Zahid Hussain: Musharraf's failures (interview)
Zahid Hussain is the Pakistan correspondent for the Times of London, the Wall Street Journal, and Newsweek. He is also the political correspondent for the Karachi-based monthly Newsline.
According to Ahmed Rashid, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan and author of several books on the region, Zahid Hussain's new book, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam "is the first serious exposure of the rise and continuation of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. Zahid Hussain shows the links between the major jihadi groups of Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and the ISI with a degree of detail not seen in any Western writing on the subject."
Zahid Hussain spoke to AsiaSource on March 13 prior to the Asia Society program featuring his new book .
Why do people think that Musharraf is a "secular and moderate" Muslim leader when it seems quite obvious that under his regime there has been such a dramatic rise in Islamic radicalism in Pakistan?
Well, I think to understand Musharraf is really a very complex issue. Musharraf is full of contradictions. His policies have been full of paradoxes. On the one hand he tries to present himself as a moderate Islamic leader who is allowing his society to open up, trying to break away from the legacy of General Zia ul Haq. But on the other hand, he is the person who was responsible for Kargil; he also intensified help for the militants. And he always, throughout, before 9/11, openly supported the jihad culture. So that paradox is very much evident in Musharraf's policy.
When he joined the U.S. he was actually doing a balancing act. On the one hand he was trying to portray himself as a very valuable and reliable ally of the United States. On the other hand, at home he did not do anything to curb Islamic extremism. He always tried to draw a thin line between what he described as sectarianism and extremism. With the result that over the last five years he has done nothing really to curb sectarianism and militancy. So we have seen that all those groups which were apparently banned have mutated into smaller cells and present a much more serious threat to internal security. What Musharraf has failed to see is that internal security cannot be maintained or cannot be established unless you really come down hard on those who are fueling sectarian conflict and are involved in militancy.
So that contradiction is very much visible and that's what we are witnessing today in Pakistan. Today the rise in Islamic extremism and in sectarian violence is a direct result of his confused policies.
What do you think the relationship is between military rule and Islamist forces in general in the history of Pakistan? Even if Musharraf is considered "liberal" and therefore different from Zia, they are both military men.
Well actually, the difference between General Zia and Musharraf is basically that they came to power in a different international environment. In the 1980s the international environment was conducive for Zia's type of Islamization. It was a time when Islam was seen as the bulwark in the war against Communism. So that war was seen as no contradiction. Musharraf came to power in a different circumstance, where the world was threatened by the rise of Islamic militancy. In his policies he is also trying to get support from the West in the fight against this Islamic extremism. But he was also actually a prisoner of the other situation where the Pakistan military for the last two decades has used Islamic militancy as an instrument of policy to pursue its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and other parts of the world. So he was a prisoner of that situation.
Musharraf also has this military mindset which really believes in jihad, completely in a kind of ruthless way. That contradiction is very much there. And Musharraf's background also says a lot. He comes from a middle class family and obviously he may have some kind of moderate thinking. But basically he never understood that you cannot develop a moderate Muslim society unless you completely eliminate the root cause of extremism. And we have seen actually the result of that confused thinking: militant organizations are far stronger today than ever.
What are the root causes, in your view?
Musharraf never took any action against those madrassas that had preached hatred. He never did anything. And he has talked a lot about it. But his statements were also very contradictory. Whenever there was pressure from abroad he announced some measures but later on, there was no implementation. He kept saying that madrassas are our biggest NGOs. So that's a huge contradiction.
One cannot say that all the madrassas have been involved in terrorism. But definitely a majority of them have been involved in fueling extremism in the society. This presents the most serious threat to internal security.
From what you say about the changed international environment in the 1980s and post-9/11, in a way it seems as though the West -- and principally the United States -- is reaping what it sowed in the Cold War.
Well, yes, actually one can say yes. But it was much easier for the West to walk out from Afghanistan then. They did use jihad, as I said earlier; Islam was seen by the West at that point as a bulwark to fight against the Soviets or the Communist bloc. That suited them because they exploited the religious fanaticism of the Muslims to fight their battles. Once the objective was done they just pulled out from Afghanistan.
Then, obviously, after the fall of the Communist bloc, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main enemy had gone. So that also pitted them against the Islamic extremists who at one point were the allies of the United States. So in a way the main flaw in Pakistani policy lies in the fact that it did not foresee that the ruthless use of Islamic fanaticism to fight a proxy war could have a blowback effect at home. That is what we are witnessing today....
