Eisenhower’s Caution in Hungary in 1956 Broadly Justified, Declassified Defense Department Study Finds

The United States’ cautious response to the popular uprising in Hungary in 1956 grew out of the Eisenhower administration’s policy of “keeping the pot boiling” in Eastern Europe without having it “boil over” into a possible nuclear conflict, according to an unpublished Defense Department historical study posted for the first time by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University.

Eisenhower’s concerns led him to reject options such as using tactical nuclear weapons on supply routes into Hungary.  But in his caution, Eisenhower also “let the matter slide” by not considering the crisis sooner, which “undercut the urgency for action.”

This is the last posting of a three-part series of studies by former DOD historian Ronald Landa. The previous studies covered U.S. covert aid to Italy and American policy toward Eastern Europe in the same period.