Nikolas K. Gvosdev: Barack and Dmitry's Special Relationship
[Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a senior editor at The National Interest, is a professor of national-security studies at the U.S. Naval War College.]
Why has the Obama administration invested so much of its political capital in the resetting of relations with Russia? Why is getting passage of New START seen as so critical to the president's foreign-policy legacy?
Russia has a way of creeping back onto the agenda of American presidents. Bill Clinton was going to focus on the U.S. domestic economy, implicitly critiquing George H. W. Bush for spending so much time managing the relationship with the Soviet Union and then the newly formed successor states—yet America's first "post–Cold War" president had a record number of meetings and summits with Boris Yeltsin. The George W. Bush campaign claimed that under their watch, Russia would not be at the center of its foreign-policy agenda, and lambasted the Clinton team for overemphasizing the "Boris and Bill" connection—until Bush himself had his Putin moment. Obama was supposed to be ushering in transformational change in U.S. foreign policy—notably to fulfill the promise of being America's first Pacific president—and yet, Russia found its way back to the top of the agenda—and like George and Bill before him, Barack has a special relationship with a Russian president, this time Dmitry Medvedev.
This is not to argue that START is not an important agreement, or that Russia is still not one of the major powers helping to shape and set the global agenda. One would expect that the U.S.-Russia relationship will still be something directly handled at the president's level. But what is surprising is the extent to which the president's political team seems to be relying on its diplomatic efforts with Moscow to help legitimize the administration's stewardship of foreign affairs: Russia becomes the yardstick to measure success or failure in bringing about "change."..
Read entire article at National Interest
Why has the Obama administration invested so much of its political capital in the resetting of relations with Russia? Why is getting passage of New START seen as so critical to the president's foreign-policy legacy?
Russia has a way of creeping back onto the agenda of American presidents. Bill Clinton was going to focus on the U.S. domestic economy, implicitly critiquing George H. W. Bush for spending so much time managing the relationship with the Soviet Union and then the newly formed successor states—yet America's first "post–Cold War" president had a record number of meetings and summits with Boris Yeltsin. The George W. Bush campaign claimed that under their watch, Russia would not be at the center of its foreign-policy agenda, and lambasted the Clinton team for overemphasizing the "Boris and Bill" connection—until Bush himself had his Putin moment. Obama was supposed to be ushering in transformational change in U.S. foreign policy—notably to fulfill the promise of being America's first Pacific president—and yet, Russia found its way back to the top of the agenda—and like George and Bill before him, Barack has a special relationship with a Russian president, this time Dmitry Medvedev.
This is not to argue that START is not an important agreement, or that Russia is still not one of the major powers helping to shape and set the global agenda. One would expect that the U.S.-Russia relationship will still be something directly handled at the president's level. But what is surprising is the extent to which the president's political team seems to be relying on its diplomatic efforts with Moscow to help legitimize the administration's stewardship of foreign affairs: Russia becomes the yardstick to measure success or failure in bringing about "change."..