James Woolsey: Old Problems With New Start
[Mr. Woolsey served as an adviser to the Salt I negotiation (1969-70), a delegate-at-large to the Start and Defense and Space negotiations (1983-86), and ambassador and chief negotiator for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (1989-91). He was director of Central Intelligence from 1993-95.]
A number of years negotiating arms-control agreements with the Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian counterparts, don't appear eager—friendly yes, eager never. Regrettably, the Obama administration seems to have become eager for a deal in its negotiations on the follow-on treaty to the recently expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start). Hopes for a boost in efforts to "reset" relations with Russia, and for progress toward the president's dream of a world without nuclear weapons, apparently combined to trump prudent negotiating strategy.
As a result, concessions to Russian demands make it difficult to support Senate approval of the new treaty, known as New Start, as it currently stands. Why has the administration agreed to a treaty that limits our nonnuclear long-range weapons and runs the risk of constraining our missile defenses? And why did the treaty end up with verification provisions substantially more lax than those negotiated in the 1991 Start treaty?
The Russians are engaging in a comprehensive modernization of their nuclear forces, which senior Russian military officials say is their top priority. We cannot deal effectively with them or with the growing number of nuclear-weapon states around the world if we are strategically weaker, undefended and clueless about our adversaries' capabilities.
Before the Senate approves New Start it should ask the administration to demonstrate its commitment to three things...
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A number of years negotiating arms-control agreements with the Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian counterparts, don't appear eager—friendly yes, eager never. Regrettably, the Obama administration seems to have become eager for a deal in its negotiations on the follow-on treaty to the recently expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start). Hopes for a boost in efforts to "reset" relations with Russia, and for progress toward the president's dream of a world without nuclear weapons, apparently combined to trump prudent negotiating strategy.
As a result, concessions to Russian demands make it difficult to support Senate approval of the new treaty, known as New Start, as it currently stands. Why has the administration agreed to a treaty that limits our nonnuclear long-range weapons and runs the risk of constraining our missile defenses? And why did the treaty end up with verification provisions substantially more lax than those negotiated in the 1991 Start treaty?
The Russians are engaging in a comprehensive modernization of their nuclear forces, which senior Russian military officials say is their top priority. We cannot deal effectively with them or with the growing number of nuclear-weapon states around the world if we are strategically weaker, undefended and clueless about our adversaries' capabilities.
Before the Senate approves New Start it should ask the administration to demonstrate its commitment to three things...