Tim Weiner: Walling off your enemies
.... The British are the prime example of success in modern times. At the close of their colonial era, after World War II, they isolated the ethnic Chinese population in Malaya, building “new villages” and herding hundreds of thousands of people into them. In doing so, they controlled the population within the walls — actually, fences that included barbed wire — and attacked Chinese insurgents outside them.
“If the insurgency is countrywide,” wrote Sir Robert Thompson, the architect of the idea of the “new villages,” “it is impossible to tackle it offensively in every area. It must be accepted that in certain areas only a holding operation can be conducted.” Hence the concept of creating walls or fences to separate friends from foes.
In practice, the British demoralized and defeated enemies of the empire, though thousands of noncombatants died in the process. The moral hazards of their methods seem fairly plain today, and therefore difficult to duplicate. But in its time, Malaya was counted as a famous victory, and the land of present-day Malaysia is peaceful and relatively prosperous.
“The results speak for themselves,” notes Lt. Col. Wade Markel, a United States Army strategist, writing last year in Parameters, the quarterly journal of the Army War College: by 1957, the number of insurgents had declined sharply — to perhaps 200 active combatants from an estimated 8,000 five years earlier — allowing a new Malay government to take shape.
“Short-term, it was a success,” said Caroline Elkins, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian whose field is the twilight of British empire. “But what happens within these walls? The British argued that they were winning hearts and minds. But behind the walls, it’s all about forcing people to cooperate.”
Winning the allegiance of civilians within the walls required a strong political will and a degree of violence, she said, and “the British were much more brutal than the Americans were willing to be in Vietnam.”....
Read entire article at NYT
“If the insurgency is countrywide,” wrote Sir Robert Thompson, the architect of the idea of the “new villages,” “it is impossible to tackle it offensively in every area. It must be accepted that in certain areas only a holding operation can be conducted.” Hence the concept of creating walls or fences to separate friends from foes.
In practice, the British demoralized and defeated enemies of the empire, though thousands of noncombatants died in the process. The moral hazards of their methods seem fairly plain today, and therefore difficult to duplicate. But in its time, Malaya was counted as a famous victory, and the land of present-day Malaysia is peaceful and relatively prosperous.
“The results speak for themselves,” notes Lt. Col. Wade Markel, a United States Army strategist, writing last year in Parameters, the quarterly journal of the Army War College: by 1957, the number of insurgents had declined sharply — to perhaps 200 active combatants from an estimated 8,000 five years earlier — allowing a new Malay government to take shape.
“Short-term, it was a success,” said Caroline Elkins, a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian whose field is the twilight of British empire. “But what happens within these walls? The British argued that they were winning hearts and minds. But behind the walls, it’s all about forcing people to cooperate.”
Winning the allegiance of civilians within the walls required a strong political will and a degree of violence, she said, and “the British were much more brutal than the Americans were willing to be in Vietnam.”....