Max Boot and Geoffrey Wheatcroft: Debate American Foreign Policy
Last weekend's Book Review devoted most of its pages to recent books on war. To continue the discussion, NYTimes.com invited two foreign policy writers to join Barry Gewen, an editor at the Book Review, in a wide-ranging discussion of the challenges facing the U.S. in Iraq and beyond.
Max Boot, Dec. 19, 10:55 AM ET:
I should begin by expressing my skepticism about all arguments for historical inevitability. It is all too easy to argue that history could not have turned out any differently than it did. But this is an example of hindsight bias. In reality, there are many possible outcomes that are shaped by contingent decisions made by countless individuals. Even the events that seem the most foreordained -- e.g., the Allied victory in World War II -- could have turned out differently, as British historian Richard Overy argued in his brilliant book, "Why the Allies Won" (1995). (See, I can bring in books too!)
In the case of Iraq, presumably we all agree that America's civilian and military policymakers made terrible blunders. We don't know what the outcome would have been if some decisions had not been made -- e.g., the decision to disband the Iraqi security forces or to send no more than 170,000 coalition troops to occupy Iraq -- but the course of events would almost certainly have been different. And, given how disastrously things have turned out, it's reasonable to assume that an alternative course might have been more successful. We'll never know, of course. As you note, Barry, these are the kinds of questions historians will be debating for centuries.
The dreadful outcome in Iraq has seemingly validated the naysayers, of whom there were many before the hostilities started (though not nearly as many as you would think; a lot of prewar hawks have magically become birds of a different feather). It's all too easy to say, Why didn't the administration listen to those who warned that an invasion of Iraq would turn out to be a disaster? Perhaps because many of these critics were Chicken Littles who had been making dire predictions before every American military intervention of the past several decades. It is all too easy too forget how many seemingly respected voices warned of disaster before the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. While congenital optimists have been discredited by the recent turn of events in Iraq, congenital pessimists were discredited by the course of earlier wars. This helps to explain why the Bush administration didn't give greater credence to voices critical of the decision to invade Iraq. Explain, but not necessarily excuse....
Read entire article at NYT
Max Boot, Dec. 19, 10:55 AM ET:
I should begin by expressing my skepticism about all arguments for historical inevitability. It is all too easy to argue that history could not have turned out any differently than it did. But this is an example of hindsight bias. In reality, there are many possible outcomes that are shaped by contingent decisions made by countless individuals. Even the events that seem the most foreordained -- e.g., the Allied victory in World War II -- could have turned out differently, as British historian Richard Overy argued in his brilliant book, "Why the Allies Won" (1995). (See, I can bring in books too!)
In the case of Iraq, presumably we all agree that America's civilian and military policymakers made terrible blunders. We don't know what the outcome would have been if some decisions had not been made -- e.g., the decision to disband the Iraqi security forces or to send no more than 170,000 coalition troops to occupy Iraq -- but the course of events would almost certainly have been different. And, given how disastrously things have turned out, it's reasonable to assume that an alternative course might have been more successful. We'll never know, of course. As you note, Barry, these are the kinds of questions historians will be debating for centuries.
The dreadful outcome in Iraq has seemingly validated the naysayers, of whom there were many before the hostilities started (though not nearly as many as you would think; a lot of prewar hawks have magically become birds of a different feather). It's all too easy to say, Why didn't the administration listen to those who warned that an invasion of Iraq would turn out to be a disaster? Perhaps because many of these critics were Chicken Littles who had been making dire predictions before every American military intervention of the past several decades. It is all too easy too forget how many seemingly respected voices warned of disaster before the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. While congenital optimists have been discredited by the recent turn of events in Iraq, congenital pessimists were discredited by the course of earlier wars. This helps to explain why the Bush administration didn't give greater credence to voices critical of the decision to invade Iraq. Explain, but not necessarily excuse....