were inclined to make important decisions about military operational matters against the advice of experienced military officers. In both administrations, the Secretary of Defense tended to suppress the free expression of opinions by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to isolate them from the President, who needed to know their opinions first-hand and unfiltered.
In the Cuba operation, Richard Bissell, the civilian CIA official in charge, didn't tell the President that the CIA military planning staff had told him a week before the Bay of Pigs began that the air operations as planned were essential to the operation. Without them, the staff said, the plan would fail. Kennedy called off the air operation less than 24 hours before the Bay of Pigs began.
• THE PRESIDENTS: President Kennedy was new in office when confronted with the CIA plan already in progress for overthrowing Castro by clandestine means. From the start, he was dubious and reluctant to make decisions about the project as Bissell continued to brief him every week. Kennedy had some experience in World War II as a Navy lieutenant junior grade in command of a PT boat, but this did not provide him with extensive knowledge of complex military operations. President Bush, while a qualified pilot in the Air National Guard, had no war experience.
• SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: Secretary Robert McNamara in the Kennedy administration and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the Bush administration share several personality traits. Both were sometimes overbearing and arrogant toward subordinates and intolerant of views differing from their own. Neither had military experience. During planning for the Cuba project in 1961, McNamara was new in office and usually remained silent at White House meetings, which I attended as assistant to Bissell. Later, in meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara showed little respect for these distinguished military officers and sometimes treated them in a demeaning manner. I witnessed this on occasions when I was at the meetings as assistant to then Maj. Gen. Victor Kurlak, of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Rumsfeld ruled the Pentagon with an iron hand. Any military officer who expressed an opinion differing from his own risked being fired. When Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, estimated just before the war began in 2003 that about 400,000 troops would be needed to control Iraq, he was promptly removed from office. This was the single most damaging error in the Iraq War to date. The fate of Gen. Shinseki undoubtedly had a chilling effect on other senior officers until Rumsfeld's departure in November 2006....