Congressman Ike Skelton: Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil Military Relations in America
Congressman Ike Skelton (D-Mo) is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He is a graduate of Wentworth Military Academy and the University of Missouri at Columbia, where he received A.B. and L.L.B. degrees. He gave this keynote address at the conference, “Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil Military Relations in America, sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association, held October 15, 2007, in Washington, D.C.
Videotapes, a conference report, and other conference papers are available at www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/mindthegap.
On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander in the Far East, when the General’s views regarding the Korean War and China collided with those of the President.
The following day, my father—who was a Lexington, Missouri, lawyer and a friend of Truman’s since 1928—sent a telegram to the President, which read: “Your Lexington friends support you fully in relieving MacArthur. Those making political capital out of this incident will get nowhere. That you should have relieved MacArthur before now is the general opinion here.” In a letter dated two days later, President Truman responded to the telegram with a “Dear Ike” letter, thanking my father for supporting him on this “difficult decision.” This exchange of correspondence was an early lesson to me, Ike Skelton the younger, in civil-military relations.
The very high regard in which the American public holds our military forces is shared throughout the Congress. We are truly blessed to have the sorts of men and women serving us in uniform that we do. While this conference focuses on the roles of officers, I mean here to include the millions of amazing enlisted members and noncommissioned officers as well. They each come from such a wide variety of backgrounds but all of them grow to join the fabric of professionalism that is the hallmark of our military. That is partially because they all possess the same service ethic, and partially a testament to our great military institutions and leadership that refine the person into a true professional.
Looking back in history, it was a defining moment in our Republic when after the Revolution, General George Washington took off his uniform and resigned his military commission. That example gave the message to future Americans that the military is subservient to civilian authority. That’s a lesson that stands with us today.
It is interesting to note that some generations of our military never participated in the political process, that is, never voted in a political election. General George C. Marshall followed that standard, as did many for decades before and after he lived. However, there have been elections in this country in which the military vote turned the political tide. For instance, the overwhelming soldier vote of 1864 reelected Abraham Lincoln for a second term. Pollsters tell us that recent elections turned on the military vote as well.
But the question here is really the relationship the military has with Congress, and as I said, we hold the institution in high regard. It does not matter to us that our pollsters report that as private people, military officers tend favor one party’s politics in much greater numbers than they do the other. When we see a military uniform, we see a professional, and we have no reason not to expect that the call of duty is paramount within that individual when they appear before us.
In fact, it has long been the tradition of the House Armed Services Committee that we do not swear in our witnesses when they come before the committee. We know that U.S. military officers have already taken an oath to support the Constitution and take it for granted that the testimony they offer will be the truth.
But, we are realists as well, and we understand they are military officers first, and therefore responsive to their chain of command. That chain of command extends to the Commander in Chief. The framers of the Constitution deliberately designed a tension between the branches of government to act as checks and balances. The execution of our constitutional duty, particularly derived from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, requires Congress to raise and maintain the military and exercise appropriate oversight, which quite naturally puts our most senior military officers in the middle of that tension.
The HASC holds annual hearings during which each service chief testifies regarding the adequacy of their services’ portion of the President’s budget. Congress, in an effort to “raise and support armies,” then attempts to determine if that budget is both adequate and allocated to properly reflect our national security priorities. These are called “Posture Hearings.” It should come as no surprise to anyone here that while we imagine that every service chief would like a bigger share of the budget, we do not expect any of them to offer an opinion contrary to the Administration’s position at these hearings. We expect forthright answers to our questions, but it is our role as civilian policymakers to draw conclusions.
All of that is by way of laying out the very basic relationship Congress has with the military. I want to add that I believe everything that can be conducted in the open ought to be conducted that way. There are some who might argue that open hearings put military officers in tough spots—the result of the Constitutional tension I spoke about—but it has been my experience that they handle themselves just fine, and the public is much better served by the transparent process.
