George F. Will: Could there be a Tet Offensive in Afghanistan?
[George F. Will is a twice-weekly columnist for The Post, writing about foreign and domestic politics and policy.]
Once when the French statesman Duc de Richelieu (1766-1822) was planning a military campaign, an officer placed a finger on a map, saying: "We shall cross the river at this point." Richelieu replied: "Excellent, sir, but your finger is not a bridge."
The difference between planning and accomplishing in war is on many minds as the Obama administration reviews progress, such as it has been, in Afghanistan in the 54 weeks since the president simultaneously announced the surge and a July 2011 beginning of "the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan." Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, was recently asked (on ABC's "This Week") to assess progress there. He responded with minimalist optimism: There has been "localized improvement" in "certain areas."
Two years ago this month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, when asked about U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, stressed creation of a strong central government. Asked if Afghanistan had ever had one, he said crisply: "No." Since then, U.S. officials have learned a lot about Afghanistan, including these two related facts: The disconnect between the government and the people is worse than hitherto suspected. And the corruption is so systemic and pandemic as to be properly described as vertically integrated.
Today, in the wake of the WikiLeaks disclosures, a strong central government seems highly unlikely and perhaps unadvisable. In one leaked document, the current U.S. ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, wonders "how to fight corruption and connect the people to their government, when the key government officials are themselves corrupt."
In the past 12 months, 2011 has been quietly eclipsed by 2014 as a decisive date - when Afghan security forces are supposed to be competent enough that U.S. forces can recede from combat. So the fundamental questions are: Can Afghan security forces become competent while the Afghan government remains riddled with, indeed defined by, corruption? If they cannot, can America successfully combat corruption and the Taliban, simultaneously?..
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Once when the French statesman Duc de Richelieu (1766-1822) was planning a military campaign, an officer placed a finger on a map, saying: "We shall cross the river at this point." Richelieu replied: "Excellent, sir, but your finger is not a bridge."
The difference between planning and accomplishing in war is on many minds as the Obama administration reviews progress, such as it has been, in Afghanistan in the 54 weeks since the president simultaneously announced the surge and a July 2011 beginning of "the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan." Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, was recently asked (on ABC's "This Week") to assess progress there. He responded with minimalist optimism: There has been "localized improvement" in "certain areas."
Two years ago this month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, when asked about U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, stressed creation of a strong central government. Asked if Afghanistan had ever had one, he said crisply: "No." Since then, U.S. officials have learned a lot about Afghanistan, including these two related facts: The disconnect between the government and the people is worse than hitherto suspected. And the corruption is so systemic and pandemic as to be properly described as vertically integrated.
Today, in the wake of the WikiLeaks disclosures, a strong central government seems highly unlikely and perhaps unadvisable. In one leaked document, the current U.S. ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, wonders "how to fight corruption and connect the people to their government, when the key government officials are themselves corrupt."
In the past 12 months, 2011 has been quietly eclipsed by 2014 as a decisive date - when Afghan security forces are supposed to be competent enough that U.S. forces can recede from combat. So the fundamental questions are: Can Afghan security forces become competent while the Afghan government remains riddled with, indeed defined by, corruption? If they cannot, can America successfully combat corruption and the Taliban, simultaneously?..