Steve LeVine: The End of the Great Game
[Steve LeVine, a Washington-based writer on energy and foreign affairs, is the author of The Oil and the Glory.]
Has the United States stopped playing the Great Game in Central Asia? In the wake of the destabilizing violence that occurred in Kyrgyzstan this summer, that seems to be the case. The Obama administration reacted slowly when at least 300 people were killed in inter-ethnic fighting in June and Kyrgyzstan seemed on the verge of spiraling out of control. American officials declined an informal request from the fragile Kyrgyz government for military assistance, deferred to Russia's lead in the crisis, and followed Moscow's example when the Kremlin proceeded to offer up little apart from humanitarian aid. Belatedly, the United States nudged the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy 52 unarmed police advisers, but the tardy action allowed local politics to intervene, and now even this skeletal force appears unlikely actually to be sent. All of this was a sharp contrast to Washington’s activism during the prior two presidential administrations. In 2005, for instance, when a massacre occurred in Uzbekistan, America organized an airlift of victims out of the country and relocated some in the United States. On paper, the Obama administration continues to reject the idea of a Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia, but the events in Kyrgyzstan appear to mark a softening of this red line in practice. Central Asia is no longer a reason to put up one’s fists.
If this trend continues, Washington’s willingness to defer to Russia in the land of Kipling may mark the beginning of something larger: a new era in which the Great Powers attempt to tread more gingerly in each other's backyards. The implications of this shift are great, and potentially risky.
To understand what's happening, it's useful to look back at the way U.S. policy has evolved since 1991. At first, after the Soviet collapse, Washington had only the vaguest idea how to interact with the eight new republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. What the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations did know, however, was their attitude toward Moscow: Both pledged to help to smooth the way for the country's natural evolution from a communist dictatorship to a free-market democracy. As far as the former Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia were concerned, they could be attended to with humanitarian and bureaucratic assistance, such as food aid and judicial training, but no policies that would interfere with the liberation of Russia from its autocratic past.
Then, the Russian Federation began to look less benign. Crushing civil wars erupted or worsened in now-forgotten places like Kulyab, Stepanakert, and Sukhumi, and officials in the struggling republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan began complaining to Washington about their inability to export their oil and natural gas for hard currency. Successive governments fell in Azerbaijan, threatening the country with disintegration, and oilmen from companies like Amoco, Pennzoil, and Unocal fretted that the daily tumult jeopardized their deals. When evidence accumulated of Russian connivance in the trouble, some in the Clinton foreign policy apparatus said the U.S. ought to be less conciliatory toward Moscow...
Read entire article at New Republic
Has the United States stopped playing the Great Game in Central Asia? In the wake of the destabilizing violence that occurred in Kyrgyzstan this summer, that seems to be the case. The Obama administration reacted slowly when at least 300 people were killed in inter-ethnic fighting in June and Kyrgyzstan seemed on the verge of spiraling out of control. American officials declined an informal request from the fragile Kyrgyz government for military assistance, deferred to Russia's lead in the crisis, and followed Moscow's example when the Kremlin proceeded to offer up little apart from humanitarian aid. Belatedly, the United States nudged the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy 52 unarmed police advisers, but the tardy action allowed local politics to intervene, and now even this skeletal force appears unlikely actually to be sent. All of this was a sharp contrast to Washington’s activism during the prior two presidential administrations. In 2005, for instance, when a massacre occurred in Uzbekistan, America organized an airlift of victims out of the country and relocated some in the United States. On paper, the Obama administration continues to reject the idea of a Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia, but the events in Kyrgyzstan appear to mark a softening of this red line in practice. Central Asia is no longer a reason to put up one’s fists.
If this trend continues, Washington’s willingness to defer to Russia in the land of Kipling may mark the beginning of something larger: a new era in which the Great Powers attempt to tread more gingerly in each other's backyards. The implications of this shift are great, and potentially risky.
To understand what's happening, it's useful to look back at the way U.S. policy has evolved since 1991. At first, after the Soviet collapse, Washington had only the vaguest idea how to interact with the eight new republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. What the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations did know, however, was their attitude toward Moscow: Both pledged to help to smooth the way for the country's natural evolution from a communist dictatorship to a free-market democracy. As far as the former Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia were concerned, they could be attended to with humanitarian and bureaucratic assistance, such as food aid and judicial training, but no policies that would interfere with the liberation of Russia from its autocratic past.
Then, the Russian Federation began to look less benign. Crushing civil wars erupted or worsened in now-forgotten places like Kulyab, Stepanakert, and Sukhumi, and officials in the struggling republics of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan began complaining to Washington about their inability to export their oil and natural gas for hard currency. Successive governments fell in Azerbaijan, threatening the country with disintegration, and oilmen from companies like Amoco, Pennzoil, and Unocal fretted that the daily tumult jeopardized their deals. When evidence accumulated of Russian connivance in the trouble, some in the Clinton foreign policy apparatus said the U.S. ought to be less conciliatory toward Moscow...