Still, recently Congress has been the scene of what I consider to be an example of a breakdown in the acceptable roles and norms of civil-military relations. I am referring, of course, to the recent hearings with General David Petraeus on the Iraq War. It is nearly impossible to steer clear of the politics surrounding these hearings, but let us try for a moment to focus on the role the General found himself playing. Congress required the General to report on the progress in Iraq, and Congress required that the report be issued in public. This, I believe, is appropriate.
However, in the weeks leading up the report, the President indicated that he would wait until the General’s testimony to Congress before he would announce the next phase of his Iraq War policy. The result was that the President largely abdicated his policymaking role and placed the burden of making U.S. war-related policy on the shoulders of a serving military officer. I spoke earlier of the natural constitutional tension that exists between the Legislative and Executive branches. The President should have received General Petraeus’ report in private first, and then issued his policy for the nation. At that time, it would have been more than appropriate to hold a hearing with General Petraeus to determine if that civilian-determined war policy was supportable by the facts presented in his report and his professional military judgment.
On October 12, the news media reported that retired General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander in Iraq, criticized the Administration’s policy in that war, calling it “a nightmare.”[1] I suppose, politically, I should applaud General Sanchez for agreeing with my assessment that goes back to serious concerns that I pointed out in two letters to the President, prior to the invasion of Iraq, about the lack of a plan for the occupation of that country. But the truth of the matter is, General Sanchez is merely reflecting facts that have been all too apparent to many informed observers. His is not a breakthrough voice—it just adds to the chorus of many who have been stating the obvious. It would have been helpful if the General, given his past posting and knowledge of Iraq, would have recommended a proposal or plan for redeployment of our forces from that country.
General Sanchez has every right within our Constitution to voice his opinion, as he did. It boils down to a matter of conscience for any such leader to comment or not. I cannot imagine General George C. Marshall, after his retirement from the military, making public comments. But on the other hand, General Marshall was not living through the troubled and unique circumstances in which we live today.
In the interest of time, I will leave you with an anecdote that is as troubling as it is illustrative. A few years ago I was addressing a class at the Joint Forces Staff College. One of the Lieutenant Colonels in the class asked me how an officer should behave if he ever found himself in a position to testify before Congress. “Tell the truth,” I replied. “Well,” said the Colonel, “General Shinseki and Secretary White told the truth, and look what happened to them.”[2] Well, I can tell you, that answer shocked me.
Is this the lesson our military officers are learning about how to deal—or not deal—with Congress? Has it really permeated all the way down the ranks that far? And if so, how will that color the nature of our civil-military relations in the future? If that’s really the way the upcoming crop of future general officers regard their pending interactions with Congress, how can we alleviate those concerns while still gathering the knowledge we need to conduct the proper oversight and make sound policy decisions? I ask because I sense that a close examination of that question will help keep civil-military relations healthy as we move forward, past this difficult time.
As I mentioned earlier, the American public holds the military in the highest regard—higher than any other profession. That is clearly because the people believe our military officers to be professional, competent, and trustworthy. They are. We should regard anything that would threaten that perception as unwise.
An informed populace makes responsible decisions, and in our system, political power flows from the consent of the governed. Committing our nation’s spirit, blood and treasure to military action is the most serious decision that elected civilian leaders make on behalf of their constituencies. Should the American people ever have cause to doubt the truthfulness of official accounts of military actions, I am concerned that they will immediately withdraw that consent, regardless of how worthy the cause for which we fight.
Most especially during a time of war, the civil-military relationship is central to the protection of our nation’s Constitutional traditions. I hope that the discussion generated by the participants of this conference will help us positively influence that relationship.
Notes
Steven Komarow, “Ex-General: Iraq a ’Nightmare’ for US, AP, Oct 12, 2007. [back]
Referring to General Eric Shinseki, who retired in summer 2003, and Army Secretary Thomas White, who was asked to resign in April 2003. Tensions had emerged between General Shinseki and the office of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld after Shinseki stated publicly that Operation Iraqi Freedom would require “several hundred thousand troops,” figures with which the Rumsfeld disagreed; Army Secretary Thomas White had agreed with Shinseki. [back]
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Read entire article at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Videotapes, a conference report, and other conference papers are available at www.fpri.org/research/nationalsecurity/mindthegap.
