John Gledhill: Whither Egypt's Military?
[John Gledhill is a fellow in global politics at the London School of Economics.]
When the Egyptian military declared that it would not turn on its own people early last week, Cairo’s opposition groups breathed a sigh of relief. With the military taken out of the equation, the path to peaceful regime change in Egypt seemed clear.
But by renouncing the use of force “against the Egyptian people,” the military simply created space for the development of an equal, if not greater, threat to peace and stability in Egypt: attacks by the people against the people....
Consider the unfolding of similar events in Indonesia in 1998 and Romania in the early 1990s. In both cases the military failed to act and violence ensued.
In May 1998, as Suharto’s 31-year reign was coming to a rapid end, demonstrators on the streets of Jakarta called for the president’s resignation. Violence by unidentified provocateurs flared into rioting. Different branches of the armed forces, riven by factional disputes, refused to cooperate to assure order. Groups of thugs — reportedly hired by hard-liners in the military — were unleashed on the demonstrators. In the end, however, the hard-liners were discredited, Suharto resigned and the way was paved for a democratic transition.
In June 1990, similar events played out in Romania. Following the country’s first post-Communist elections, opposition protests flared into rioting. The military initially remained passive. The door was then opened for Romania’s secret services to demonstrate their commitment to the country’s anti-reformist governing elite by unleashing attacks on Romania’s nascent political opposition. The violence set back the process of democratic reform for several years....
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When the Egyptian military declared that it would not turn on its own people early last week, Cairo’s opposition groups breathed a sigh of relief. With the military taken out of the equation, the path to peaceful regime change in Egypt seemed clear.
But by renouncing the use of force “against the Egyptian people,” the military simply created space for the development of an equal, if not greater, threat to peace and stability in Egypt: attacks by the people against the people....
Consider the unfolding of similar events in Indonesia in 1998 and Romania in the early 1990s. In both cases the military failed to act and violence ensued.
In May 1998, as Suharto’s 31-year reign was coming to a rapid end, demonstrators on the streets of Jakarta called for the president’s resignation. Violence by unidentified provocateurs flared into rioting. Different branches of the armed forces, riven by factional disputes, refused to cooperate to assure order. Groups of thugs — reportedly hired by hard-liners in the military — were unleashed on the demonstrators. In the end, however, the hard-liners were discredited, Suharto resigned and the way was paved for a democratic transition.
In June 1990, similar events played out in Romania. Following the country’s first post-Communist elections, opposition protests flared into rioting. The military initially remained passive. The door was then opened for Romania’s secret services to demonstrate their commitment to the country’s anti-reformist governing elite by unleashing attacks on Romania’s nascent political opposition. The violence set back the process of democratic reform for several years....