Read entire article at http://www.asiasource.org
According to Ahmed Rashid, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan and author of several books on the region, Zahid Hussain's new book, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam "is the first serious exposure of the rise and continuation of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. Zahid Hussain shows the links between the major jihadi groups of Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and the ISI with a degree of detail not seen in any Western writing on the subject."
Zahid Hussain spoke to AsiaSource on March 13 prior to the Asia Society program featuring his new book .
Why do people think that Musharraf is a "secular and moderate" Muslim leader when it seems quite obvious that under his regime there has been such a dramatic rise in Islamic radicalism in Pakistan?
Well, I think to understand Musharraf is really a very complex issue. Musharraf is full of contradictions. His policies have been full of paradoxes. On the one hand he tries to present himself as a moderate Islamic leader who is allowing his society to open up, trying to break away from the legacy of General Zia ul Haq. But on the other hand, he is the person who was responsible for Kargil; he also intensified help for the militants. And he always, throughout, before 9/11, openly supported the jihad culture. So that paradox is very much evident in Musharraf's policy.
When he joined the U.S. he was actually doing a balancing act. On the one hand he was trying to portray himself as a very valuable and reliable ally of the United States. On the other hand, at home he did not do anything to curb Islamic extremism. He always tried to draw a thin line between what he described as sectarianism and extremism. With the result that over the last five years he has done nothing really to curb sectarianism and militancy. So we have seen that all those groups which were apparently banned have mutated into smaller cells and present a much more serious threat to internal security. What Musharraf has failed to see is that internal security cannot be maintained or cannot be established unless you really come down hard on those who are fueling sectarian conflict and are involved in militancy.
So that contradiction is very much visible and that's what we are witnessing today in Pakistan. Today the rise in Islamic extremism and in sectarian violence is a direct result of his confused policies.
What do you think the relationship is between military rule and Islamist forces in general in the history of Pakistan? Even if Musharraf is considered "liberal" and therefore different from Zia, they are both military men.
Well actually, the difference between General Zia and Musharraf is basically that they came to power in a different international environment. In the 1980s the international environment was conducive for Zia's type of Islamization. It was a time when Islam was seen as the bulwark in the war against Communism. So that war was seen as no contradiction. Musharraf came to power in a different circumstance, where the world was threatened by the rise of Islamic militancy. In his policies he is also trying to get support from the West in the fight against this Islamic extremism. But he was also actually a prisoner of the other situation where the Pakistan military for the last two decades has used Islamic militancy as an instrument of policy to pursue its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and other parts of the world. So he was a prisoner of that situation.
Musharraf also has this military mindset which really believes in jihad, completely in a kind of ruthless way. That contradiction is very much there. And Musharraf's background also says a lot. He comes from a middle class family and obviously he may have some kind of moderate thinking. But basically he never understood that you cannot develop a moderate Muslim society unless you completely eliminate the root cause of extremism. And we have seen actually the result of that confused thinking: militant organizations are far stronger today than ever.
What are the root causes, in your view?
Musharraf never took any action against those madrassas that had preached hatred. He never did anything. And he has talked a lot about it. But his statements were also very contradictory. Whenever there was pressure from abroad he announced some measures but later on, there was no implementation. He kept saying that madrassas are our biggest NGOs. So that's a huge contradiction.
One cannot say that all the madrassas have been involved in terrorism. But definitely a majority of them have been involved in fueling extremism in the society. This presents the most serious threat to internal security.
From what you say about the changed international environment in the 1980s and post-9/11, in a way it seems as though the West -- and principally the United States -- is reaping what it sowed in the Cold War.
Well, yes, actually one can say yes. But it was much easier for the West to walk out from Afghanistan then. They did use jihad, as I said earlier; Islam was seen by the West at that point as a bulwark to fight against the Soviets or the Communist bloc. That suited them because they exploited the religious fanaticism of the Muslims to fight their battles. Once the objective was done they just pulled out from Afghanistan.
Then, obviously, after the fall of the Communist bloc, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main enemy had gone. So that also pitted them against the Islamic extremists who at one point were the allies of the United States. So in a way the main flaw in Pakistani policy lies in the fact that it did not foresee that the ruthless use of Islamic fanaticism to fight a proxy war could have a blowback effect at home. That is what we are witnessing today....