On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander in the Far East, when the General’s views regarding the Korean War and China collided with those of the President.
The following day, my father—who was a Lexington, Missouri, lawyer and a friend of Truman’s since 1928—sent a telegram to the President, which read: “Your Lexington friends support you fully in relieving MacArthur. Those making political capital out of this incident will get nowhere. That you should have relieved MacArthur before now is the general opinion here.” In a letter dated two days later, President Truman responded to the telegram with a “Dear Ike” letter, thanking my father for supporting him on this “difficult decision.” This exchange of correspondence was an early lesson to me, Ike Skelton the younger, in civil-military relations.
The very high regard in which the American public holds our military forces is shared throughout the Congress. We are truly blessed to have the sorts of men and women serving us in uniform that we do. While this conference focuses on the roles of officers, I mean here to include the millions of amazing enlisted members and noncommissioned officers as well. They each come from such a wide variety of backgrounds but all of them grow to join the fabric of professionalism that is the hallmark of our military. That is partially because they all possess the same service ethic, and partially a testament to our great military institutions and leadership that refine the person into a true professional.
Looking back in history, it was a defining moment in our Republic when after the Revolution, General George Washington took off his uniform and resigned his military commission. That example gave the message to future Americans that the military is subservient to civilian authority. That’s a lesson that stands with us today.
It is interesting to note that some generations of our military never participated in the political process, that is, never voted in a political election. General George C. Marshall followed that standard, as did many for decades before and after he lived. However, there have been elections in this country in which the military vote turned the political tide. For instance, the overwhelming soldier vote of 1864 reelected Abraham Lincoln for a second term. Pollsters tell us that recent elections turned on the military vote as well.
But the question here is really the relationship the military has with Congress, and as I said, we hold the institution in high regard. It does not matter to us that our pollsters report that as private people, military officers tend favor one party’s politics in much greater numbers than they do the other. When we see a military uniform, we see a professional, and we have no reason not to expect that the call of duty is paramount within that individual when they appear before us.
In fact, it has long been the tradition of the House Armed Services Committee that we do not swear in our witnesses when they come before the committee. We know that U.S. military officers have already taken an oath to support the Constitution and take it for granted that the testimony they offer will be the truth.
But, we are realists as well, and we understand they are military officers first, and therefore responsive to their chain of command. That chain of command extends to the Commander in Chief. The framers of the Constitution deliberately designed a tension between the branches of government to act as checks and balances. The execution of our constitutional duty, particularly derived from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, requires Congress to raise and maintain the military and exercise appropriate oversight, which quite naturally puts our most senior military officers in the middle of that tension.
The HASC holds annual hearings during which each service chief testifies regarding the adequacy of their services’ portion of the President’s budget. Congress, in an effort to “raise and support armies,” then attempts to determine if that budget is both adequate and allocated to properly reflect our national security priorities. These are called “Posture Hearings.” It should come as no surprise to anyone here that while we imagine that every service chief would like a bigger share of the budget, we do not expect any of them to offer an opinion contrary to the Administration’s position at these hearings. We expect forthright answers to our questions, but it is our role as civilian policymakers to draw conclusions.
All of that is by way of laying out the very basic relationship Congress has with the military. I want to add that I believe everything that can be conducted in the open ought to be conducted that way. There are some who might argue that open hearings put military officers in tough spots—the result of the Constitutional tension I spoke about—but it has been my experience that they handle themselves just fine, and the public is much better served by the transparent process.
Still, recently Congress has been the scene of what I consider to be an example of a breakdown in the acceptable roles and norms of civil-military relations. I am referring, of course, to the recent hearings with General David Petraeus on the Iraq War. It is nearly impossible to steer clear of the politics surrounding these hearings, but let us try for a moment to focus on the role the General found himself playing. Congress required the General to report on the progress in Iraq, and Congress required that the report be issued in public. This, I believe, is appropriate.
