Andrew Cockburn: The Limits of Air Power
[Andrew Cockburn is the author of, most recently, "Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy."]
...The very first bombing raid ever occurred almost 100 years ago on Nov. 1, 1911, when an Italian airman hand-dropped four 4.5-pound bombs on forces defending Tripoli against Italian invaders. This momentous event went down well with the press: "Italian Military Aviator Outside Tripoli Proves War Value of Aeroplane," headlined the New York Times. But it had little effect on the fighting, thus commencing a pattern of disappointment that has recurred with monotonous regularity in subsequent conflicts, irrespective of advances in technology. Precision bombing, touted as an instrument of victory in World War II and Vietnam, turned out to be anything but, leaving the wars to be decided by foot soldiers on the ground.
The 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia is often cited as a turning point in this sorry narrative. Despite the fact that it lasted 11 weeks rather than the three days predicted by NATO commanders, not a single U.S. serviceman was killed. Furthermore, the attacks ended when the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, thus permitting the return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees freed from the threat of Serb persecution. Not only had the operation apparently vindicated liberal interventionists in the Clinton administration, but it also indicated that at long last, air power alone could win a war.
Subsequent inquiry gravely tarnished this shining example. The Serbian army deployed in Kosovo had been the principal target of bombs and missiles, yet at the end of the conflict allied military observers were surprised to see Serb formations withdrawing in good order, morale and equipment apparently intact. And despite contemporary official claims that more than 300 tanks had been destroyed, the actual number, according to sources on the command staff and an internal Air Force study, was 14. Most strikingly of all, the cease-fire terms were almost identical to those accepted by Milosevic before the war....
Read entire article at LA Times
...The very first bombing raid ever occurred almost 100 years ago on Nov. 1, 1911, when an Italian airman hand-dropped four 4.5-pound bombs on forces defending Tripoli against Italian invaders. This momentous event went down well with the press: "Italian Military Aviator Outside Tripoli Proves War Value of Aeroplane," headlined the New York Times. But it had little effect on the fighting, thus commencing a pattern of disappointment that has recurred with monotonous regularity in subsequent conflicts, irrespective of advances in technology. Precision bombing, touted as an instrument of victory in World War II and Vietnam, turned out to be anything but, leaving the wars to be decided by foot soldiers on the ground.
The 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia is often cited as a turning point in this sorry narrative. Despite the fact that it lasted 11 weeks rather than the three days predicted by NATO commanders, not a single U.S. serviceman was killed. Furthermore, the attacks ended when the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, thus permitting the return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees freed from the threat of Serb persecution. Not only had the operation apparently vindicated liberal interventionists in the Clinton administration, but it also indicated that at long last, air power alone could win a war.
Subsequent inquiry gravely tarnished this shining example. The Serbian army deployed in Kosovo had been the principal target of bombs and missiles, yet at the end of the conflict allied military observers were surprised to see Serb formations withdrawing in good order, morale and equipment apparently intact. And despite contemporary official claims that more than 300 tanks had been destroyed, the actual number, according to sources on the command staff and an internal Air Force study, was 14. Most strikingly of all, the cease-fire terms were almost identical to those accepted by Milosevic before the war....