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Truman on Trial: The Defense, Closing Argument

Philip Nobile is correct to note that I did not answer the question of whether or not Harry S. Truman was a war criminal by accepting his terms of the argument; i.e., whether or not on legal grounds using the A-bomb on Hiroshima constitutes a crime of war. I did so because I find this to be a largely academic and irrelevant exercise. It is based largely on the horrible effect that the single bomb had on the Japanese population, and ignores the context of the decision. As I tried to argue, that context made use of the A-bomb not only a viable alternative to forcing an end to the war and acceptance by Japan of the Potsdam terms, but was an alternative better and more humane than any of the other existing alternatives. Hence, to call use of the A-bomb a war crime is to allow those actually liable for prosecution of war crimes an easy way to get off the hook. If once accepts Nobile's terms of the argument, any act of war with disastrous results on civilians is ipso facto a crime of war.

Contrary to Nobile, Truman and his staff did not intend to commit"fiendish slaughters." It was not"the whole point." Their purpose was to force the Japanese military to accept surrender and end the fighting---something which to my satisfaction, Richard B. Frank in particular has shown they would not have done were it not for the actual use of the A-bomb. Indeed, the A-bomb gave them a way to accept surrender and save face. They could argue that they had to give in because science forced them to---not the actions of a competing military force. It was, as one of the Japanese members of the peace faction put it, a"gift from heaven."

Evidently, careful arguments for a position with which he disagrees makes one intellectually dishonest. This, indeed, is a smear.

I apologize if I suggested that Philip Nobile had sympathy for Axis gangsters. I stand corrected and take his word that this is not the case. He does, however, if one goes back to the ending of his statement, have a clear sympathy with the position of some Japanese who want all those who made the decision to use the bomb hanged, which the man he quotes believes would be what would have happened if a war crimes tribunal was convened against Truman and his associates. As for the issue of the killing of noncombatants, Frank points out---and I cite Frank because I consider his book to be the most recent, balanced and definitive study of the issues involved---that local war production was carried out in civilian homes; that many" civilians" were actually quite involved in work for the military and the war, and that there were clusters of production purposefully introduced throughout Hiroshima in order to integrate daily life with the war effort. And as I noted, Japanese leaders were candid to acknowledge at the time that if they had developed an atomic bomb, they would have immediately used it without concern on the American mainland.

I would also suggest that one reason Allied historians have"washed their hands" of the issue of supposed Allied criminality is that, in fact, the Allied actions were not criminal. That is the essence of my own statement, and I stand by it. I did write, perhaps carelessly, that the historians he cites had been accused of"war crimes." What Philip Nobile accused them of is apologizing for war criminals and"intellectual dishonesty." He now accuses me of this as well. Evidently, careful arguments for a position with which he disagrees makes one intellectually dishonest. This, indeed, is a smear.

As to Eisenhower, the main point, which Nobile does not address, is that whatever the accuracy of his view of use of the bomb, Eisenhower knew little about the Pacific theater, and his judgment about the bomb's use there must be regarded not as the words of a skilled"military man," but the same as that of any commentator opposed to the bomb who has no expertise at all. Nobile cites him because his point of view is that held by Nobile. I wonder if he would have cited him if Eisenhower had said"thank God we used the bomb to end the war quickly." He would, indeed, then have added him to the docket of war criminals along with Truman.

As for the Japanese sources---they were used by Frank, which is where I learned about them---to put Truman and his administration's decision making in the context of actual Japanese policy as it was affected by the bomb. It is not a question of"might" making right, as well as success. What Nobile again leaves out is the other part of the equation---that any of the existing alternatives would have meant more death, destruction, loss of both American and Japanese lives, and would have likely been far worse than the effects of the two atomic bombs that were dropped. As for the figures he cites with dismay, they are carefully developed by Frank from solid military sources, and are not a matter of insignificant or"unprecedented apocalyptic" figures. I think what disturbs Nobile is that once one takes these figures into consideration; the use of the bomb becomes a more difficult proposition to condemn as a war crime. He puts his finger on the issue when he writes that he doubts that Truman would have risked doubling the number of American deaths in a final assault. Precisely. That is a good reason for why he sought to use the A-bomb, to end the war quickly, and to save lives in the process.

Nobile also cites the well known US government study of 1946-the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey -and notes that even that official study" concluded that the bombs were unnecessary," and he writes that this"detailed investigation" was based on all the facts, as well as the testimony of Japanese leaders. As the Survey concluded:" certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

To exonerate Harry S. Truman of the charge leveled against him by Philip Nobile will be to honor Reason and not Power.

These are strong and indeed definitive sounding judgments. It is also true, as Nobile says, that many military leaders argued after the war that conventional attacks could have done the job without use of the bomb. But as Frank writes, and once again I defer to him, the date set down"so authoritatively by the Strategic Bombing Survey has not fared well under scrutiny." Indeed, he adds that in fact, the USSBS did not in reality examine all the facts, as it had claimed. Moreover, the contemporary record gives no indication of such confident predictions to Truman. No wonder Nobile easily dismisses General Marshall's words as"waffling." But he did not waffle. He told the President on June 18, 1945 that bombing could not end the war. Nobile may disagree---but Marshall hardly waffled. As to their arguments, they were made in the context of major debates between different sectors of the military, at a time when the creation of a single Department of Defense with a separate Air Force was being made. Their statements, Frank writes,"packed a lot of baggage behind their superficial representations of sound military judgment." And more importantly, neither did the USSBS or the military leaders Nobile cites address"the contingency of the Japanese political situation and, more significant, neither compared the human costs of these alternatives with the toll exacted by atomic weapons." In other words, they made the same mistaken argument that Nobile makes today.

Nobile argues, in fact, that"it may well be that the bombs were the proximate cause of Japan's surrender." But he moralizes that"only in the mind of a criminal does might and success make right." Once again, Nobile does not come to terms with the strong evidence that the other alternatives might have been worse in terms of the cost of human life on both sides of the conflict. If one accepts this argument, then deciding to use the atomic bombs cannot be viewed-- because of the resulting civilian casualties--as a war crime. It is as simple as that.

As to the vote of the jury of historians, I argue that once again, this is an academic exercise that can only work to make the historical profession look more foolish than many already consider it to be, should this meaningless jury actually vote to condemn Truman in retrospect for war crimes. Surely, such a vote will get some press attention--as to those endless Presidential surveys when historians tell the public Ronald Reagan was the worst President and stands at the end of the list---while liberal Democrats are always on the top. These polls and now this jury say more about the state of the historical profession and its politics than it does about the questions being discussed.

To reach such a conclusion is to accept Nobile's faulty scenario that has Japan on"the final throes of defeat," the Pacific battleground"quiet," etc. etc. etc. The actual evidence and the most recent research of the scholars I have cited, however, indicates that contrary to Nobile, Harry S. Truman did not engage in a"sham excuse" and in fact was not"drowning in untried alternatives," because such alternatives were themselves faulty and were not sufficient to cause the President not to use the bomb. Nor were the estimates of invasion of the homelands saturated with"fantasy casualty estimates." They are obviously to Philip Nobile, but not to those who had to consider the actual invasions. To exonerate Harry S. Truman of the charge leveled against him by Philip Nobile will be to honor Reason and not Power. I urge the jury to take this step.