However, in the weeks leading up the report, the President indicated that he would wait until the General’s testimony to Congress before he would announce the next phase of his Iraq War policy. The result was that the President largely abdicated his policymaking role and placed the burden of making U.S. war-related policy on the shoulders of a serving military officer. I spoke earlier of the natural constitutional tension that exists between the Legislative and Executive branches. The President should have received General Petraeus’ report in private first, and then issued his policy for the nation. At that time, it would have been more than appropriate to hold a hearing with General Petraeus to determine if that civilian-determined war policy was supportable by the facts presented in his report and his professional military judgment.
On October 12, the news media reported that retired General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander in Iraq, criticized the Administration’s policy in that war, calling it “a nightmare.”[1] I suppose, politically, I should applaud General Sanchez for agreeing with my assessment that goes back to serious concerns that I pointed out in two letters to the President, prior to the invasion of Iraq, about the lack of a plan for the occupation of that country. But the truth of the matter is, General Sanchez is merely reflecting facts that have been all too apparent to many informed observers. His is not a breakthrough voice—it just adds to the chorus of many who have been stating the obvious. It would have been helpful if the General, given his past posting and knowledge of Iraq, would have recommended a proposal or plan for redeployment of our forces from that country.
General Sanchez has every right within our Constitution to voice his opinion, as he did. It boils down to a matter of conscience for any such leader to comment or not. I cannot imagine General George C. Marshall, after his retirement from the military, making public comments. But on the other hand, General Marshall was not living through the troubled and unique circumstances in which we live today.
In the interest of time, I will leave you with an anecdote that is as troubling as it is illustrative. A few years ago I was addressing a class at the Joint Forces Staff College. One of the Lieutenant Colonels in the class asked me how an officer should behave if he ever found himself in a position to testify before Congress. “Tell the truth,” I replied. “Well,” said the Colonel, “General Shinseki and Secretary White told the truth, and look what happened to them.”[2] Well, I can tell you, that answer shocked me.
Is this the lesson our military officers are learning about how to deal—or not deal—with Congress? Has it really permeated all the way down the ranks that far? And if so, how will that color the nature of our civil-military relations in the future? If that’s really the way the upcoming crop of future general officers regard their pending interactions with Congress, how can we alleviate those concerns while still gathering the knowledge we need to conduct the proper oversight and make sound policy decisions? I ask because I sense that a close examination of that question will help keep civil-military relations healthy as we move forward, past this difficult time.
As I mentioned earlier, the American public holds the military in the highest regard—higher than any other profession. That is clearly because the people believe our military officers to be professional, competent, and trustworthy. They are. We should regard anything that would threaten that perception as unwise.
An informed populace makes responsible decisions, and in our system, political power flows from the consent of the governed. Committing our nation’s spirit, blood and treasure to military action is the most serious decision that elected civilian leaders make on behalf of their constituencies. Should the American people ever have cause to doubt the truthfulness of official accounts of military actions, I am concerned that they will immediately withdraw that consent, regardless of how worthy the cause for which we fight.
Most especially during a time of war, the civil-military relationship is central to the protection of our nation’s Constitutional traditions. I hope that the discussion generated by the participants of this conference will help us positively influence that relationship.
Notes
Steven Komarow, “Ex-General: Iraq a ’Nightmare’ for US, AP, Oct 12, 2007. [back]
Referring to General Eric Shinseki, who retired in summer 2003, and Army Secretary Thomas White, who was asked to resign in April 2003. Tensions had emerged between General Shinseki and the office of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld after Shinseki stated publicly that Operation Iraqi Freedom would require “several hundred thousand troops,” figures with which the Rumsfeld disagreed; Army Secretary Thomas White had agreed with Shinseki. [back]
You may forward this email as you like provided that you send it in its entirety, attribute it to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and include our web address (www.fpri.org). If you post it on a mailing list, please contact FPRI with the name, location, purpose, and number of recipients of the mailing list.
If you receive this as a forward and would like to be placed directly on our mailing lists, send email to FPRI@fpri.org. Include your name, address, and affiliation. For further information, contact Alan Luxenberg at (215) 732-3774 x105.