Milton Viorst: Richard Nixon's Mideast blunder
[MILTON VIORST has covered the Middle East for 40 years. His most recent book is "Storm from the East: The Struggle between the Arab World and the Christian West."]
IN HER ACCLAIMED new book, "Nixon and Mao," Margaret MacMillan reminds readers, quite accurately, that Richard Nixon's bold act of diplomacy in promoting the American opening to China in 1972 made the world a safer, more stable place. But, at the same time, readers reflect on Nixon's missed opportunity for boldness in the Middle East, which has left the world far more volatile and dangerous than it might have been.
As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tries to patch things up between Palestinians and Israelis in 2007, we forget that Nixon's first secretary of State, William P. Rogers, made a similar effort in the region. The situation was more fluid then. Though Israel's huge victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 had ripened local animosities, the occupied territories were still free of Israeli settlers.
Rogers' most formidable obstacle wasn't those belligerents, it was Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor. The two saw the world differently. Rogers' concern was that the region was a powder keg for World War III. Kissinger saw it as an arena for defeating the Russians. And, of the two, Kissinger was the better political infighter.
The Rogers Plan was based on U.N. Resolution 242, which the U.S. had pushed through, establishing the land-for-peace principle. In 1969, Rogers declared: "To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel…. Any changes in the pre-existing [border] lines should not reflect the weight of conquest [but] should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security…. Our policy is and will continue to be a balanced one."
But, in fact, the "balance" that Rogers proposed was not U.S. policy at all. Israel, claiming the right to design its own borders, was upset at Rogers' call for "insubstantial" territorial changes. Its politicians were also being pressured by right-wingers to allow the colonization of the conquered lands. Israel, calling the Rogers Plan appeasement, rejected it outright. Stubborn themselves, so did the Arab states. Rogers persisted but, under Kissinger's influence, Nixon declined to make the plan his own. Without presidential support, the Rogers Plan died. ...
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IN HER ACCLAIMED new book, "Nixon and Mao," Margaret MacMillan reminds readers, quite accurately, that Richard Nixon's bold act of diplomacy in promoting the American opening to China in 1972 made the world a safer, more stable place. But, at the same time, readers reflect on Nixon's missed opportunity for boldness in the Middle East, which has left the world far more volatile and dangerous than it might have been.
As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice tries to patch things up between Palestinians and Israelis in 2007, we forget that Nixon's first secretary of State, William P. Rogers, made a similar effort in the region. The situation was more fluid then. Though Israel's huge victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 had ripened local animosities, the occupied territories were still free of Israeli settlers.
Rogers' most formidable obstacle wasn't those belligerents, it was Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor. The two saw the world differently. Rogers' concern was that the region was a powder keg for World War III. Kissinger saw it as an arena for defeating the Russians. And, of the two, Kissinger was the better political infighter.
The Rogers Plan was based on U.N. Resolution 242, which the U.S. had pushed through, establishing the land-for-peace principle. In 1969, Rogers declared: "To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel…. Any changes in the pre-existing [border] lines should not reflect the weight of conquest [but] should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security…. Our policy is and will continue to be a balanced one."
But, in fact, the "balance" that Rogers proposed was not U.S. policy at all. Israel, claiming the right to design its own borders, was upset at Rogers' call for "insubstantial" territorial changes. Its politicians were also being pressured by right-wingers to allow the colonization of the conquered lands. Israel, calling the Rogers Plan appeasement, rejected it outright. Stubborn themselves, so did the Arab states. Rogers persisted but, under Kissinger's influence, Nixon declined to make the plan his own. Without presidential support, the Rogers Plan died. ...