Charles W. Dunne: The Right Side of History
[Charles W. Dunne is a scholar with the Middle East Institute in Washington and a former staff member of the U.S. National Security Council. He served as political-military officer in the U.S. Embassy in Cairo from 1999-2002.]
The end is now at hand for the government of Hosni Mubarak, ruler of Egypt for the last thirty years. Two outstanding questions face us now: What will the army do? And how should the United States react?
Called into the streets by President Mubarak in an eleventh-hour attempt to secure his rule, the army has shown remarkable restraint. It has deployed to protect key buildings and infrastructure and, so far, has refused to enforce bans on demonstrations. In some places the army—regarded as the most august of national institutions and the most powerful arbiter of Egyptian politics—has given demonstrators rides on armored personnel carriers.
The military is undoubtedly weighing several factors here. First, it must consider the cost to its national prestige of engaging in wholesale repression of a broadly popular political movement. Second, it will calculate the advantages or disadvantages of doing so in the service of a badly wounded regime. Third—and critically—it will bear in mind the implications that crushing the demonstrations would have on its close military relations with the United States, which provides the financial aid, advanced weapons systems and vital logistics support the Egyptian military depends on. So far, the military has erred on the side of caution. That may not be true tomorrow....
Read entire article at American Interest (Blog)
The end is now at hand for the government of Hosni Mubarak, ruler of Egypt for the last thirty years. Two outstanding questions face us now: What will the army do? And how should the United States react?
Called into the streets by President Mubarak in an eleventh-hour attempt to secure his rule, the army has shown remarkable restraint. It has deployed to protect key buildings and infrastructure and, so far, has refused to enforce bans on demonstrations. In some places the army—regarded as the most august of national institutions and the most powerful arbiter of Egyptian politics—has given demonstrators rides on armored personnel carriers.
The military is undoubtedly weighing several factors here. First, it must consider the cost to its national prestige of engaging in wholesale repression of a broadly popular political movement. Second, it will calculate the advantages or disadvantages of doing so in the service of a badly wounded regime. Third—and critically—it will bear in mind the implications that crushing the demonstrations would have on its close military relations with the United States, which provides the financial aid, advanced weapons systems and vital logistics support the Egyptian military depends on. So far, the military has erred on the side of caution. That may not be true tomorrow....