Bret Stephens: Requiem for a Revolution ... The Iranian Green movement is dead
[Mr. Stephens writes the Journal's "Global View" column on foreign affairs.]
Suppose that in the days following last year's fraudulent election in Iran, the U.S. and its Western allies had warned Tehran's leaders that their repression at home would be met, swiftly and severely, with consequences abroad. For every Neda Soltan shot dead in the street, an Iranian diplomat posted abroad would be expelled. For every foreigner put on trial in Iran, a Western firm doing business in the country would close its doors. For every opposition activist hanged, deliveries of imported gasoline would be curtailed.
And for every call to wipe Israel off the map, the U.S. would supply the Jewish state with 100 bunker-busters suitable for use against Iran's nuclear facilities.
Had any of that happened, it's just possible that Iran's leaders might have hesitated before moving ahead with their bloody crackdown and, in hesitating, given Iran's democratic opposition the opening it needed to sustain itself. But it didn't happen. In those critical June days, as the regime wobbled, the Obama administration opted to ease the regime's fears instead of multiplying them. And instead of creating leverage for himself, the president conceded it preemptively in hopes of currying favor for a nuclear deal.
A year on, we are living with the consequences of his failure. The hoped-for nuclear deal never materialized. The "sanctions with bite" that the administration promised turn out, on close inspection, to have no bite. The international consensus—as well as the consensus in the U.S. foreign policy establishment—is shifting away from the view that Iran must not be allowed to get nuclear weapons to the idea that a nuclear Iran can be "contained." The regime is more emboldened than ever—and much closer to a nuclear capability. Israel, the one country that might yet take action, is more isolated than ever.
Worst of all, the Green movement is, if not extinguished completely, little more than a flickering ember. The three million Iranians who marched for freedom last June may have to wait another generation for a similar opportunity.
I realize this view is disputed by those who believe that Iranian people power can assert itself again. Writing in these pages Saturday, Michael Ledeen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies described signs of mass discontent and regime weakness. "Sooner or later there will be a showdown, most likely sooner," Mr. Ledeen wrote. "The regime is riven by internal conflict, and some of the past heroes of the Islamic Republic are openly siding with the Greens."
I hope Mr. Ledeen is right. But I doubt it. If mass discontent alone were sufficient to topple a regime, Stalin and Mao would not have died in their beds, and Cuba, Burma and North Korea would be free countries today. And if regime factionalism were evidence of an impending fall, the Soviet Union should not have survived long past Khrushchev's feud with Beria, or Brezhnev's with Khrushchev. But it did...
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Suppose that in the days following last year's fraudulent election in Iran, the U.S. and its Western allies had warned Tehran's leaders that their repression at home would be met, swiftly and severely, with consequences abroad. For every Neda Soltan shot dead in the street, an Iranian diplomat posted abroad would be expelled. For every foreigner put on trial in Iran, a Western firm doing business in the country would close its doors. For every opposition activist hanged, deliveries of imported gasoline would be curtailed.
And for every call to wipe Israel off the map, the U.S. would supply the Jewish state with 100 bunker-busters suitable for use against Iran's nuclear facilities.
Had any of that happened, it's just possible that Iran's leaders might have hesitated before moving ahead with their bloody crackdown and, in hesitating, given Iran's democratic opposition the opening it needed to sustain itself. But it didn't happen. In those critical June days, as the regime wobbled, the Obama administration opted to ease the regime's fears instead of multiplying them. And instead of creating leverage for himself, the president conceded it preemptively in hopes of currying favor for a nuclear deal.
A year on, we are living with the consequences of his failure. The hoped-for nuclear deal never materialized. The "sanctions with bite" that the administration promised turn out, on close inspection, to have no bite. The international consensus—as well as the consensus in the U.S. foreign policy establishment—is shifting away from the view that Iran must not be allowed to get nuclear weapons to the idea that a nuclear Iran can be "contained." The regime is more emboldened than ever—and much closer to a nuclear capability. Israel, the one country that might yet take action, is more isolated than ever.
Worst of all, the Green movement is, if not extinguished completely, little more than a flickering ember. The three million Iranians who marched for freedom last June may have to wait another generation for a similar opportunity.
I realize this view is disputed by those who believe that Iranian people power can assert itself again. Writing in these pages Saturday, Michael Ledeen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies described signs of mass discontent and regime weakness. "Sooner or later there will be a showdown, most likely sooner," Mr. Ledeen wrote. "The regime is riven by internal conflict, and some of the past heroes of the Islamic Republic are openly siding with the Greens."
I hope Mr. Ledeen is right. But I doubt it. If mass discontent alone were sufficient to topple a regime, Stalin and Mao would not have died in their beds, and Cuba, Burma and North Korea would be free countries today. And if regime factionalism were evidence of an impending fall, the Soviet Union should not have survived long past Khrushchev's feud with Beria, or Brezhnev's with Khrushchev. But it did...